

Web Appendix to: “What’s in a Line? Is Partition the Solution to Civil War?”
Nicholas Sambanis and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl
Yale University

This document includes detailed coding notes and empirical results that are mentioned but not presented in our paper. The supplement is organized in six sections. Section 1 provides a detailed discussion of issues that arise in the coding of partitions. Section 2 discusses the complexities of coding war recurrence and presents results from our analysis using different datasets and different coding of war recurrence. Section 3 has a detailed replication of Chapman and Roeder’s (2007) analysis. Section 4 includes robustness tests for our analysis. Section 5 includes balance statistics and further discussion of matching estimates of the effects of partition. Section 6 includes results from survival models that estimate the effect of partition in the longer term

1. Coding Partitions

The list of war-related partitions since 1945 is small. The following are cases that most scholars would agree are cases of *de facto* or *de jure* partition that *resulted from civil war*: *de facto* partition in Nagorno-Karabakh, following civil war between Armenians and Azeris ending in 1994 with a truce/stalemate; *de facto* partition of the northern part of Cyprus, forming the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1974; declaration of independence by Eritrea in 1993 after a civil war against the Ethiopian government since 1974 (with the war ending in 1991, two years prior to Eritrean independence); *de facto* partitions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, following civil wars against the government of Georgia ending in stalemate; *de facto* partition of Trans-Dniestria from Moldova following a short civil war in 1991; declaration of independence by Bangladesh, after successful secessionist war against the government of Pakistan in 1971; *de facto* partition of the Republic of Chechnya in 1996, overturned in a second war with Russia from 1999-2001; *de facto* partition of Taiwan, separating from China in 1947 when Chinese nationalists flee to the island following their defeat in the Chinese civil war; declaration of independence by Croatia in 1991 following secessionist war against Serb-controlled Yugoslavia; *de facto* partition of Kosovo following a short civil war against Serbia in 1999 (the partition was recognized by major powers in 2008); declaration of independence by Somaliland in 1991 during civil war and state collapse in Somalia. Table A1 includes these 12 cases.

Several other cases may be included, though they require more discussion. The list of partitions in Table A1 excludes some cases that Sambanis (2000) and Kaufman (1996, 1998) have coded as partitions and includes others that Chapman and Roeder (2007) do not code. We briefly explain coding differences here, focusing on differences from Sambanis (2000), since that is the most inclusive list. Below, we first review the general parameters for the inclusion of a partition in our list. Next we discuss criteria for

excluding a partition from strict versions of the variable. In some such cases, partition happened following violent conflict, meeting the core part of our definition of partition, but the conflict itself may not meet all the coding criteria for civil wars. In other cases, partition happened before the civil war, causing the civil war, or during the war. In other cases, partition may happen during the war. Finally, in one case (Northern Iraq), the nature of the partition makes the coding ambiguous, as the separation of forces on the ground and the status of the “partitioned” territory in question may not have been sufficient to rise to the level of a partition.

Table A.1: “Strict” List of Partitions, 1945-1999

Country	Partition	Year War Started	Year War Ended
Azerbaijan	Nagorno-Karabakh	1991	1994
China	Taiwan	1946	1949
Cyprus	Northern Cyprus	1974	1974
Ethiopia	Eritrea	1974	1991
Georgia	South Ossetia	1991	1992
Georgia	Abkhazia	1992	1994
Moldova	Transdnistria	1991	1992
Pakistan	Bangladesh	1971	1971
Russia	Chechnya	1994	1996
Somalia	Somaliland	1988	1991
Yugoslavia	Croatia	1991	1991
Yugoslavia	Kosovo	1998	1999

One source of differences across lists is that some authors focus on externally-imposed partitions rather than all territorial adjustments following civil war (which is our concept of partition). In our analysis, we do not preserve this distinction between internationally-arbitrated partition and other cases since it is not clear that agreement by warring sides to separate or international intervention to partition countries ever takes place without consideration of the likelihood of military victory by one side. So, we code all cases of partition that are the result of civil war, combining cases of partition and secession in Kaufman’s list.¹ Kaufman (1998), for example, defines partitions as “separations jointly decided upon by the responsible powers: either agreed between the two sides (and not under pressure of imminent military victory by one side), or imposed on both sides by a stronger third party . . . [and he defines] secessions as new states created by the unilateral action of a rebellious ethnic group.”² However, this narrow

¹ Most scholars use the broad definition. See Horowitz (1985), Heraclides (1991). It might be that cases of border adjustment following civil wars (secessions or partitions) that are endorsed by the international community are more stable.

² See Kaufmann (1998, 125, fn. 21). In Kaufman (1996, 160), Abkhazia is classified as a case of “autonomy,” which is under outcomes “other than partition.” In Kaufman (1998, 126) this is a case of secession.

definition would exclude some cases that were actually included in Kaufmann's list, such as Cyprus, which Kaufmann correctly —though for the wrong reasons— classifies as a *de facto* partition (Kaufman 1998). The 1974 partition of Cyprus was neither the outcome of an agreement between the parties nor an imposition by a third party (Turkey). It was the result of military victory by one side in an internationalized civil war.³

Consistent with our view of partition as a violent border redefinition, Sambanis (2000) combined cases of partitions and secessions from Kaufmann's two articles and added cases from other studies. He included cases where there was secession, followed by war over that secession, but not necessarily a new secession or partition as a result of that war.⁴ Out of 125 cases of civil war in the dataset, Sambanis coded 21 war-related partitions in Azerbaijan, Yugoslavia (Bosnia and 2 cases in Croatia), China, Cyprus (2 cases), Ethiopia, Georgia (2 cases), India (3 cases), Israel, Korea, Moldova, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, Tajikistan, and Vietnam.⁵

We drop several cases from Sambanis's (2000) list. Our concern is that the partition in question may not meet our core concept of partition as a violent redefinition of a border (or a prior partition line) and that not all cases of war on that list meet the definition of a civil war. Due to the first issue, we drop Tajikistan from the list. While the war in Tajikistan does meet all criteria for coding a civil war and while Tajikistan was partitioned from the USSR and a civil war ensued (from 1992 to 1997), Tajikistan's secession from the Soviet Union was peaceful.⁶

Next, we drop two cases of partition-related war that because we recode the conflicts as inter-state wars: the Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir in 1965 and the Korean War in 1953.⁷ Some datasets code a war and partition in Israel in 1947.⁸ Although this is also included as a civil war-related partition by Chapman and Roeder (2007), this is an ambiguous case of civil war. Most armed conflict datasets do not code a civil war in Israel in that period. In 1947 the state of Israel was created from the partition of British Palestine into the Jewish state of Israel and the accession to Jordan and Egypt of the Arab

³ Turkey is the third party that makes this case compatible with Kaufman's description of the partition of Cyprus as externally-imposed. But it is well known to scholars of the Cyprus problem that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots constituted a single party in the conflict (cite some sources here). The 1974 war was an inter-state war but also a civil war between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

⁴ This allowed a test of the stability of war-induced partitions and including cases where partition happened before the civil war were not coded as "failed" partitions unless there was war recurrence after the end of the first war. For example, Bosnia declared independence in 1992, starting a war that lasted until 1995. Following the end of that war, there was no war recurrence (see Sambanis 2000 for coding details).

⁵ One might argue that the real number of partitions is actually smaller, since several of them are associated with the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia. This issue was controlled in the analysis by clustering on country (so wars arising in former Yugoslavia were clustered together as were wars in the former USSR).

⁶ This case had been included because it was a case of a partition followed by civil war, similar to Bosnia and other such cases. In 1994 in Tajikistan, during the civil war, the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region was recognized, but we exclude autonomy cases from our lists of *de facto* partitions.

⁷ Some datasets classify these as civil wars. Both cases appear in Licklider's (1995) list of civil wars, for example. But according to our coding rules, there was no significant civil war component.

⁸ This case was included in Sambanis's list because the partition of Palestine was one of the main cases of partition in Kaufman (1998, 126). Violence within Israel due to the first Intifada is also included in Kaufman (1996) with "autonomy" as the outcome.

areas of British Palestine. Since violence ensued and the partition was not finalized until the end of the war in 1949, this might be considered as an internal armed conflict though it is unclear if violence rose to the level of civil war. Thus, we have dropped it from the civil war dataset. We have added one new case of civil war in Israel for the first Intifada (1987-1997; with another case, the second Intifada, starting after the end of the analysis period in 1999). Both cases are low-intensity conflicts and might thus be dropped from the civil war list on that basis (indeed, many civil war datasets do not include them).⁹ It is not clear if *de facto* partition or regional autonomy should be coded as the outcome to the first Intifada. Despite the implementation of Palestinian self-rule on the local level and the creation of the Palestinian Authority under the 1993 Oslo Accords, Israel still had effective control of the West Bank and Gaza as evidenced by military operations in those areas. We therefore do not consider there to have been a *de facto* partition in the first case, but rather a form of regional autonomy. The Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in September 2005, combined with Palestinian self-government, allows us to code a *de facto* partition in the second case. While on multiple occasions Israeli troops have used air and artillery strikes against targets in the Gaza Strip, or re-entered the territory and conducted operations, including large-scale ones in the spring of 2008,¹⁰ these operations simply indicate that the *de facto* partition has not so far resulted in amelioration of the conflict.

Additionally, the Israeli/Palestinian cases might be excluded because the wars may be considered extra-state or inter-state wars due to the occupation of the territories in question. One prominent ambiguous case of this nature is Namibia's partition from South Africa. Although a substantial civil war took place in Namibia, ending with Namibia's independence in 1989, the case is not included in most civil war datasets because Namibia was not an internationally recognized state when the violence started.¹¹ While South Africa had a territorial claim on Namibia, the territory was not officially a part of South Africa when the civil war started as Namibia was under international trusteeship. Our civil war dataset includes this case, but notes this ambiguity. The international status of the country complicates further the coding of partition, since the international mandate on Namibia meant that it was officially broken off from South Africa *before* the civil war started. Nonetheless, the case might be included because the violence was effectively over secession from South Africa and resulted in independence.¹²

⁹ The death toll in the first Intifada may be slightly below the threshold of a civil war. These cases are sometimes classified as extra-state or inter-state wars since the West Bank and Gaza are occupied territories. Fearon (2004b) and Walter (2004) code no civil war in Israel. See Sambanis (2004) for a discussion of why such cases are included in the dataset.

¹⁰ See BBC (2005), Haughey (2005), Myre (2006), BBC (2006), Witte (2008).

¹¹ For example, Fearon (2004b) and Walter (2004) do not include this case in their datasets.

¹² Namibia separated from South Africa in 1990, at the end of a civil war that was fought partly by proxies of the South African government. South Africa did not have legitimate authority over the territory. The League of Nations had given a mandate in 1920 to South Africa to govern the territory of South West Africa, but the UN General Assembly denied South African requests to annex the territory in 1946. Namibia came under international trusteeship and violence started in 1965, leading to a civil war from 1973-1989. Because South Africa did not relinquish *de facto* control until 1990, we could code a partition at the end of the civil war.

There are other such cases, for example East Timor/Indonesia, or the conflict between POLISARIO and the Moroccan government over control of Western Sahara. If these cases are included as civil wars, then the partitions should be coded.

In the Western Saharan case, which is typically not coded as a partition, the conflict began once it became clear that Spain would give up its control over the territory. Western Sahara ended up being split between Morocco and Mauritania, and the Sahrawi inhabitants (represented by Polisario) fought both these states for control of the territory, forcing Mauritania to withdraw from its portion of Western Sahara in 1979 (see Hodges 1983, Zartman 2007). The war was fought to a standstill. By 1981, the Moroccan government had driven the Polisario out of a large portion of the territory, and built a defensive berm (a roughly 2,000-km long sand wall) to separate the two sides and consolidate its territorial gains. The other side of the berm comprises about 15% of Western Sahara as a whole, and is governed by the Polisario as the Sahrawi Arab Republic. The construction of the wall marks the start of partition. Fighting continued until a 1991 cease fire that led to the deployment of UN peacekeepers (MINURSO). We include this case in the “lenient” partition list, but drop it from the version of the variable that excludes partitions that happened before/during the war.

Assuming the conflict itself fully meets the criteria for coding a civil war, a second issue is the timing of the partition itself. Sambanis (2000) codes two civil wars in Croatia with partition coded in each case. The first case refers to the war between the secessionist republic of Croatia and Serbian-dominated Yugoslavian state in 1991. The second case refers to the war between the Croatian state and secessionist Serb in the Krajina region of Croatia. The first case resulted in Croatia’s partition. The second case was coded as a partition in accordance with the coding rule that partitioned states would be coded even if the war resulted from those partitions. The question is, therefore, how do we deal with such cases?

In our dataset, the first Croatian war ends with the successful secession of Croatia (a case of partition). Croatia first declared independence from Yugoslavia on June 25, 1991, but under a cease-fire agreement brokered by the European Community at the beginning of July suspended independence for a three-month period with the Brioni Accord signed on July 7, 1991 (Hanson 2000, 85). No states officially recognized Croatia until the end of 1991, Iceland doing so on December 20 and Germany on December 23, although negotiations during that period culminated in the official European Community recognition of Croatia in mid-January 1992 (UPI 1991; Buric 1991).¹³ On May 22, 1992, Croatia joined the United Nations.¹⁴ The fighting between Croatian forces and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and its ethnic Serbian allies in Croatia is separable from the second war in Croatia for the secession of the ethnically Serbian Krajina region. Croatia signed a cease-fire with the JNA on January 3, 1992, effectively marking the end of the JNA’s war over Croatia’s secession (Cigar 1997: 34).

¹³ Germany established “formal ties” with Croatia on January 15, 1992, but in a letter to Croatian President Tudjman on December 23 granted official recognition. Additionally prior to that, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had already recognized Croatia. (See St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1991).

¹⁴ A/RES/46/238.

In our dataset, the war is coded as ending in “rebel victory” in December 1991 with the first international recognitions of Croatia as an independent state. The Croatia-JNA agreement paved the way for the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops, and despite some violations, represented the basis of the conclusion of the war. The JNA completed withdrawing all its forces from Croatian territory by October 20, 1992 (Burns 1992). Croatia’s victory in seceding from Yugoslavia, particularly after the Croatian government was internationally recognized, marks a clear separation between this war and the Krajina Serb’s war of secession against the Croatian government, as “continuing armed conflict against a new government implies a new civil war” (Sambanis 2004: 830).¹⁵

The second case corresponds to the war between Krajina Serbs, who wanted to secede from Croatia, and the Croatian government. Though the Yugoslav army assisted Krajina Serbs, the tables turned in the second war, with Serbs trying to secede from Croatia rather than Croatia’s trying to secede from Yugoslavia. The war from 1992 to 1995 is also clearly separable from the first in terms of the combatants. Whatever assistance the JNA may have provided the Krajina Serbs, the war was fought between their local units, organized as the Army of Serbian Krajina (VSK) and the Croatian Army (see Vego 1993; Cigar 2004: 513). Lower-level armed conflict started in 1992 and 1993

¹⁵ The change in government criterion is important to highlight due to other authors’ coding of the wars in Croatia. Johnson (2008:155), for example, does not count a partition of Croatia in 1992 “because of the difficulty of categorizing it as a war end.” In support of this, he notes ongoing hostilities between “Yugoslavian/Serb and Croatian forces” including “the Serb siege of Dubrovnik and the Croat siege of Bihać,” and fighting between the Croatian army and the army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, giving the examples of operations in Maslenica and Zadar in January 1993 and in the Medak Pocket in September 1993, as well as the Croatian army’s Operation Flash in May 1995. Of the fighting that took place during this period, only fighting between the VSK and the Croatian army can reasonably be considered to represent a possible continuation of the 1991. However, the international recognition of the Croatian government represents an end to the war of secession. If casualty thresholds were met in the fighting between the JNA and the Croatian army after this point, we might code this as a new war. However, it would qualify as an international war, rather than an internal one (the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia considered the war after October 8, 1991 to be an international conflict, even before the distinct we are making of the international recognition of the Croatian government (Cited in Bjelajac and Žunec 2007, 13). It is also not clear whether the fighting between the JNA and the Croatian army following Croatia’s recognition can be considered a war in its on right in terms of casualty thresholds. The siege of Dubrovnik, for example, is particularly well documented, following an extensive field study by the United Nations. According to the UN, “possibly as many as 88” civilians were killed between September 1991 and the end of December 1992.” Most of the civilian casualties came in the fall of 1991, with approximately 20 civilian casualties in the year between December 1991 and 1992 ((S/1994/674/Add.2 [Vol. V, Annex IX.A]). Local officials are cited in a journalistic account as estimating 180 combined military and civilian casualties for the duration of the siege (LeBor and Evans 1992). The later engagements cited by Johnson (2008) were between the Croatian army and the VSK, as we discuss above. Again, because of the victory of the Croatian government in its secession from Yugoslavia, these cannot be considered part of an ongoing war from 1991 (Johnson’s ad hoc recoding of Croatia is strange given that he uses Sambanis’ (2000) dataset, which uses the change in government criterion to code an end to the original war and the start of a new one). The fighting in Bihać cited by Johnson did not even take place on the territory of Croatia, but was part of Croatia’s participation in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, any assistance that the JNA gave the VSK during the period does not imply that the war at this point was an international war and thus, setting aside the criterion of a change in government, part of the original war between the JNA and the Croatian government. As Sambanis (2004:829) emphasizes, “external involvement and recruitment [in addition to the actions of local insurgents] need not imply that the war is not intrastate.”

(see coding notes from Sambanis 2004 for details on the coding of start and end dates for this conflict; Špegelj 2001, the Croatian Minister of Defense before the first war started also provides a detailed description of the Croatian Army's operations in this period). Violence was low intensity for most of that period, rising to the level of civil war in 1995. Krajina Serbs were not successful in separating from Croatia. Thus, this case is excluded from our "strict" list of partitions, which only includes cases where partition was the outcome of the war.¹⁶

A war-related partition was coded in Vietnam by Sambanis (2000) consistent with the decision to include violent partitions even if they preceded the war. Vietnam was partitioned into North and South Vietnam in 1954 during the Indochinese war, which led to the civil war in Vietnam in 1960. The country was reunified at the end of that war and the war was heavily internationalized after 1965. Accordingly, this case appears in our inclusive list of partitions but is excluded from our list when pre-war partitions are dropped.

Bosnia is included in Kaufmann's (1998, 126) list of partitions, so it was also included in Sambanis (2000) and in Chapman and Roeder (2007). It is, however, an ambiguous case. While the war happened *in order to* partition Bosnia from Yugoslavia, Bosnia was effectively recognized by the international community before the violence reached the level of a civil war in 1992 and then the war continued until 1995, with reunification with Serbia never being an option. So, the partition of Bosnia could be considered as having started the war. The war coded in our dataset took place between Bosnian Muslims and Serb and Croat groups fighting over control of Bosnian territory and over Serb aspirations to secede from Bosnia. Thus, while Bosnia was clearly a case of war-related partition, there was no *new* partition that resulted from that war and so it is excluded from the first version of our partition variable though we included it in the second, broader list of partitions. Alternatively, some authors consider the pattern of ethnic separation within Bosnia since the Dayton Accords as a *de facto* partition (see Downes 2004). With that understanding of the case, one could include this as a case of *de facto* partition resulting from the war, so it is included in our lenient partition list. However, once we exclude pre-war partitions from a version of our list, Bosnia is dropped.

India presents at least two interesting complications. The partition of India is a frequently cited case in the partition literature. It is included in Sambanis (2000) and Chapman and Roeder (2007) and Sambanis also includes a second observation of partition-related civil war in coding the 1989 Kashmir war. The first of these two cases – the 1947 partition—is ambiguous because most datasets do not code a civil war in India related to the partition of 1947. We do code a civil war from 1946 to 1948 corresponding to the violence that took place within India largely *as the result* of the partition. That

¹⁶ If a line of partition is established in one war and the line is redrawn in a new war, both cases could be coded (as in Cyprus, where the 1964-67 partition line was redrawn and expanded following the 1974 invasion). In India/Kashmir, by contrast, the second Kashmir war should be coded as a case of no new partition. In a version of the partition variable that identifies all partitioned countries (regardless of when the civil war-related partition took place, these cases could be included.

violence is usually coded as inter-communal ethnic violence rather than civil war.¹⁷ Thus, partition *preceded* the start of the violence, and so if it is included it must be coded as a war-related partition, but not as a partition that *resulted from* the civil war or a partition that *ended* the violence. This is how this case was coded in Sambanis (2000) and the case of the war in Kashmir follows the same logic and is similarly ambiguous: the civil war corresponds to a flare up in the recurrent conflict over Kashmir between Kashmiri Hindus and Muslims, but the line of demarcation in Kashmir did not change as a result of the war. Thus, although these cases could be included as war-related partitions (or wars in partitioned states where the violence is about partition), the actual partition preceded the start of the war in both cases. Including them would help assess questions about the stability of ends to civil wars that are about partition.¹⁸

Iraq in 1991 (war against the Kurds) was included in Sambanis (2000) as a civil war-related partition, following Kaufman. This case is ambiguous not only because of the timing of partition (the civil war as coded in the dataset lasted from 1985 until 1996), but also because there was neither an internationally recognized state nor a functionally autonomous state in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1991. The territory and its population would have been within reach of the Iraqi military had it not been for the U.S.-enforced no-fly zone.¹⁹ Nonetheless, the same argument (about external protection offered to the separatist state) might apply to several other cases of *de facto* partition (e.g. the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus). Since Kurdish armed groups did control territory in northern Iraq despite continued fighting with the Iraqi government until 1996, we could include this case. We do not include, however, the 1991 uprising by the Shia in southern Iraq. Despite a no-fly zone, the Iraqi government was better able to wage war against the rebels, who were driven into the marshes of southern Iraq and thereafter able only to conduct guerrilla operations against government troops without holding territory.²⁰ Since we recognize the ambiguities discussed above, we propose a more inclusive list of partitions – this “lenient” (inclusive) list appears as Table A.2 below (*part2* in our dataset).

Table A.2: “Inclusive” List of Partitions (*part2*)

Country	Partition	Year War Started	Year War Ended
Azerbaijan	Nagorno-Karabakh	1991	1994

¹⁷ See coding notes in Sambanis (2004a) for a discussion of why the case was included in the dataset.

¹⁸ These coding problems only arise in the version of the dataset where each war is a separate observation. In a panel dataset, where each county is observed annually, the timing of partition can be coded when it occurs, along with any subsequent changes to the partition line.

¹⁹ Kaufman (1996, 160) codes this as a *de facto* partition. This case offers a good illustration of how rules about the coding of war termination might affect inferences about the short-term peacebuilding effects of partition. Kaufman (1998, 126) codes the Kurdish war as ending in 1991 with the date of partition of Iraqi Kurdistan. However, Saddam Hussein’s regime continued to fight the Kurds until about 1996. Coding an end to the war in 1991 would imply that there was war recurrence in this case, despite the partition.

According to my coding rules, this war is coded as ending in 1996, after which there is a period of peace.

²⁰ For details on the differences between these two conflicts in Iraq following the institution of the no-fly zones, see, e.g. Goldstein (1992:12, 22).

Bosnia	Secession from Yugoslavia	1992	1995
China	Taiwan	1946	1949
Cyprus	Northern Cyprus	1963	1967
Cyprus	Northern Cyprus	1974	1974
Ethiopia	Eritrea	1974	1991
Georgia	South Ossetia	1991	1992
Georgia	Abkhazia	1992	1994
India	Pakistan	1946	1948
India	Kashmir	1989	.
Indonesia	East Timor	1975	1999
Iraq	Kurdistan	1985	1996
Israel	Palestinian Territories ²¹	2000	.
Moldova	Transdnistria	1991	1992
Morocco	Western Sahara	1975	1991
Pakistan	Bangladesh	1971	1971
Russia	Chechnya	1994	1996
Somalia	Somaliland	1988	1991
South Africa	Namibia ²²	1973	1989
Vietnam	North Vietnam	1960	1975
Yugoslavia	Croatia	1991	1991
Yugoslavia	Kosovo	1998	1999

In our analysis we construct alternative versions of the partition variable by dropping sub-groups from this inclusive list (like *de facto* partitions, or partitions that preceded the war or happened early in the war. The alternative versions of the inclusive partition list are created as follows: Starting with the list of partitions in Table A.2 (*part2*), we drop all cases of *de facto* partition to create *part3* (Table A.3).

A.3: Inclusive List of Partitions, excluding cases of *de facto* partition (*part3*)

Country	Partition	Year War Started	Year War Ended
Bosnia	Secession from Yugoslavia	1992	1995
China	Taiwan	1946	1949
Ethiopia	Eritrea	1974	1991
India	Pakistan	1946	1948
India	Kashmir	1989	.
Indonesia	East Timor	1975	1999
Pakistan	Bangladesh	1971	1971
South Africa	Namibia	1973	1989
Vietnam	North Vietnam	1960	1975
Yugoslavia	Croatia	1991	1991

²¹ This is dropped from the analysis because the war starts after the end of the time period in our dataset.

²² In the dataset, this is listed under Namibia.

Next, starting again from the inclusive list from Table A.2, drop all cases of partitions that took place prior to the beginning of the war itself (*part4*). These are listed in Table A.4). Finally, starting from the inclusive list, drop both *de facto* and the pre-war partitions, creating *part5* (Table A.5). The resulting lists of partitions are presented below.

A.4: Inclusive List of Partitions, excluding violent partition that happened before the war (*part4*)

Country	Partition	Year War Started	Year War Ended
Azerbaijan	Nagorno-Karabakh	1991	1994
China	Taiwan	1946	1949
Cyprus ²³	Northern Cyprus	1963	1967
Cyprus	Northern Cyprus	1974	1974
Ethiopia	Eritrea	1974	1991
Georgia	South Ossetia	1991	1992
Georgia	Abkhazia	1992	1994
Indonesia	East Timor	1975	1999
Iraq	Kurdistan	1985	1996
Israel	Palestinian Territories	2000	.
Moldova	Transdnistria	1991	1992
Morocco	Western Sahara	1975	1991
Pakistan	Bangladesh	1971	1971
Russia	Chechnya	1994	1996
Somalia	Somaliland	1988	1991
South Africa	Namibia	1973	1989
Yugoslavia	Croatia	1991	1991
Yugoslavia	Kosovo	1998	1999

A.5 Inclusive List of Partitions, excluding *de facto* cases and pre-war cases (*part5*)

Country	Partition	Year War Started	Year War Ended
China	Taiwan	1946	1949

²³ The earlier partition is included because it happened early in the war (1964), but not prior to the war. After 1964 there was a lull in the fighting and the partition expanded (with more Turkish Cypriots moving to the defensible enclaves) and more violence took place in 1967. This sequence of events is coded as a single civil war from 1963 to 1967.

Ethiopia	Eritrea	1974	1991
Indonesia	East Timor ²⁴	1975	1999
Pakistan	Bangladesh	1971	1971
South Africa	Namibia	1973	1989
Yugoslavia	Croatia	1991	1991

A sixth list of partitions can be coded, including only those cases that achieved very high levels of separation of the populations of the warring groups. These are cases of “complete” partition in Carter Johnson’s (2008) analysis. Johnson (2008) measures the degree of ethnic separation due to the partition by subtracting the share of residual minorities in the new state from the share of minority population in the pre-war state, dividing by the share of the minority population in the pre-war state. He identifies six cases of “complete” partition—that is, cases with very high degree of post-partition ethnic homogeneity—out of Sambanis’s (2000) list of civil wars and partitions. The list therefore does not correspond exactly to the wars in our dataset, and Indonesia/East Timor might also be added since it seems to conform to his coding rules as a complete partition. Johnson’s (2008) argument about complete partitions follows the logic of the security dilemma and makes no distinction between *de jure* and *de facto* partitions. All partitions other than the ones on his list (see Table A.6) are considered “incomplete.” We therefore use a sixth variable, *part6*, to capture complete partitions, equal to 1 for all of the complete partitions in Table A.6 below (Johnson’s list) and for East Timor.

A.6: Complete versus Incomplete Partitions (Johnson 2008)

Country (Partition)	Complete Partition?
Azerbaijan (Nagorno Karabakh)	Yes
Bosnia	No
Cyprus (1963)	No
Cyprus (1974)	Yes
Ethiopia (Eritrea)	Yes
Georgia (Abkhazia)	Yes
Georgia (Ossetia)	Yes
India (Kashmir 1965)	No
India (Kashmir 1989)	No
India (Pakistan)	No
Israel (partition from Palestine)	No
Moldova	No
Pakistan (Bangladesh)	Yes
Russia (Chechnya)	No
Somalia	No
Yugoslavia (Croatia)	No

²⁴ This case is coded as *de facto* partition in other datasets.

Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	No
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This discussion describes the cases coded under each of the six different lists of partition used in our analysis. We now turn to a discussion of how we code war recurrence.

A.7: Alternate Partition Variables and Short-Term War/Violence Indicators; All Civil Wars, 1945-1999

Short-Term War Recurrence

	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2
Part3	0.203 [1.383]			
Part4		0.171 [1.025]		
Part5			0.05 [1.473]	
Part6				1.588 [1.240]
Ethnic war (<i>ewars1</i>)	1.423 [0.598]*	1.419 [0.603]*	1.427 [0.586]*	1.439 [0.609]*
Dead/ displaced (<i>logcost</i>)	-0.331 [0.187]+	-0.329 [0.182]+	-0.324 [0.183]+	-0.36 [0.193]+
Factions (<i>factnum</i>)	-0.09 [0.137]	-0.093 [0.138]	-0.093 [0.138]	-0.058 [0.139]
Peacekeepers (<i>anypko</i>)	-0.527 [0.715]	-0.547 [0.760]	-0.516 [0.724]	-0.696 [0.730]
Peace treaty (<i>treaty</i>)	0.548 [0.615]	0.568 [0.672]	0.528 [0.619]	0.778 [0.681]
Primary comm (<i>isxp2</i>)	-2.302 [0.908]*	-2.328 [0.905]*	-2.357 [0.891]**	-2.388 [0.973]*
Ethnic fraction. (<i>ef</i>)	-2.82 [1.447]+	-2.788 [1.347]*	-2.764 [1.394]*	-2.882 [1.153]*
Pre-war GDP (<i>lnmaddpre_i</i>)	0.817 [0.467]+	0.799 [0.519]	0.823 [0.474]+	0.79 [0.464]+
Post-war growth (<i>imaddgro</i>)	0.136 [0.046]**	0.137 [0.047]**	0.136 [0.046]**	0.145 [0.049]**
Constant	1.799 [3.674]	1.902 [4.058]	1.686 [3.684]	2.212 [3.632]
Observations	127	127	127	127
χ^2	29.88**	28.24**	29.43**	28.06**
Pseudo-R ²	0.3547	0.3547	0.3544	0.3685

Logit regression, Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

A.7 Continued:

Short-Term War Recurrence, Alternate Version

	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2
Part3	0.439 [1.159]			
Part4		0.53 [0.788]		
Part5			0.165 [1.252]	
Part6				0.392 [1.210]
Ethnic war (<i>ewars1</i>)	0.679 [0.567]	0.674 [0.570]	0.689 [0.573]	0.673 [0.569]
Dead/ displaced (<i>logcost</i>)	-0.256 [0.173]	-0.257 [0.169]	-0.244 [0.169]	-0.248 [0.171]
Factions (<i>factnum</i>)	-0.146 [0.173]	-0.152 [0.168]	-0.154 [0.169]	-0.148 [0.173]
Peacekeepers (<i>anypko</i>)	0.28 [0.690]	0.193 [0.753]	0.297 [0.697]	0.259 [0.730]
Peace treaty (<i>treaty</i>)	0.325 [0.620]	0.402 [0.664]	0.284 [0.612]	0.332 [0.649]
Primary comm (<i>isxp2</i>)	-2.953 [0.733]**	-3.006 [0.802]**	-3.049 [0.758]**	-3.094 [0.815]**
Ethnic fraction. (<i>ef</i>)	-2.595 [1.430]+	-2.544 [1.392]+	-2.499 [1.386]+	-2.476 [1.353]+
Pre-war GDP (<i>lnmaddpre_i</i>)	0.764 [0.280]**	0.703 [0.304]*	0.766 [0.284]**	0.757 [0.288]**
Post-war growth (<i>imaddgro</i>)	0.112 [0.032]**	0.116 [0.034]**	0.112 [0.032]**	0.114 [0.033]**
Constant	0.852 [2.962]	1.264 [3.107]	0.706 [2.950]	0.781 [2.987]
Observations	127	127	127	127
χ^2	36.35**	35.71**	35.53**	36.46**
Pseudo-R ²	0.3005	0.3018	0.2993	0.3001

Logit regression, Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

A.7 Continued

No Short-Term Residual Violence

	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01
Part3	1.89 [1.206]			
Part4		1.137 [0.775]		
Part5			1.518 [1.263]	
Part6				2.775 [1.158]*
Ethnic war (<i>ewars1</i>)	0.853 [0.478]+	0.787 [0.506]	0.871 [0.478]+	0.747 [0.468]
Dead/ displaced (<i>logcost</i>)	-0.249 [0.110]*	-0.223 [0.113]*	-0.225 [0.110]*	-0.237 [0.110]*
Factions (<i>factnum</i>)	-0.25 [0.150]+	-0.256 [0.151]+	-0.259 [0.148]+	-0.24 [0.168]
Peacekeepers (<i>anypko</i>)	1.571 [0.526]**	1.392 [0.541]*	1.581 [0.511]**	1.431 [0.504]**
Peace treaty (<i>treaty</i>)	0.722 [0.531]	0.772 [0.583]	0.632 [0.504]	0.865 [0.514]+
Primary comm (<i>isxp2</i>)	-2.059 [0.781]**	-2.447 [0.891]**	-2.234 [0.826]**	-2.605 [1.008]**
Ethnic fraction. (<i>ef</i>)	-2.384 [0.786]**	-2.101 [0.801]**	-2.243 [0.804]**	-2.129 [0.822]**
Pre-war GDP (<i>lnmaddpre_i</i>)	0.212 [0.282]	0.08 [0.319]	0.194 [0.278]	0.144 [0.297]
Post-war growth (<i>imaddgro</i>)	0.068 [0.026]**	0.075 [0.025]**	0.069 [0.025]**	0.079 [0.026]**
Constant	2.565 [2.498]	3.188 [2.821]	2.461 [2.496]	2.854 [2.635]
Observations	127	127	127	127
χ^2	34.32**	32.99**	34.24**	40.10**
Pseudo-R ²	0.2376	0.2267	0.2271	0.2510

Logit regression, Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

A.8: Alternate Partition Variables and Short-Term War/Violence Indicators; Ethnic Civil Wars, 1945-1999

Short-Term War Recurrence

	Norecur2	Norecur2	Norecur2	Norecur2
Part3	10.3 [6.643]			
Part4		1.112 [1.466]		
Part5			10.371 [6.524]	
Part6				0.622 [1.982]
Dead/displaced (logcost)	-5.233 [3.596]	-1.277 [0.627]*	-5.284 [3.481]	-1.217 [0.669]+
Factions (<i>factnum</i>)	-0.057 [0.607]	-0.296 [0.317]	-0.063 [0.604]	-0.211 [0.240]
Peacekeepers (<i>anypko</i>)	-16.99 [10.168]+	-5.153 [1.613]**	-17.172 [9.734]+	-5.081 [1.672]**
Peace treaty (<i>treaty</i>)	-3.134 [2.997]	-0.202 [1.304]	-3.193 [2.854]	-0.406 [1.293]
Primary comm.. (<i>isxp2</i>)	13.487 [10.213]	1.481 [2.563]	13.62 [9.934]	1.336 [2.701]
Ethnic fraction. (<i>ef</i>)	-37.318 [19.532]+	-15.338 [6.630]*	-37.589 [19.016]*	-14.585 [6.559]*
Pre-war GDP (<i>lnmaddpre_i</i>)	8.929 [5.601]	2.72 [1.182]*	9.021 [5.381]+	2.793 [1.280]*
Post-war growth (<i>imaddgro</i>)	1.131 [0.705]	0.394 [0.126]**	1.142 [0.679]+	0.367 [0.105]**
Constant	44.909 [31.265]	14.162 [9.657]	45.294 [30.562]	12.299 [9.551]
Observations	80	80	80	80
χ^2	14.58	36.26**	16.13+	39.76**
Pseudo-R ²	0.7465	0.6606	0.7464	0.6556

Logit regression, Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

A.8 Continued

Short-Term War Recurrence, Alternate Version

	Norecur2_v2	Norecur2_v2	Norecur2_v2	Norecur2_v2
Part3	0.406 [1.353]			
Part4		-0.066 [1.170]		
Part5			-0.015 [1.444]	
Part6				-0.232 [1.363]
Dead/displaced (logcost)	-0.28 [0.207]	-0.253 [0.199]	-0.255 [0.199]	-0.247 [0.198]
Factions (<i>factnum</i>)	-0.186 [0.287]	-0.195 [0.274]	-0.196 [0.276]	-0.204 [0.280]
Peacekeepers (<i>anypk0</i>)	-0.991 [1.085]	-0.973 [1.091]	-0.978 [1.088]	-0.968 [1.092]
Peace treaty (<i>treaty</i>)	0.228 [0.855]	0.136 [0.861]	0.155 [0.797]	0.109 [0.832]
Primary comm.. (<i>isxp2</i>)	-1.716 [0.744]*	-1.851 [0.725]*	-1.847 [0.714]**	-1.84 [0.745]*
Ethnic fraction. (<i>ef</i>)	-4.418 [2.739]	-4.155 [2.430]+	-4.164 [2.540]	-4.196 [2.409]+
Pre-war GDP (<i>lnmaddpre_i</i>)	1.411 [0.489]**	1.43 [0.580]*	1.419 [0.498]**	1.43 [0.518]**
Post-war growth (<i>imaddgro</i>)	0.122 [0.048]*	0.118 [0.048]*	0.119 [0.048]*	0.118 [0.045]**
Constant	-1.19 [4.053]	-1.677 [4.531]	-1.582 [3.973]	-1.678 [3.996]
Observations	80	80	80	80
χ^2	28.97**	27.02**	29.45**	26.52**
Pseudo-R ²	0.3555	0.3539	0.3539	0.3544

Logit regression, Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

A.8 Continued

No Short-Term Residual Violence

	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01
Part3	2.621 [1.420]+			
Part4		1.624 [0.991]		
Part5			2.118 [1.453]	
Part6				2.633 [0.936]**
Dead/displaced (logcost)	-0.069 [0.155]	-0.02 [0.156]	-0.024 [0.155]	-0.041 [0.155]
Factions (factnum)	-0.373 [0.243]	-0.432 [0.273]	-0.402 [0.244]+	-0.355 [0.254]
Peacekeepers (anypko)	1.12 [0.612]+	0.718 [0.699]	1.076 [0.593]+	0.982 [0.594]+
Peace treaty (treaty)	0.852 [0.697]	1.063 [0.918]	0.722 [0.660]	0.973 [0.656]
Primary comm.. (isxp2)	-2.023 [1.215]+	-2.61 [1.473]+	-2.28 [1.281]+	-2.898 [1.690]+
Ethnic fraction. (ef)	-2.29 [1.206]+	-1.482 [1.248]	-1.896 [1.230]	-1.363 [1.232]
Pre-war GDP (lnmaddpre_i)	0.61 [0.335]+	0.456 [0.365]	0.591 [0.329]+	0.534 [0.340]
Post-war growth (imaddgro)	0.062 [0.027]*	0.069 [0.027]*	0.059 [0.025]*	0.07 [0.029]*
Constant	-1.7 [3.340]	-1.388 [3.501]	-2.061 [3.333]	-1.952 [3.267]
Observations	80	80	80	80
χ^2	20.55*	15.03+	19.13*	20.72*
Pseudo-R ²	0.2114	0.1928	0.1914	0.2137

Logit regression, Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

2. Coding War Recurrence

We use Sambanis's (2004) list of civil wars as our starting point. Our dependent variable (*norecur2*) is defined as war recurrence within two years of the war's end. This is coded 1 if there was no new war within the two years following the end of the conflict in question; and 0 otherwise.

A version of this variable is included in Doyle and Sambanis (2006), but we extend the coding of outcomes to 2001 so that we do not have to drop cases where the war ends in 1999 (no new civil wars that started after 1999 are included) and we make a few coding changes that we discuss below.²⁵ Coding differences with Doyle and Sambanis (2006) are explained in comments embedded in the dataset.

In our paper, we discuss the complexity of coding war recurrence, as coding must reflect a judgment about which wars are new and different and which represent a return to violence over a pre-existing conflict. We have identified a number of potentially ambiguous cases and recode them in a second version of the dependent variable (*norecur2_v2*) that we use in our analysis to check robustness. Recoding reflects different assumptions about which wars are new as opposed to recurrences of old wars; and in a few cases it reflects ambiguity about the precise start or end date of these wars, or levels of violence following the termination of a civil war. We discuss cases that are recoded in the second version of our dependent variable below.

We also code war recurrence on a 5-year period following the end of a given conflict (*norecur5*). This is coded exactly as *norecur2*, except that the period of peace after the conflict must extend at least five years out in order for now war recurrence to be coded. We also code a 5-year version of the second version of the dependent variable (*norecur5_v2*).

Part of the reason for the coding ambiguity in the cases that we discuss below is that there are substantial differences between lists of civil wars in the literature (see Sambanis 2004 for a discussion). These differences are partly the result of conceptual disagreement about what counts as a civil war, but also lack of precise information for the coding of different events. One source of differences is that our list of civil wars sometimes disaggregates cases into more than one event when other lists combine events

²⁵ The relevant variable in Doyle and Sambanis's (2006) dataset is *warend2_v2*. We drop all ongoing wars in our analysis (some were included in theirs, if significant peace processes had started and ended almost immediately; those cases were identified in their dataset as *dataset=2, 8*). Doyle and Sambanis wanted to capture failures of peace processes leading to immediate war resumption after peace operations were deployed, so they included some cases where war was ongoing at the end of 1999. For example, Sierra Leone is included even though the war was ongoing at the end of their analysis period (December 1999), because they wanted to capture the failure of the UN peacekeepers to end the conflict after deployment in July 1998. Since we are concerned with assessing postwar outcomes of partitions, we drop this and other such cases (there are only four such changes). We include Angola/Cabinda, which they had not coded because the peace process started on the last month of the dataset. We recode Congo-Brazzaville and Uganda/LRA as no war recurrences (there was return to violence two years after the end of the war, but violence levels are likely lower than civil war). As in their dataset, we exclude the civil wars in the former USSR because they started before 1945.

in one longer civil war (e.g. we code three wars in Afghanistan from 1978-2001, whereas most other lists code one or two wars; we code a recurrence of war in Rwanda after the failure of the Arusha Accords in 1993, whereas Fearon (2004b) codes a single war in Rwanda from 1990 all the way to the end of the 1990s). This coding rule has substantive implications for studies of the consequences of different civil war *outcomes*. If, for example, rebel victories (of which partitions are a subset) lead to renewed fighting within a few months, and we treat this as a continuation of war and not as a new civil war start following rebel victory, then our coding rule would be deleting cases of rebel victories that immediately collapse into renewed war. The coding rule proposed by Sambanis (2004) tries to capture these cases, which is why we use it our starting point for our analysis.

Because coded war starts and ends are often very different across datasets, it is also not clear in some cases if violence that takes place after the end of a war in our dataset represents the start of a new war or just lower-level violence. Precise data on annual deaths and levels of armed conflict by year is usually not available to adjudicate all potentially ambiguous cases. It is because of such uncertainty that we recode a few cases of war recurrence from Doyle and Sambanis (2006).

We discuss coding issues and coding changes in detail because differences across civil war lists can be consequential for the analysis of the effects of partition, given the small number of partitions. For example, our dataset includes a civil war in India that refers to the Hindu-Muslim violence *following* the territorial partition from 1947-1949. The partition of India was not the result of that war; it preceded the war. This case is actually not coded as a civil war in many datasets, but it is included in Sambanis (2004) as a potentially ambiguous case of civil war (see dataset; variable *ambig* identifies those cases that might be questionable with respect to any of the coding criteria for civil war). We code this as a case of a failure of partition to achieve peace (but, per our discussion in appendix A, drop this case in using *part4*). Kaufman and others consider the partition of India a good case for partition theory, arguing that the peace does not fail until the start of either the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir, or the 1989 intra-Kashmiri war between Hindus and Muslims.

The two versions of our dependent variable (*norecur2*, *norecur2_v2*) differ with respect to the following cases:

Table B.1: War Recurrence Versions A and B, 2 years

Country	Conflict	Year Start	Year End	War Recurrence	
				<i>Version A</i>	<i>Version B</i>
Angola	UNITA	1992	1994	No	Yes
China	PLA vs. KMT	1946	1949	Yes	No
Ethiopia	Ogaden, Somalis	1976	1988	No	Yes
Indonesia	OPM (West Papua)	1976	1978	No	Yes
Iran	Revolution	1978	1979	No	Yes

Korea	Yosu Rebellion	1948	1949	No	Yes
Pakistan	Bangladesh secession	1971	1971	No	Yes
Uganda	Kony (pre-LRA)	1990	1992	No	Yes
Zimbabwe	ZANU, ZAPU	1972	1979	No	Yes

The rationale for recoding is explained in comments embedded in the dataset, but a brief mention of some cases is instructive. Following the war between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists, we initially code a “recurrence” (*norecur2* = 0) because of the war of re-annexation of Tibet in 1951. In the second version of the dependent variable (*norecur2_v2*), this is recoded as no recurrence, under the assumption that the conflicts are not sufficiently linked. Another such case is the Iranian Revolution, which is initially coded as having no war recurrence. We recode it as a recurrence of war (*norecur2_v2*=0) under the assumption that there is a connection between the change in regime following the revolution and the outbreak of the Kurdish rebellion in 1979.

In a few other cases (Indonesia, Uganda, Ethiopia), we recode outcomes because of new violent conflicts following war termination and uncertainty about the level of violence or the precise end of the previous conflict (or the start of the next one). In all such cases, at least one other major dataset codes a longer war than we do, hence the question regarding the precise end point of the first war.

Table B.2, below, verifies that the results for partition in the war recurrence models in Tables 3 and 4 of our article do not change if we use 5-year versions of the dependent variables.

Table B.2: Partition, Longer-Term War Recurrence (5 years)

	All Civil Wars, 1945-1999				Ethnic Civil Wars, 1945-1999			
	norecur5	norecur5_v2	norecur5	norecur5_v2	norecur5	norecur5_v2	norecur5	norecur5_v2
part	-0.626 [0.714]	-1.093 [0.721]			-1.132 [0.707]	-1.265 [0.810]		
part2			0.262 [0.727]	0.005 [0.679]			0.241 [0.862]	0.243 [0.858]
Ethnic war	-0.041 [0.508]	-0.008 [0.439]	-0.04 [0.504]	-0.037 [0.431]				
logcost	-0.142 [0.134]	-0.157 [0.101]	-0.172 [0.131]	-0.184 [0.099]+	-0.107 [0.154]	-0.053 [0.131]	-0.164 [0.147]	-0.111 [0.130]
factnum	-0.346 [0.138]*	-0.272 [0.113]*	-0.325 [0.138]*	-0.242 [0.117]*	-0.511 [0.218]*	-0.373 [0.169]*	-0.477 [0.227]*	-0.331 [0.184]+
anypko	1.263 [0.712]+	1.673 [0.575]**	1.187 [0.767]	1.539 [0.584]**	0.755 [0.856]	1.054 [0.724]	0.749 [0.925]	0.971 [0.735]
treaty	-1.172 [0.610]+	-0.524 [0.482]	-0.994 [0.670]	-0.35 [0.499]	-1.38 [0.671]*	-0.834 [0.558]	-1.042 [0.786]	-0.518 [0.623]
isxp2	-2.698 [0.886]**	-3.769 [1.056]**	-2.601 [0.960]**	-3.687 [1.063]**	-2.331 [0.772]**	-3.19 [1.032]**	-2.257 [0.884]*	-3.17 [1.063]**
ethnic fraction.	-1.414 [1.066]	-0.977 [0.864]	-1.455 [1.074]	-0.956 [0.842]	0.167 [1.574]	-0.989 [1.243]	-0.007 [1.566]	-1.089 [1.230]
pre-war GDP	0.621 [0.333]+	0.723 [0.294]*	0.546 [0.330]+	0.619 [0.285]*	1.037 [0.419]*	0.896 [0.371]*	0.864 [0.390]*	0.708 [0.349]*
Post-war Growth	0.047 [0.025]+	0.065 [0.020]**	0.051 [0.025]*	0.074 [0.021]**	0.022 [0.024]	0.045 [0.026]+	0.033 [0.026]	0.062 [0.029]*
Constant	0.911 [3.002]	-1.025 [2.462]	1.603 [2.981]	-0.202 [2.457]	-2.719 [4.079]	-2.907 [3.518]	-1.18 [3.755]	-1.278 [3.301]
χ^2	38.89**	40.91**	38.08**	43.65**	39.11**	33.08**	31.31**	27.94**
Pseudo-R ²	0.2231	0.2388	0.2203	0.2281	0.2430	0.2166	0.2306	0.2002
Observations	127	127	127	127	80	80	80	80

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

As an additional robustness check, we code two new variables based on two new concepts of war recurrence. We code 2-year and 5-year versions of these variables and take the dates of the wars in our dataset as fixed (so no case is recoded from *norecur2* because of ambiguity over the level of violence following a war and all recoded cases reflect different assumptions about connections between sequential events of war).

The first variable (*issend2_v2*) codes whether a war recurred within the period in question over the same issues as the first war. The second, conceptually broader, variable (*rend2*) codes whether another war occurred or was on-going in the period on the territory of the state in which the first war occurred (or, in the case of a partition, on the territory of either of the two resulting states). This captures recurrence any time the country (or partitioned countries) has another civil war, even if the parties are different. For consistency, all cases in which the original recurrence variables are coded missing are also coded missing for these additional variables.

In order to code whether the issues were the same in the original war and the one that followed, we divide wars into two types – wars fought for control over the government and wars fought for autonomy or secession.²⁶ Wars fought for control of the government are defined as recurring if within the period in question another war for control over the central government takes place, so separatist wars are excluded.²⁷ Wars of autonomy or secession are defined as recurring *only* if another war for the secession and autonomy of the same region take place or the same (ethnic) groups are involved in war (so, rebellions to capture the center in the secessionist region are excluded as are rebellions for autonomy or secession from the region in question if they do not involve reunification with the rump state).²⁸

An example of a case where we code a war recurrence within two years due to the *territorial* criterion is East Pakistan's secession from Pakistan in 1971 to form Bangladesh, which was followed by a civil war in Baluchistan in the Pakistani rump state in 1973. This fits our definition of this type of recurrence (*rend2* = 0) as new war anywhere in the territory of the state in which the original war took place (including any of the partitioned remnants – rump or secessionist states – created from that state).²⁹ The

²⁶ In some instances, a rebel group in a war for autonomy or secession may still try to depose the central government, but in these types of wars this is only a tactical step, a means of achieving autonomy or secession.

²⁷ If the first war results in a partition, war recurrence would be coded if there was a war over control of the central government of the partitioned region; or if there was another war over capture of the central government of the rump state.

²⁸ If the first war leads to partition, recurrence can occur if the same region that seceded is engaged in a new secessionist war with a minority group in the secessionist region trying to re-unite with the rump state; or if the rump state attempts to recapture the secessionist region. Since in the case of de jure partition, "recapturing" can only take the form of inter-state war, we code recurrence if there is such a war (only Korea qualifies for the two-year version of this variable, with a recurrence coded after the Yosu rebellion at the start of the Korean war in 1950). Ethiopia/Eritrea is another such case that would be captured by a longer time threshold in this outcome variable.

²⁹ The coding of the five-year version of this variable is even more straightforward, because starting in 1974 there was also another civil war in Bangladesh (the Chittagong Hills conflict) in addition to the Baluchistan conflict in Pakistan. Thus, civil war recurred in both the rump and secessionist states.

logic is that potential rebels are likely to base their demands and actions on their observations of the government's past actions in dealing with threats to its rule. At the same time, the government may also factor past history into its decision-making. An interview with a Baluch rebel leader, Mir Hazar, at the end of the war suggests that the secession of East Pakistan in 1971 had the potential to serve as a guide: "In the beginning the Bengalis didn't want independence, but if Pakistan continues to use force to crush us, we'll have no alternative but to go that way."³⁰ It is not clear the extent to which the secession of East Pakistan encouraged Baluch rebels to attempt their own secession or increase their demands for autonomy. However, particularly in the year between that event and the beginning of the war in Baluchistan saw the formation of more radical Baluch organizations. Two examples are the World Baluchi Organization and the Baluch Wana, both of which "insist[ed] on creating a unified, independent and sovereign Baluchi nation" (Ziring 1974:64).³¹ From the side of the government, the actions taken toward Baluchistan can also be linked East Pakistan's secession.³² For example, the counter-insurgency against the Baluchi rebels provided an opportunity for the Pakistani army to re-establish its credibility after losing the war in East Pakistan (see Akhtar 2007, 75)

Importantly the beginning of the civil war in Baluchistan was also understood through the frame of Bangladesh. The central government took control of the province from its elected provincial government following the discovery of an arms cache at the Iraqi Embassy in 1973, which it alleged was intended for use by Baluch rebels. The discovery of the arms cache is widely viewed as the precipitating incident of the war. The government's actions may have led the rebels to opt for an immediate rebellion rather than face a potentially more difficult environment for one in the future. The government's action could be seen as one in a series of many including the war over East Pakistan's secession. When read through the lens of the East Pakistan secession, it allowed greater certainty that the government was unwilling to respond to greater demands for autonomy for Baluchistan (see Khan 2003).³³

Table B.3 presents a list of the cases in which the coding of war recurrence with respect to the *same issues* differs from the first version of our dependent variable that we use for the analysis in the paper for a two-year period following the end of the conflict (*norecur2*). Table B.4 then looks at these differences for war recurrence with respect to the same territory.

³⁰ Quoted in Harrison (1978:139)

³¹ Schmid and Jongman (2005:635-637) also provide a description of Baluch political organizations and rebel groups, and their agendas.

³² Interestingly, the connection between the two also precedes the secession. In an attempt to regain control over East Pakistan as unrest in the province grew, President Yahya Khan replaced the governor of the region with General Tikka Khan, who previously "had brutally repressed separatist movements in Baluchistan" (Bhattacharya 2002:54). Khan later became known in Bangladesh as the Butcher of Bengal for his role in the war over secession.

³³ Khan (2003:291) describes the view of the situation that one politician from the province held years later: "After the Pakistani establishment's refusal to accept the will of the people in East Bengal (Bangladesh) in 1971, the dismissal of the nationalist government in Balochistan was the second time that it violated the principle of representative rule."

Table B.3: Alternate Coding of War Recurrence, Same Issues, 2 years

Country	Conflict	Year Start	Year End	War Recurrence	
				Same Issues	<i>Version A</i>
China	PLA vs. KMT	1946	1949	No	Yes
Georgia	South Ossetia	1991	1992	No	Yes
Iraq	Shammar	1959	1959	No	Yes
Korea	Yosu Rebellion	1948	1949	Yes	No
Myanmar/Burma	Karen Rebellion 1	1948	1951	No	Yes
Myanmar/Burma	Communist Insurgency	1948	1988	No	Yes

Table B.4: Alternate Coding of War Recurrence, Same Territory, 2 years

Country	Conflict	Year Start	Year End	War Recurrence	
				Same Territory	<i>Version A</i>
Angola	UNITA	1992	1994	Yes	No
Angola	Cabinda; FLEC	1994	1999	Yes	No
Ethiopia	Ogaden; Somalis	1976	1988	Yes	No
India	Sikhs	1984	1993	Yes	No
Indonesia	East Timor	1975	1999	Yes	No
Indonesia	OPM (West Papua)	1976	1978	Yes	No
Indonesia	Aceh	1990	1991	Yes	No
Iran	Khomeini	1978	1979	Yes	No
Iraq	Shiite Uprising	1991	1993	Yes	No
Pakistan	Bangladesh Secession	1971	1971	Yes	No
Philippines	NPA	1972	1992	Yes	No
Sri Lanka	JVP II	1987	1989	Yes	No

Table B.5 below verifies that the results for partition in the war recurrence models in Tables 3 and 4 of our article do not change if we use the same issues dependent variable, for both 2-year and 5-year versions of recurrence. Table B.6 does the same, but with the same territory dependent variable.

Table B.5: Partition, Alternate Versions of War Recurrence - Same Issues (2 and 5 years)

	All Civil Wars, 1945-1999				Ethnic Civil Wars, 1945-1999			
	issend2_v2	issend5_v2	issend2_v2	issend5_v2	issend2_v2	issend5_v2	issend2_v2	issend5_v2
part	-0.122 [0.927]	-0.605 [0.732]			-0.721 [3.153]	-1.132 [0.707]		
part2			0.605 [0.800]	0.22 [0.711]			0.808 [2.217]	0.241 [0.862]
Ethnic war	0.991 [0.624]	-0.045 [0.519]	0.943 [0.636]	-0.043 [0.511]				
logcost	-0.282 [0.172]	-0.173 [0.131]	-0.314 [0.178]+	-0.201 [0.129]	-6.667 [3.218]*	-0.107 [0.154]	-7.094 [2.900]*	-0.164 [0.147]
factnum	-0.15 [0.166]	-0.333 [0.137]*	-0.132 [0.162]	-0.315 [0.139]*	-1.92 [0.851]*	-0.511 [0.218]*	-2.018 [0.934]*	-0.477 [0.227]*
anypko	-0.182 [0.746]	1.264 [0.748]+	-0.289 [0.772]	1.202 [0.800]	-16.713 [7.632]*	0.755 [0.856]	-17.436 [7.423]*	0.749 [0.925]
treaty	-0.384 [0.675]	-1.178 [0.639]+	-0.192 [0.690]	-1.019 [0.696]	-3.568 [1.563]*	-1.38 [0.671]*	-3.024 [1.825]+	-1.042 [0.786]
isxp2	-2.747 [1.169]*	-2.932 [0.911]**	-2.505 [1.256]*	-2.854 [0.979]**	8.429 [5.684]	-2.331 [0.772]**	9.199 [4.779]+	-2.257 [0.884]*
Ethnic fract.	-2.312 [2.069]	-0.888 [1.174]	-2.535 [2.157]	-0.928 [1.179]	-31.444 [14.184]*	0.167 [1.574]	-33.621 [13.077]*	-0.007 [1.566]
pre-war GDP	1.014 [0.524]+	0.763 [0.324]*	0.923 [0.518]+	0.692 [0.319]*	10.154 [4.228]*	1.037 [0.419]*	10.499 [4.086]*	0.864 [0.390]*
Post-war growth	0.13 [0.043]**	0.049 [0.023]*	0.134 [0.045]**	0.053 [0.024]*	0.971 [0.418]*	0.022 [0.024]	1.041 [0.365]**	0.033 [0.026]
Constant	0.604 [4.844]	-0.042 [3.219]	1.54 [4.988]	0.612 [3.174]	62.165 [31.527]*	-2.719 [4.079]	67.077 [27.914]*	-1.18 [3.755]
χ^2	45.12**	42.47**	44.11**	39.93**				
Pseudo-R ²	0.3597	0.2311	0.3629	0.2283				
Obs	127	127	127	127	80	80	80	80

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table B.6: Partition, Alternate Versions of War Recurrence - Same Territory (2 and 5 years)

	All Civil Wars, 1945-1999				Ethnic Civil Wars, 1945-1999			
	rend2	rend5	rend2	rend5	rend2	rend5	rend2	rend5
part	-0.075 [1.025]	-0.746 [0.701]			-0.244 [1.325]	-0.881 [0.791]		
part2			0.5 [0.845]	-0.094 [0.667]			0.718 [0.942]	-0.004 [0.782]
ethnic war	0.939 [0.535]+	0.019 [0.438]	0.901 [0.518]+	0.002 [0.431]				
logcost	-0.356 [0.147]*	-0.202 [0.108]+	-0.38 [0.140]**	-0.216 [0.112]+	-0.248 [0.165]	-0.048 [0.120]	-0.323 [0.170]+	-0.08 [0.134]
factnum	0.069 [0.190]	-0.191 [0.127]	0.08 [0.182]	-0.174 [0.125]	0.044 [0.140]	-0.295 [0.167]+	0.071 [0.144]	-0.27 [0.172]
anypko	-0.023 [0.514]	1.439 [0.554]**	-0.147 [0.584]	1.374 [0.564]*	-1.402 [0.907]	0.836 [0.664]	-1.492 [0.905]+	0.81 [0.689]
treaty	0.99 [0.556]+	-0.193 [0.497]	1.155 [0.584]*	-0.1 [0.493]	0.701 [0.910]	-0.53 [0.616]	1.073 [0.928]	-0.36 [0.623]
isxp2	-4.359 [1.266]**	-3.536 [0.991]**	-4.269 [1.266]**	-3.506 [0.995]**	-3.834 [1.194]**	-3.084 [0.951]**	-3.675 [1.254]**	-3.09 [0.973]**
ethnic fract.	-3.013 [0.999]**	-1.74 [0.829]*	-3.113 [0.987]**	-1.718 [0.815]*	-5.621 [1.715]**	-1.407 [1.262]	-5.985 [1.733]**	-1.457 [1.247]
pre-war GDP	0.61 [0.365]+	0.524 [0.274]+	0.539 [0.345]	0.461 [0.269]+	1.242 [0.716]+	0.743 [0.363]*	1.112 [0.617]+	0.633 [0.335]+
Post-war growth	0.104 [0.026]**	0.06 [0.020]**	0.108 [0.026]**	0.065 [0.020]**	0.12 [0.040]**	0.043 [0.024]+	0.135 [0.041]**	0.053 [0.025]*
Constant	2.48 [2.437]	0.897 [2.206]	3.203 [2.395]	1.371 [2.324]	-0.087 [4.172]	-2.096 [3.178]	1.549 [3.739]	-1.159 [3.157]
χ^2	37.61**	35.77**	41.47**	37.32**	20.73*	28.55**	20.95*	26.45**
Pseudo-R ²	0.3237	0.2239	0.3263	0.2188	0.3975	0.1800	0.4017	0.1712
Obs	127	127	127	127	80	80	80	80

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

As a final robustness check we code war recurrence using different datasets of civil wars. We compute peace duration variables using Fearon’s (2004b) data and Walter’s (2004) list of “repeat” wars. The list of civil wars in Walter’s article is different (58 wars as compared to our 145 cases). This makes it difficult to make the two lists compatible: for example, if we code a “subsequent” war but she does not, we cannot know if she would have considered this a “repeat” or “new” war, so we follow our coding for non-overlapping cases and change our coding only for cases that are included in both datasets, focusing on her 14 cases of “repeat” wars. If the same war is included in both datasets, we keep our start/end dates and only use Walter’s judgment on whether the war is “repeat” or “new.”³⁴

Using Fearon’s (2004b) list of wars, we code recurrence in the 2 and 5-year period and calculate peace duration in years from the end of the war.³⁵ We focus on the short-term war recurrence outcomes (see below) and use them to check the robustness of results obtained from our dataset. Table B.4 illustrates the results of this coding process by showing the list cases of war recurrence for the two-year version of the variable; it specifies on what basis recurrence is coded by describing the subsequent war(s).

Table B.7: Cases of War Recurrence, 2 years (Based on Fearon 2004b)

Country	Conflict	Dates	Second War (Dates)
<i>Excluding Anti-Colonial</i>			
Afghanistan	Mujahideen	1978-92	Afghanistan, v. Taliban (1992-)
Chad	Rebels in South	1994-98	Chad, Frolinat, Various (1965-)
Colombia	La Violence	1948-62	Colombia, FARC, ELN, etc. (1963-)
DR Congo	AFDL (Kabila)	1996-97	DR Congo, RCD, etc. v. govt (1998-)
Ethiopia	Eritrea, Tigray, etc.	1974-92	Ethopia, Oromo Liberation Front (1992-)
Nicaragua	FSLN	1978-79	Nicaragua, Contras (1981-88)
Somalia	SSDF, SNM (Isaaqs)	1981-91	Somalia, post-Barre war (1991-)
Yugoslavia	Croatia/Krajina	1991-91	Croatia, Krajina (1992-95)
<i>Anti-Colonial (war recurrence on territory of formal colony)</i>			
Belgium	Rwandan Revolution	1956-61	Rwanda, Post-rev strife (1962-65)
France	Algeria	1954-61	Algeria, Kabylie (1962-63)
Portugal	Angola	1961-75	Angola, UNITA (1975-)
Portugal	Mozambique	1964-74	Mozambique, RENAMO (1976-95)
<i>Anti-Colonial (war recurrence on territory of colonial power)</i>			
France	Vietnam	1945-54	France: Morocco (‘53-56), Algeria (‘54-61), Cameroon (‘55-60)
France	Madagascar	1947-48	France: Vietnam (‘45-54)
France	Tunisia	1952-54	France: Morocco (‘53-56), Algeria (‘54-61), Cameroon (‘55-60)
France	Morocco	1953-56	France: Algeria (‘54-61), Cameroon (‘55-60)

³⁴ We only use the Walter dataset in duration analyses, so we do not present short-term war outcomes from that dataset here.

³⁵ We also code peace duration beyond the short-term benchmarks of 2 and 5 years. We count the year the war ended) until 2000 (inclusive), unless another war starts in the country, if that war can be considered a recurrence (we count half of that year as a period of peace, assuming the wars start in the middle of the year). If a war starts in the same year that the previous war ends (e.g. Afghanistan in 1992), we code 0.5 years at peace following the first war. This variable can be used in duration analysis.

France	Cameroon	1955-60	France: Algeria ('54-61)
Portugal	Guinea-Bissau	1962-74	Portugal: Angola ('61-75)

The first version of war recurrence we code from Fearon (2004b), excludes the 13 anti-colonial wars included in Fearon's list (Table B.5). In our next version, we include anti-colonial wars, but have a strict definition of recurrence for them, only considering an anti-colonial war to have recurred if there was a new war in the decolonized state (Table B.6). For example, peace is considered to have failed in the two years following the Rwanda revolution against Belgian rule because of violence rising to the level of civil war after independence. Similarly, a post-independence civil war in Algeria from 1962-63 caused peace to fail after the Algerian War of Independence of 1954-61 successfully separated Algeria from France, even though the new war no longer involved France.

Finally, we use a more lenient definition of recurrence for anti-colonial wars, considering peace to have failed if there was a new or ongoing war on any of the territories of the colonial power in the period (Table B.7). In this version, although peace did not fail in Vietnam following the French Indochina war from 1945-54, the coding must take into account the wars in Algeria starting in 1954 and Cameroon starting in 1955, and the ongoing war in Morocco (1953-6), all against French rule. This results in coding war recurrence against the colonial power.

Table B.8: War Recurrence Outcomes in Fearon's (2004b) list of civil wars (excluding anti-colonial wars)

	Number of Cases	Percent of Total
2 years		
No Recurrence	82	91.11
Recurrence	8	8.89
5 years		
No Recurrence	76	84.44
Recurrence	14	15.56

Table B.9: War Recurrence Outcomes in Fearon's (2004b) list of civil wars (including anti-colonial wars, strict definition of colonial recurrence)

	Number of Cases	Percent of Total
2 years		
No Recurrence	91	88.35
Recurrence	12	11.65
5 years		
No Recurrence	84	81.55
Recurrence	19	18.45

Table B.10: War Recurrence Outcomes in Fearon's (2004b) list of civil wars (including anti-colonial wars, lenient definition of colonial recurrence)

	Number of Cases	Percent of Total
2 years		
No Recurrence	85	82.52
Recurrence	18	17.48
5 years		
No Recurrence	82	79.61
Recurrence	21	20.39

Using these war outcomes, we can conduct an analysis of the effects of partition on war recurrence on Fearon’s data to check the robustness of our results. We also need to code partitions. We coded four partition variables for Fearon’s (2004b) data, using the lists of partitions we had from our dataset, which includes more wars than Fearon’s. The first variable (*part*) excludes anti-colonial wars and codes a strict list of partitions (corresponding to *part* in our data). It contains all of the strict partitions from our dataset except for Georgia – South Ossetia and Kosovo.³⁶ The second variable (*part2*) we code, again excluding anti-colonial wars, is a lenient list of partitions (corresponding to *part2* in our data). The same lenient partitions are coded as in our data, except for the following, which are omitted because the wars are not coded in Fearon: Cyprus 1963-7, Georgia – South Ossetia, India-Pakistan 1946-8, South Africa – Namibia 1973-89, and Kosovo. Next, we include anti-colonial wars, and add all decolonizations as partitions to our strict and lenient lists. This creates a second strict partition variable that includes all the original strict partitions plus all decolonizations (*part3*), and a second lenient partition variable that includes all the original lenient partitions plus all decolonizations (*part4*).

Detailed results from the analysis using Fearon’s data are presented in Tables B.11-B.14 below. Briefly, the main result using Fearon’s (2004b) list of civil wars, is a robust finding that partition has a statistically significant and *negative* effect on the short-term persistence of peace. This is particularly true once we take into account wars of decolonization. Excluding wars of decolonization, strictly defined partition still has this negative effect, but the lenient version of partition has no statistically significant effect at the 5% level (many cases of de facto partition are actually dropped in this dataset, which could explain the difference). We also consider an alternative version of recurrence when examining a definition of partition that includes decolonizations. In Tables B.10 and B.11, Models 5.3.1 and 5.4.1 code recurrence if a civil war subsequently occurred in the relevant time period in any territory of the colonial power in question. Fearon’s dataset also has far fewer cases of recurrence overall as a result of the aggregating of several episodes of civil war that we consider separate. Across all specifications, therefore, we find no evidence that partition helps to prevent the recurrence of war, and we find significant evidence that it has a negative effect on the persistence of peace. Readers can also verify using the master do-file that there is no statistically significant, positive effect of partition on the persistence of peace using a 5-year version of the dependent variable.

³⁶ These wars are not included in Fearon’s dataset, although since Fearon’s data sometimes collapses what are multiple wars in one country in our data into a single observation, Georgia – so South Ossetia may be included in his observation for Georgia – Abkhazia.

Table B.11: Short-Term War Recurrence (2 yrs) using Fearon (2004b), strict partition definition

	Model 1.1	Model 2.1	Model 3.1	Model 4.1	Model 5.1	Model 6.1
Part	-1.861 [0.830]*	-2.401 [0.967]*	-2.718 [1.100]*	-3.239 [1.261]*	-2.655 [1.108]*	-2.717 [1.111]*
Duration		-0.067 [0.055]	-0.063 [0.056]	-0.067 [0.058]	-0.068 [0.057]	-0.072 [0.056]
lagged lgdpn		0.601 [0.395]	0.598 [0.421]	0.771 [0.444]+	0.632 [0.434]	0.693 [0.448]
lagged lpop		0.21 [0.256]	0.241 [0.268]	0.09 [0.315]	0.264 [0.282]	0.256 [0.282]
Ethnic war			0.275 [0.539]	0.496 [0.612]	0.240 [0.545]	0.253 [0.542]
Ethnic fraction			-1.086 [1.602]	-0.558 [1.659]	-0.946 [1.630]	-0.752 [1.639]
Lagged anocracy				-0.486 [0.930]		
Lagged anocracy (China = 1) §					-0.330 [0.892]	
Lagged anocracy (China = 0) §§						-0.651 [0.907]
Constant	2.708 [0.462]**	-2.863 [3.866]	-2.877 [4.026]	-2.819 [4.090]	-3.18 [4.189]	-3.419 [4.229]
Observations	90	88	88	87	88	88
χ^2	4.37*	7.96+	8.54	10.35	8.68	9.07
Pseudo-R ²	0.0809	0.1485	0.1593	0.1938	0.1618	0.1691

Standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

§ China 1946-49 coded anocratic

§§ China 1946-49 coded non-anocratic

Table B.12: Short-Term War Recurrence (2 yrs) using Fearon (2004b), lenient partition definition

	Model 1.2	Model 2.2	Model 3.2	Model 4.2	Model 5.2	Model 6.2
part2	-1.354 [0.799]+	-1.548 [0.868]+	-1.619 [0.919]+	-1.733 [0.955]+	-1.550 [0.923]+	-1.575 [0.919]+
duration		-0.039 [0.053]	-0.036 [0.055]	-0.037 [0.057]	-0.043 [0.056]	-0.044 [0.055]
lagged lgdpen		0.54 [0.393]	0.55 [0.410]	0.643 [0.422]	0.586 [0.422]	0.614 [0.428]
lagged lpop		0.18 [0.254]	0.198 [0.263]	0.122 [0.292]	0.214 [0.271]	0.197 [0.274]
Ethnic war			0.067 [0.492]	0.114 [0.515]	0.025 [0.499]	0.031 [0.495]
Ethnic fraction.			-0.56 [1.479]	-0.161 [1.523]	-0.412 [1.498]	-0.296 [1.515]
Lagged anocracy				-0.494 [0.855]		
Lagged anocracy (China =1) §					-0.395 [0.836]	
Lagged anocracy (China=0)§§						-0.56 [0.845]
Constant	2.653 [0.463]**	-2.471 [3.833]	-2.541 [3.917]	-2.471 [3.959]	-2.724 [4.030]	-2.736 [4.037]
Observations	90	88	88	87	88	88
χ^2	2.57	4.99	5.14	5.98	5.36	5.58
Pseudo-R ²	0.0476	0.0932	0.0959	0.1118	0.1000	0.1042

Standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

§ China 1946-49 coded anocratic

§§ China 1946-49 coded non-anocratic

Table B.13: Short-Term War Recurrence (2 yrs) using Fearon (2004b), strict partition definition, decolonizations included

	Model 1.3	Model 5.3	Model 5.3.1
Part3	-1.881 [0.647]**	-3.126 [1.066]**	-3.612 [0.966]**
Duration		-0.088 [0.052]+	-0.080 [0.051]
lagged lgdpn		0.594 [0.397]	0.402 [0.394]
lagged lpop		0.326 [0.251]	0.126 [0.226]
Ethnic		0.163 [0.515]	-0.058 [0.486]
Ethnic fraction.		-0.968 [1.487]	-0.018 [1.437]
Lagged anocracy (China 1946-49 coded anocratic)		0.065 [0.760]	0.479 [0.727]
Constant	2.708 [0.462]**	-3.380 [3.634]	-0.695 [3.505]
χ^2	8.47**	14.83*	30.35**
Pseudo-R ²	0.1142	0.2013	0.3206
Observations	103	101	101

Standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table B.14: Short-Term War Recurrence (2 yrs) using Fearon (2004b), lenient partition definition, decolonizations included

	Model 1.4	Model 5.4	Model 5.4.1
Part4	-1.603 [0.638]*	-1.959 [0.811]*	-2.448 [0.722]**
Duration		-0.055 [0.048]	-0.034 [0.046]
lagged lgdpn		0.438 [0.367]	0.179 [0.346]
lagged lpop		0.258 [0.240]	0.059 [0.206]
Ethnic war		-0.115 [0.459]	-0.301 [0.434]
Ethnic fraction.		-0.014 [1.287]	1.045 [1.253]
Lagged anocracy (China 1946-49 coded anocratic)		0.068 [0.725]	0.404 [0.684]
Constant	2.653 [0.463]**	-2.287 [3.450]	0.821 [3.261]
Observations	103	101	101
χ^2	6.36*	9.84	23.39**
Pseudo-R ²	0.0858	0.1336	0.2471

Standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

3. Replication of Chapman and Roeder (2007)

List of civil wars analyzed

In the discussion below, we refer to the Sambanis (2000) dataset as the “original” dataset and the Chapman and Roeder (2007) dataset as the “new” dataset.

In the original dataset, cases were included if the civil war had ended by 1997 since outcomes had to be evaluated at least 2 years after the end of the war. A few cases where the war was ongoing were included if significant peace initiative had started and failed immediately, but those cases were dropped in robustness checks (Sambanis 2000, 444). An example is Somalia, where a peace transition can be coded at the time of the UN intervention in the early 1990s; another example is Angola, with peace treaties signed in 1994 and 1997, etc. In none of those cases was there a partition and dropping those cases in robustness tests did not affect the results (the main result was no significant association between partition and war recurrence).

Chapman and Roeder (2007, 683) describe their modifications to the original civil war list: they drop all ongoing wars and all cases of “non-ethnic” wars because they “do not involve disputes over competing nation-state projects” and add two wars that started and ended after 1997 (Kosovo 1998-1999 and Chechnya 1999-2001, with the peace coded as “surviving” after the Kosovo war and failing after the Chechnya war).

We checked if making these changes to the original dataset gives us the same list of 72 civil wars used by Chapman and Roeder (2007) in their regression analysis (results presented in Table 3 in their article). These modifications result in a list of 74 cases, excluding the two new cases they added:

* Use the replication dataset from Sambanis (2000):

```
. use C:\MyDocuments\Partition&War\partition_replication
```

```
* Drop ongoing war cases:
```

```
. drop if yrend==.
```

```
(8 observations deleted)
```

```
* Drop "non-ethnic" war cases:
```

```
. drop if wartype==0
```

```
(45 observations deleted)
```

```
* Check war outcomes in this new list of civil wars:
```

```
. tab warend2
```

Has the war ended for 2 years?	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
No	16	21.62	21.62
Yes	58	78.38	100.00
Total	74	100.00	

Chapman and Roeder's dataset was created by making a number of *ad hoc* coding changes to the original dataset. To recreate their dataset from the original dataset, we must make the following changes:

First drop the following wars that were "ongoing" in Sambanis (2000): Angola (92-ong); Burundi (91-ong); Somalia (92-ong); Sri Lanka Tamils; Sudan (83-).

Second, include Afghanistan, which was an "ongoing war" in Sambanis (2000), coding an end in 2001. The defeat of the Taliban by the USA in 2001 could be coded as an end to the civil war according to civil war coding rules in Sambanis (2004), so this coding change is not controversial. However, a precise definition of coding criteria is needed to justify inclusion. Continued violence in Afghanistan after 2001 would result in a coding of ongoing war (no war termination in 2001) according to some coding rules (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003). Many datasets do not code an end to the war when there is a change in government due to military defeat if that defeat is followed by a near immediate resumption of war. This coding decision has important consequences for the evaluation of the stability of different war outcomes as it removes from consideration cases with near immediate return to war. We discuss this point more in the paper with reference to Croatia and in the appendix on the complexities of coding war recurrence.

Third, drop Turkey. This case should be included (if Afghanistan is included with an end in 2001, the Kurdish war in Turkey should be included as it ended in 1999). That war was coded as ongoing in the original dataset (only wars ending by 1997 were included). The Kurdish war ended in 1999 with the capture of Kurdish leader Ocalan and subsequent termination of hostilities (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). This is a case of an ethnic/separatist war that should have been included in the analysis. Minor skirmishes re-started several years later and a war might be coded in 2007-08. This is a case of no partition and no war recurrence within two years of the war's end.

Fourth, drop a number of wars that had ended by 1997 and were coded as "ethnic" in the original dataset: Congo/Zaire (1996-1997); Egypt (1992-1996); India/Kashmir (1989-1994); Indonesia (1986); Philippines (1972-1996). These cases should have been included. Among them are secessionist wars and wars characterized by ethnic violence. Two clear cases of separatist war that are dropped are the conflict between the Moro Islamic Liberation front and the Philippine government as well as the conflict between Muslim and Hindu separatists in Kashmir. These cases might have been dropped in the new dataset according to new coding criteria set by Chapman and Roeder, but these criteria are unclear. It is unlikely that these cases were recoded as non-ethnic wars, since no other case of "ethnic" war in the original dataset was recoded as "nonethnic" in the new dataset even though several cases are ambiguous and might be recoded.

Thus, to reproduce the list of cases used in Chapman and Roeder's Table 1 from the original dataset (Sambanis 2000), add Kosovo (98-99) and Chechnya (99-01) and make the following changes to the dataset:

```
drop if wartype==0
```

```

drop if ccode=="ANG2"
drop if ccode=="BUR4"
drop if ccode=="SOM2"
drop if ccode=="SRI2"
drop if ccode=="SUD2"
drop if ccode=="TUR"
drop if ccode=="ZAI5"
drop if ccode=="EGY"
drop if ccode=="IND3"
drop if ccode=="IDN5"
drop if ccode=="PHL3"

```

Dependent variable

Sambanis (2000) coded two types of outcomes relating to violence: *No war recurrence* two years after the war (*warend2*) is coded 1 if there is no new war within two years of the end of the first war; and it is coded 0 if there is a new war. *No residual violence* (*noviol2*) is coded 1 if there is no lower-level armed conflict and no mass-level human rights violations within two years of the end of the first war; and 0 otherwise.

Chapman and Roeder (2007, 683) code two variables to describe “whether the parties avoided reescalating their conflict with one another for at least 2 years after the end of the civil war.” The first variable, *survival of peace* is coded 1 if “there was no renewal of violence during the 2 years.” The second variable, *Extent of peace*, is “a three-level index of the extent of the peace that distinguishes survival of peace with no resumption of violence (*Extent of peace* =2), survival of peace marred by violence short of a civil war (*Extent of peace* =1), and breakdown of the peace with a new civil war (*Extent of peace* = 0).”

Next, we use Chapman and Roeder’s modified dataset to compare the coding of outcomes – war recurrence and residual (lower-level) violence. The relevant comparisons are between *noviol2* (residual violence in the original dataset) and *survival of peace* (in the Chapman and Roeder dataset); and between *warend2* (war recurrence in the original dataset) and *Extent of peace* = 0 in the Chapman and Roeder dataset.

We drop the two new cases added by Chapman and Roeder since these have no corresponding outcomes in the original dataset.

Two-year war outcomes in restricted Sambanis (2000) list:

warend2	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
No	16	22.86	22.86
Yes	54	77.14	100.00
Total	70	100.00	

noviol2	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	39	55.71	55.71
1	31	44.29	100.00

SurvivalofP	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Total	70	100.00	

Two-year war outcomes in Chapman and Roeder (2007)

```
. use C:\MyDocuments\Partition&War\Data\Roeder_repl_test.dta, clear
. tab survivalofpeace if cnumb!=992 & cnumb!=994
```

SurvivalofP	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	40	57.14	57.14
1	30	42.86	100.00
Total	70	100.00	

```
. l cname yearbegin yearend if survivalofpeace==0 & noviol2==1 & cnumb!=992 &
cnumb!=994
```

	cname	yearbegin	yearend
57.	Rwanda	90	94

The case of Rwanda is recoded in the new dataset as a case of violence re-escalation following the end of the war.

While there was clearly no *re-escalation* in Rwanda if we compare levels of violence after 1994 to violence during the civil war and genocide, there was new violence that some code as a new civil war in 1998. The violence took place in border regions due to attacks by groups stationed entirely in territories across the border. While Chapman and Roeder's recoding of this case may be defensible, it is also *ad hoc*.

According to coding notes in the dataset compiled by Doyle and Sambanis (2006), which updates the Sambanis (2000) dataset, a new war may be coded in Rwanda from 1998-1999. This war is not coded by Doyle and Sambanis (2006) because the rebels did not hold any territory in Rwanda and violence was due to cross-border raids by ex-FAR troops stationed across the border. Gleditsch et al (2001) code no violence in Rwanda in 1995, 1996, 1997 and a return to war in 1998. This implies that, assuming that the 1990-94 war can be coded as ending in 1994, *survival of peace* should be coded 1 (i.e. peace lasts) for the 2-year period from 1994-1996. A different coding is seen in other datasets that code ongoing civil war in Rwanda from 1990 until 1999 (see Fearon and Laitin 2003). According to this alternative coding rule, *survival of peace* would again be coded 1 (peace lasts) for the 2 years after the war's end in 1999. Either way, Chapman and Roeder's recoding of the case is inconsistent with the coding rules in these datasets.

Despite these possible objections to the recoding of the Rwanda case, we keep Chapman and Roeder's coding on the basis of information provided by Sambanis (2004), who cites Human Rights Watch reports writing that hundreds, perhaps thousands, of civilians may have been killed in attacks by cross-border groups or by army retaliations since 1995. We note, however, that the information from Human Rights groups is at odds with Gleditsch et al (2002, 626) and Wallensteen and Sollenberg (2001), whose datasets code no internal armed conflict in Rwanda for years 1995- May1997.

A comparison of data on war recurrence in the two datasets reveals no recoding of outcomes of war recurrence from the Sambanis dataset:

```
* In Chapman and Roeder's dataset, generate war recurrence variable
* based on "extentofpeace" to isolate war recurrences
* extent_nowar2 is coded 1 if there was no war recurrence in 2 years:
```

```
. gen extent_nowar2=1 if extentofpeace!=0
(16 missing values generated)
. replace extent_nowar2=0 if extent_nowar2==.
(16 real changes made)

. tab warend2 extent_nowar2
```

warend2	extent_nowar2		Total
	0	1	
0	16	0	16
1	0	54	54
Total	16	54	70

The Table below lists war outcomes across all cases included the two datasets, having filled in Chapman and Roeder's outcomes for the two new cases, Kosovo and Chechnya:

	cname	yrend	warend2	noviol2	surviv~e	extent~e
1.	Afghanistan-Taliban	.	0	0	0	0
2.	Algeria	97	0	0	0	0
3.	Angola	91	0	0	0	0
4.	Azerbaijan	96	1	1	1	2
5.	Bangladesh--Hill	94	1	1	1	2
6.	Burma	82	0	0	0	0
7.	Burma	95	1	0	0	1
8.	Burundi	69	1	0	0	1
9.	Burundi	73	1	1	1	2
10.	Burundi	88	0	0	0	0
11.	Chad	79	0	0	0	0
12.	Chad	94	1	1	1	2
13.	China-Tibet	51	1	0	0	1
14.	China	68	1	0	0	1
15.	Congo/Zaire	65	0	0	0	0

16.	Congo-Kisangani	67	1	1	1	2
17.	Congo-Shabba I&II	79	1	0	0	1
18.	Cyprus	64	0	0	0	0
19.	Cyprus	74	1	1	1	2
20.	Eritrean	91	1	1	1	2

21.	Ethiopia-Ogaden	85	1	0	0	1
22.	Georgia-Abkhazia	93	1	1	1	2
23.	Georgia-Ossetia	94	1	1	1	2
24.	Guatemala	72	0	0	0	0
25.	Guatemala	94	1	1	1	2

26.	India-partition	48	1	1	1	2
27.	India-Kashmir	65	1	0	0	1
28.	India-Sikh	94	1	1	1	2
29.	Indonesia-Mol.	50	0	0	0	0
30.	Indonesia-Dar.	53	0	0	0	0

31.	Indonesia-East Tim.	82	1	0	0	1
32.	Iran	82	1	0	0	1
33.	Iraq-Shammar	59	0	0	0	0
34.	Iraq-Kurds	75	1	0	0	1
35.	Iraq-Kurds	94	1	0	0	1

36.	Iraq-Shiites	94	1	0	0	1
37.	Israel-Palest.	49	0	0	0	0
38.	Jordan	71	1	1	1	2
39.	Kenya	93	1	0	0	1
40.	Lebanon	58	1	1	1	2

41.	Lebanon	78	1	0	0	1
42.	Lebanon	92	1	0	0	1
43.	Mali	95	1	1	1	2
44.	Mexico	94	1	1	1	2
45.	Moldova	94	1	0	0	1

46.	Morocco/WestSah	89	1	1	1	2
47.	Namibia	89	1	1	1	2
48.	Nigeria-Biafra	70	1	1	1	2
49.	Nigeria-Muslim	84	1	0	0	1
50.	Northern Ireland	94	1	1	1	2

51.	Pakistan-Bngl.	71	1	1	1	2
52.	Pakistan-Blch	77	1	0	0	1
53.	Papua NG	91	1	0	0	1
54.	Paraguay	47	1	1	1	2
55.	Russia-Chechnya	96	0	0	0	0

56.	Rwanda	64	1	0	0	1
57.	Rwanda	94	1	1	0	1
58.	Somalia	91	0	0	0	0
59.	South Africa	94	1	1	1	2
60.	Sudan	72	1	1	1	2

61.	Tajikistan	94	1	0	0	1
62.	Thailand-Commun.	85	1	1	1	2
63.	Uganda	66	1	1	1	2
64.	Uganda	86	1	0	0	1
65.	Yugoslavia-Bosnia	95	1	1	1	2

66.	Yugoslavia-Croatia	91	0	0	0	0
67.	Yugoslavia-Croatia	95	1	1	1	2
68.	Zimbabwe/Rhodesia	80	1	0	0	1

69.	Zimbabwe/Rhodesia	84	1	1	1	2
70.	Israel-Palest.	94	1	1	1	2

71.	Kosovo	.	1	1	1	2
72.	Chechnya	.	1	0	0	1

Replication of Results in Table 3 of Chapman and Roeder

We first use their “survival of peace” measure as the dependent variable and then look at war recurrence (which we code as they do in the ordinal measure “extent of the peace”). Sambanis’s war recurrence and residual violence measures have been added to the new dataset that we use below for ease of comparison. War outcomes for the two new cases have also been added as in Chapman and Roeder (2007). There are only 7 cases of partition in these data with only one peace failure. It follows that the results will be very sensitive to recoding any one case of partition or to the addition of cases.³⁷

```
. use "C:\MyDocuments\Partition&War\Data\Roeder_repl_test_varsadded_12_14.dta", clear
. l cname extent if cnumb==992 |cnumb==994
71. | Kosovo          2
72. | Chechnya         1
. replace warend2=1 if cnumb==992
(1 real change made)
. replace warend2=1 if cnumb==994
(1 real change made)
. replace noviol2=1 if cnumb==992
(1 real change made)
. replace noviol2=0 if cnumb==994
(1 real change made)
```

³⁷ Out of the 7 partition cases, only one (Israel-Palestine, 1947-49) is coded as having had a failed peace within two years. They might claim that “Arabs” (not Palestinians) are the relevant group and so escalation of conflict between Israelis and any Arab nation qualifies as peace failure. But if 1967 is the first such war then there should not be a peace failure code for the 2-year outcome following the partition (the same would be true if the 1956 Suez Canal War, mainly between the British and Egyptians, but with Israeli intervention, were counted as the first Arab-Israeli war).

* Model 4, Table 3

```
. probit survivalofpeace partition separation autonomy warduration wardeaths
armedforces gdppercapita peaceoperations, nolog

Probit estimates                                     Number of obs   =           72
                                                    LR chi2(8)      =           22.30
                                                    Prob > chi2     =           0.0044
Log likelihood = -38.061882                          Pseudo R2      =           0.2265
```

survivalof~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
partition	2.433621	.892343	2.73	0.006	.6846613 4.182581
separation	.8188011	.517877	1.58	0.114	-.1962191 1.833821
autonomy	-.3853459	.5922182	-0.65	0.515	-1.546072 .7753805
warduration	.0853505	.029534	2.89	0.004	.0274651 .143236
wardeaths	-.2099618	.0801901	-2.62	0.009	-.3671315 -.0527921
armedforces	-.2713668	.3899972	-0.70	0.487	-1.035747 .4930135
gdppercapita	-.1290906	.0965908	-1.34	0.181	-.318405 .0602238
peaceopera~s	.1531008	.4136802	0.37	0.711	-.6576976 .9638991
_cons	1.783698	.9295461	1.92	0.055	-.0381792 3.605574

The model specification is motivated by a theoretical argument that the effects of partition on postwar peace should be different from the effects of all other institutional outcomes. This justifies separating cases of partition from cases of de facto separation and autonomy. After estimation, we can test if there is an empirical basis for this claim by testing for a significant difference between the coefficients of partition and the other institutional outcomes:

```
. test partition = separation

( 1)  partition - separation = 0

      chi2( 1) =    3.35
      Prob > chi2 =    0.0671

. test partition = autonomy

( 1)  partition - autonomy = 0

      chi2( 1) =    7.27
      Prob > chi2 =    0.0070

. test separation = autonomy

( 1)  separation - autonomy = 0

      chi2( 1) =    2.56
      Prob > chi2 =    0.1097
```

These tests reveal that, even using the same data and model specification that Chapman and Roeder propose, we find no support for their bargaining model as summarized in their Table 2, since we cannot reject at the 95% confidence level the null hypothesis that the effect of

partition is not different from the effect of separations with respect to the survival of the peace; and since there are no statistically significant differences between the effects of separation and autonomy.

Next, we address a serious coding error in the new dataset. Chapman and Roeder include all cases of “ethnic” war from the original dataset, but their theory applies only to wars “over competing nation-state projects.” Even a cursory inspection of the list of included wars makes it clear that only a fraction are actually separatist wars between groups with competing nation-state projects. Not all “ethnic” wars are separatist wars and several cases of “ethnic” war in the original dataset are wars over capture of the central government (an example is the civil war in Angola since 1975).

This is a key point of disjuncture between the main theoretical claim in Chapman and Roeder (2007) and the empirical tests of the theory. The empirical results presented in their article are not based on the correct universe of cases.

Which wars should be included in their analysis? According to our research, only 39 out of the 72 cases they analyze are cases of war over national self-determination or secession. These are wars that meet their coding criteria for war over “competing nation-state” projects. Once the analysis is limited to these cases, partition no longer has a statistically significant effect.

A related point is that classifying cases into “ethnic” and “non-ethnic” wars is complicated. Anywhere from 18 to 31 cases among the “ethnic” wars in the original dataset could be reclassified as non-ethnic depending on the coding rule (see below for more details). Out of the 59 cases of civil war in the original dataset that overlap with Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) list of civil war, 4 are recoded as “non-ethnic” by Fearon and Laitin and 11 are ambiguous.

Next, we show estimates of the effects of partition using Chapman and Roeder’s model while restricting the test to the 39 cases of separatist war in their sample. (Note that, since their sample excludes “non-ethnic” wars, we lose some cases of separatist war since not all separatist wars are ethnic.)

```
use "C:\MyDocuments\Partition&War\Roeder_repl_test_varsadded_12_14.dta", clear

* We code Israel/Palestine as a secessionist war
* We code Mexico and India/Kashmir as secessionist wars according to the logic of the
original dataset, though these cases are dropped in the updated civil war dataset that
we use later.

. replace secession=1 in 37
(1 real change made)
. replace secession=1 in 27
(1 real change made)
. replace secession=1 in 44
(1 real change made)

. drop if secession==0
```

(33 observations deleted)

```
. probit survivalofpeace partition separation autonomy warduration wardeaths
armedforces gdppecapita peaceoperations, nolog
```

```
Probit regression                               Number of obs   =          39
                                                LR chi2(8)      =          13.24
                                                Prob > chi2     =          0.1040
Log likelihood = -20.402177                    Pseudo R2       =          0.2449
```

survivalof~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
partition	1.811478	1.052959	1.72	0.085	-.2522835	3.875239
separation	.565126	.6046954	0.93	0.350	-.6200553	1.750307
autonomy	-.4308478	.7012602	-0.61	0.539	-1.805293	.9435971
warduration	.1018306	.0437259	2.33	0.020	.0161295	.1875317
wardeaths	-.06574	.1056551	-0.62	0.534	-.2728203	.1413403
armedforces	-.1504352	.4674976	-0.32	0.748	-1.066714	.7658433
gdppecapita	-.115038	.1130268	-1.02	0.309	-.3365665	.1064905
peaceopera~s	.3140479	.5548489	0.57	0.571	-.773436	1.401532
_cons	.016264	1.21953	0.01	0.989	-2.37397	2.406498

Partition now does not have a statistically significant correlation to peace survival. In light of the fact that the number of observations is small, we bootstrap the standard errors. We find that the results on partition are not robust as bias-corrected confidence interval is very large and includes zero.

```
. set seed 123456789
```

```
. bs "probit survivalofpeace partition separation autonomy warduration wardeaths
armedforces gdppecapita peaceoperations" _b[partition] _b[separation] _b[autonomy]
_b[warduration] _b[wardeaths] _b[armedforces] _b[gdppecapita] _b[peaceoperations]",
reps(1000)
```

```
command:      probit survivalofpeace partition separation autonomy warduration
wardeaths armedforces gdppecapita peaceoperations
```

```
statistics:  _bs_1      = _b[partition]
              _bs_2      = _b[separation]
              _bs_3      = _b[autonomy]
              _bs_4      = _b[warduration]
              _bs_5      = _b[wardeaths]
              _bs_6      = _b[armedforces]
              _bs_7      = _b[gdppecapita]
              _bs_8      = _b[peaceoperations]
```

note: label truncated to 80 characters

```
Bootstrap statistics                               Number of obs   =          39
                                                Replications    =          1000
```

Variable	Reps	Observed	Bias	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		
_bs_1	621	1.811478	17.60611	174.5962	-341.0601	344.6831	(N)
					-.9054623	105.4897	(P)
					-3.15776	7.744967	(BC)
_bs_2	993	.5651259	14.81634	206.1754	-404.0249	405.1552	(N)

					-1.375847	40.31154	(P)
					-4.162946	5.161525	(BC)
_bs_3	944	-.4308478	-6.831096	236.2538	-464.0748	463.2131	(N)
					-14.92526	4.019797	(P)
					-4.722755	65.97089	(BC)
_bs_4	1000	.1018306	2.811321	52.8773	-103.6615	103.8651	(N)
					-.0041872	5.417905	(P)
					-1.693002	.2431401	(BC)
_bs_5	1000	-.06574	4.077759	152.2211	-298.7755	298.644	(N)
					-1.291267	1.176864	(P)
					-.9538028	1.868696	(BC)
_bs_6	1000	-.1504352	-13.949	136.7656	-268.5313	268.2305	(N)
					-34.7056	2.272642	(P)
					-4.108152	4.359777	(BC)
_bs_7	1000	-.115038	-7.973941	248.1429	-487.0561	486.826	(N)
					-3.915262	.5141828	(P)
					-2.086716	.601437	(BC)
_bs_8	999	.3140479	4.813443	128.5587	-251.9624	252.5905	(N)
					-3.033594	8.816448	(P)
					-5.762944	4.482869	(BC)

Note: N = normal
P = percentile
BC = bias-corrected

Next, we check if the results presented by Chapman and Roeder are sensitive to the coding of the peace survival variable. While Chapman and Roeder's discussion of their results seems to overturn earlier results by Sambanis (2000) with respect to war recurrence, we show that their conclusions are not supported by the data.

Using no war recurrence variable (*warend2*) as the dependent variable, there is no support for the claim that partition increases the stability of the peace, which again weakens support for the underlying theoretical model since the model does not explain why partition would have a different effects in large-scale political violence (civil war) as opposed to lower-level violence. The model has poor overall fit to the data and partition does not have a statistically significant association to war resumption or significant differences from the other institutional outcomes. (Results are substantively the same if we restrict the analysis to cases of separatist war.)

```
. use "C:\MyDocuments\Partition&War\Data\Roeder_repl_test.dta", clear

. replace warend2=1 if cnumb==992
(1 real change made)
. replace warend2=1 if cnumb==994
(1 real change made)
. replace noviol2=1 if cnumb==992
(1 real change made)
. replace noviol2=0 if cnumb==994
(1 real change made)

. probit warend2 partition separation autonomy warduration wardeaths armedforces
gdppercapita peaceoperations, nolog
```

Probit regression

Number of obs = 72
LR chi2(8) = 10.37
Prob > chi2 = 0.2403
Pseudo R2 = 0.1359

Log likelihood = -32.956278

wardend2	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
partition	1.346502	.9506954	1.42	0.157	-.5168266 3.209831
separation	.5448142	.6086801	0.90	0.371	-.6481769 1.737805
autonomy	.3437394	.6956768	0.49	0.621	-1.019762 1.707241
warduration	.0495614	.0326557	1.52	0.129	-.0144425 .1135654
wardeaths	-.1675527	.0919823	-1.82	0.069	-.3478346 .0127293
armedforces	.7557727	.5307215	1.42	0.154	-.2844223 1.795968
gdppercapita	-.1857349	.1064745	-1.74	0.081	-.394421 .0229513
peaceopera~s	.360456	.426191	0.85	0.398	-.474863 1.195775
_cons	2.292578	1.098019	2.09	0.037	.1405007 4.444656

. test partition = separation

(1) partition - separation = 0

chi2(1) = 0.72
Prob > chi2 = 0.3950

. test partition = autonomy

(1) partition - autonomy = 0

chi2(1) = 0.74
Prob > chi2 = 0.3908

. test separation = autonomy

(1) separation - autonomy = 0

chi2(1) = 0.05
Prob > chi2 = 0.8246

Re-run the model of war recurrence, restricting the cases to secessionist war:

```
. probit warend2 partition separation autonomy warduration wardeaths armedforces
gdppercapita peaceoperations if secession==1, nolog
note: autonomy != 0 predicts success perfectly
      autonomy dropped and 8 obs not used
```

```
Probit regression                               Number of obs   =          31
                                                LR chi2(7)      =           8.48
                                                Prob > chi2     =          0.2925
Log likelihood = -10.993274                    Pseudo R2      =          0.2782
```

warend2	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
partition	1.830731	1.40061	1.31	0.191	-.9144131 4.575876
separation	.9757904	.831361	1.17	0.241	-.6536471 2.605228
warduration	.223328	.1625591	1.37	0.169	-.0952819 .541938
wardeaths	-.1632411	.1722226	-0.95	0.343	-.5007911 .174309
armedforces	.4208697	1.084075	0.39	0.698	-1.703879 2.545618
gdppercapita	-.2062205	.1561106	-1.32	0.187	-.5121916 .0997507
peaceopera~s	-.1552599	.8814871	-0.18	0.860	-1.882943 1.572423
_cons	1.983415	1.750168	1.13	0.257	-1.446851 5.413681

Note: 0 failures and 1 success completely determined.

```
. probit warend2 partition separation warduration wardeaths armedforces gdppercapita
peaceoperations if secession==1, nolog
```

```
Probit regression                               Number of obs   =          39
                                                LR chi2(7)      =           9.77
                                                Prob > chi2     =          0.2021
Log likelihood = -11.859924                    Pseudo R2      =          0.2917
```

warend2	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
partition	1.790174	1.405624	1.27	0.203	-.9647981 4.545145
separation	.8215849	.8216116	1.00	0.317	-.7887443 2.431914
warduration	.2092444	.1439282	1.45	0.146	-.0728496 .4913384
wardeaths	-.1713228	.1593275	-1.08	0.282	-.4835991 .1409534
armedforces	.9006635	.9485566	0.95	0.342	-.9584733 2.7598
gdppercapita	-.2305086	.1535342	-1.50	0.133	-.5314301 .0704129
peaceopera~s	.1141227	.7923759	0.14	0.885	-1.438906 1.667151
_cons	2.015726	1.606232	1.25	0.210	-1.132432 5.163884

Note: 0 failures and 2 successes completely determined.

These results contradict Chapman and Roeder's (2007, 686) claim that "the differences in [their] results [and Sambanis's (2000) results] are not the consequence of different measurement or different case selection...." Using the same cases, same model, same estimation method, and same measures of war outcomes, the results are the same – partition has no effect.

This simple replication exercise reveals that the reported differences between Chapman and Roeder (2007) and Sambanis (2000) are not due to new theory that underlies differences in model specification. Chapman and Roeder's theory is not supported when tests are done on the set of cases that correspond to their theory. The theory is not supported even when we use

Chapman and Roeder's sample, since partition does not outperform other institutional outcomes with respect to its effect on war recurrence.

In light of important differences in the results that are due to coding differences and using different measure of post-war peace, data coding must be scrutinized and a clear conceptual foundation must be provided for coding decisions. Two questions need to be addressed. First, what do we mean by "war recurrence" and what *should* we mean, if we want to assess the effects of partition? Second, for which cases of civil war is partition a relevant outcome, and where should we expect partition to have an important influence on postwar peace? We provide such a discussion in our paper and offer new data that help elucidate the effects of partition on post-civil war peace.

The following are cases of partition with peace survival according to Chapman and Roeder (2007):

	cname	yrbeg	yrend
20.	Eritrean	74	91
26.	India-partition	46	48
47.	Namibia	65	89
51.	Pakistan-Bngl.	71	71
65.	Yugoslavia-Bosnia	92	95
67.	Yugoslavia-Croatia	95	95

```
. l cname yearbegin warend2 partition separation autonomy in 66
    |          cname   yearbe~n   warend2   partit~n   separa~n   autonomy
66. | Yugoslavia-Croatia          91           0           0           1           0

. l cname yearbegin warend2 partition separation autonomy in 67
    |          cname   yearbe~n   warend2   partit~n   separa~n   autonomy
67. | Yugoslavia-Croatia          95           1           1           0           0

* Recode case as a partition in 1991 and no partition in 1995

* Coefficient and standard error for partition
* with survivalofpeace as DV is 2.433621 and .892343, respectively
* Coefficient and standard error for partition
* with warend2 as DV is .9415133 and .8720022, respectively

. replace partition=1 in 66
(1 real change made)
. replace separation=0 in 66
(1 real change made)

. probit survivalofpeace partition separation autonomy warduration wardeaths
armedforces gdpper capita peaceoperations, nolog
```



```

Probit regression                               Number of obs   =           72
                                                LR chi2(8)      =          19.91
                                                Prob > chi2     =          0.0107
Log likelihood = -39.25289                    Pseudo R2      =          0.2023

```

survivalof~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
partition	1.840334	.721813	2.55	0.011	.4256068 3.255062
separation	.9022776	.5239766	1.72	0.085	-.1246977 1.929253
autonomy	-.3948989	.5920796	-0.67	0.505	-1.555354 .7655557
warduration	.0834759	.0292114	2.86	0.004	.0262225 .1407293
wardeaths	-.1947506	.0795855	-2.45	0.014	-.3507354 -.0387658
armedforces	-.2820708	.3909393	-0.72	0.471	-1.048298 .4841563
gdppercapita	-.1160817	.0964118	-1.20	0.229	-.3050453 .0728819
peaceopera~s	.1179022	.4066099	0.29	0.772	-.6790385 .9148429
_cons	1.617242	.9254738	1.75	0.081	-.1966532 3.431137

* coefficient for partition is reduced by 24%.

Now change Croatia 1995 to no-partition and re-run the model:

```

. replace partition=0 in 67
(1 real change made)

```

```

. probit survivalofpeace partition separation autonomy warduration wardeaths
armedforces gdppercapita peaceoperations, nolog

```

```

Probit regression                               Number of obs   =           72
                                                LR chi2(8)      =          16.68
                                                Prob > chi2     =          0.0337
Log likelihood = -40.872377                    Pseudo R2      =          0.1694

```

survivalof~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
partition	1.373213	.6712003	2.05	0.041	.0576849 2.688742
separation	.7312655	.5111724	1.43	0.153	-.270614 1.733145
autonomy	-.4187312	.5885044	-0.71	0.477	-1.572179 .7347161
warduration	.0705285	.0269704	2.62	0.009	.0176675 .1233895
wardeaths	-.1665892	.0767138	-2.17	0.030	-.3169455 -.0162329
armedforces	-.307471	.389385	-0.79	0.430	-1.070652 .4557095
gdppercapita	-.0716253	.0903511	-0.79	0.428	-.2487102 .1054597
peaceopera~s	.2051705	.3922371	0.52	0.601	-.5636001 .9739412
_cons	1.341819	.9015383	1.49	0.137	-.4251632 3.108802

* The coefficient for partition is 44% lower than the original results and it is barely significant (z-value of 2.05).

* In models of war recurrence, these changes result in a substantially lower estimate of the effects of partition (77% lower).

```
. probit warend2 partition separation autonomy warduration wardeaths armedforces
gdppercapita peaceoperations, nolog
```

```
Probit regression                               Number of obs   =           72
                                                LR chi2(8)      =           8.30
                                                Prob > chi2     =          0.4045
Log likelihood = -35.201036                    Pseudo R2       =          0.1055
```

warend2	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
partition	.3347552	.7053677	0.47	0.635	-1.04774 1.71725
separation	.7649554	.6620311	1.16	0.248	-.5326018 2.062512
autonomy	-.2146469	.5888291	-0.36	0.715	-1.368731 .9394369
warduration	.0509622	.0290148	1.76	0.079	-.0059057 .1078301
wardeaths	-.0877654	.0827777	-1.06	0.289	-.2500067 .0744758
armedforces	.560371	.4418904	1.27	0.205	-.3057183 1.42646
gdppercapita	-.1682522	.0975686	-1.72	0.085	-.3594832 .0229788
peaceopera~s	.3668733	.407409	0.90	0.368	-.4316336 1.16538
_cons	1.403089	.9948285	1.41	0.158	-.5467393 3.352917

* Recode Croatia as above and re-run the model only on cases of secessionist war

```
. use "C:\MyDocuments\Partition&War\Roeder_repl_test_varsadded_12_14.dta", clear

. replace partition=1 in 66
(1 real change made)

. replace separation=0 in 66
(1 real change made)

. replace partition=0 in 67
(1 real change made)

. replace secession=1 in 37
(1 real change made)

. replace secession=1 in 27
(1 real change made)

. replace secession=1 in 44
(1 real change made)
```

```
. probit survivalofpeace partition separation autonomy warduration wardeaths
armedforces gdppecapita peaceoperations if secession==1, nolog

Probit regression                               Number of obs   =           39
                                                LR chi2(8)       =           10.21
                                                Prob > chi2      =           0.2509
Log likelihood = -21.917082                    Pseudo R2        =           0.1889
```

survivalof~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
partition	.4942734	.7976457	0.62	0.535	-1.069083	2.05763
separation	.3919561	.5670942	0.69	0.489	-.7195281	1.50344
autonomy	-.5410965	.7031789	-0.77	0.442	-1.919302	.8371088
warduration	.0869355	.0403143	2.16	0.031	.0079209	.16595
wardeaths	.0066383	.0999241	0.07	0.947	-.1892094	.2024859
armedforces	-.3279432	.5278215	-0.62	0.534	-1.362454	.7065679
gdppecapita	-.0435953	.1066838	-0.41	0.683	-.2526917	.1655011
peaceopera~s	.271077	.5335	0.51	0.611	-.7745638	1.316718
_cons	-.5917579	1.20386	-0.49	0.623	-2.951281	1.767765

Finally, simply recoding this case makes the effects of partition in the ordered logit regression of *extent of peace* (Table 3, Regression 5) not statistically significant.

Results reported in Table 3, Column 5 of Chapman and Roeder (2007, 685), with Croatia recoded as above:

```
. ologit extentofpeace partition separation autonomy warduration wardeaths armedforces
gdppecapita peaceoperations, nolog

Ordered logistic regression                       Number of obs   =           72
                                                LR chi2(8)       =           13.45
                                                Prob > chi2      =           0.0972
Log likelihood = -69.907564                    Pseudo R2        =           0.0878
```

extentofpe~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
partition	1.632123	1.032675	1.58	0.114	-.3918833	3.65613
separation	1.01444	.7487656	1.35	0.175	-.4531135	2.481994
autonomy	-.2234359	.7253782	-0.31	0.758	-1.645151	1.198279
warduration	.1004504	.0396103	2.54	0.011	.0228157	.1780852
wardeaths	-.2481852	.1111122	-2.23	0.026	-.4659803	-.0303902
armedforces	.1529453	.3202893	0.48	0.633	-.4748102	.7807009
gdppecapita	-.1872193	.1371263	-1.37	0.172	-.4559819	.0815433
peaceopera~s	.6128474	.5456403	1.12	0.261	-.4565879	1.682283
/cut1	-3.578458	1.357529			-6.239166	-.9177489
/cut2	-1.832811	1.303361			-4.387352	.7217299

Cases of secession only:

```
. ologit extentofpeace partition separation autonomy warduration wardeaths armedforces
gdppercapita peaceoperations if secession==1, nolog
```

```
Ordered logistic regression          Number of obs   =          39
                                     LR chi2(8)       =           9.16
                                     Prob > chi2      =          0.3289
Log likelihood = -34.656542          Pseudo R2       =          0.1167
```

extentofpe~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
partition	.475691	1.241326	0.38	0.702	-1.957264	2.908646
separation	.766147	.8810116	0.87	0.385	-.9606041	2.492898
autonomy	.0189111	.9082165	0.02	0.983	-1.761161	1.798983
warduration	.1391328	.060171	2.31	0.021	.0211998	.2570657
wardeaths	-.0350443	.1432206	-0.24	0.807	-.3157515	.2456628
armedforces	-.0734831	.4722328	-0.16	0.876	-.9990423	.8520761
gdppercapita	-.165775	.1639334	-1.01	0.312	-.4870786	.1555287
peaceopera~s	.3965714	.752174	0.53	0.598	-1.077663	1.870805
/cut1	-1.492797	1.702997			-4.830611	1.845016
/cut2	.5492204	1.683096			-2.749587	3.848028

Replication and Discussion of Table 6 in Chapman and Roeder

Chapman and Roeder extend their analysis to all partitions, not just civil war-related partitions and explore the “international consequences” of partitions (p. 686). They identify 144 new nation states that joined the international system between 1999 and 2002. Out these, 46 were created by partition, 91 by decolonization, 4 out of unification of independent states, 2 with incorporation of new areas, and 1 with the resumption of independence (p. 687). They compare those states that were created by partition to those created in other ways.³⁸ They argue that “states created by partition were (1) more likely to be born democratic, (2) even when born nondemocratic were more likely to democratize, and (3) were no more likely to experience postindependence ethnic violence. Moreover, (4) the reemergence of intra-state conflicts as interstate conflicts did not make the relations among successor states more violent than relations among other states” (p. 687).

The following replicates results reported in Table 6 in Chapman and Roeder (2007, 688):

```
. use "C:\MyDocuments\Partition&War\RoederTable6data.dta", clear
.
. stset time, id(ccode) failure(conflict)

           id:  ccode
failure event:  conflict != 0 & conflict < .
obs. time interval:  (time[_n-1], time]
exit on or before:  failure

-----
1734 total obs.
   0 exclusions
-----

1734 obs. remaining, representing
   76 subjects
   19 failures in single failure-per-subject data
20087 total analysis time at risk, at risk from t =           0
           earliest observed entry t =           0
           last observed exit t =           527

. stcox partition gdppc population mountains noncontiguous oil instability refrac an
> ocracy, nolog

           failure _d:  conflict
analysis time _t:  time
           id:  ccode

Cox regression -- Breslow method for ties

No. of subjects =           76                Number of obs   =           1734
No. of failures =           19
Time at risk    =           20087

Log likelihood  =  -63.594665                LR chi2(9)        =           26.71
                                           Prob > chi2       =           0.0016

-----
      _t | Haz. Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----
partition |   1.541599   1.195131     0.56  0.577     .3373449     7.0448
gdppc    |   .488204   .2392697    -1.46  0.143     .1868211     1.275783
-----
```

³⁸ why not compare to all states rather than only to those created after 1900?

population	1.837891	.4153466	2.69	0.007	1.180201	2.862091
mountains	1.198811	.200426	1.08	0.278	.8638545	1.663646
noncontigu~s	2.053628	2.216119	0.67	0.505	.2477252	17.02447
oil	.3403334	.4214096	-0.87	0.384	.0300556	3.853757
instability	1.510334	.9648398	0.65	0.519	.4318208	5.282534
relfrac	.3875816	.4505951	-0.82	0.415	.0396983	3.784025
anocracy	3.195715	1.711011	2.17	0.030	1.118995	9.126582

Discussion:

Below, we list the countries that Chapman and Roeder code as having been born out of partition and dates these states were created:

```
. l country year if partition==1 & cmark==1
```

	country	year
121.	CZECHREP	1993
128.	SLOVAKIA	1993
135.	MACEDONIA	1991
144.	YUGOSLAVIA	1992
151.	SLOVENIA	1991
164.	MOLDOVA	1991
166.	RUSSIA	1991
170.	ESTONIA	1991
179.	LATVIA	1991
188.	LITHUANIA	1991
197.	UKRAINE	1991
206.	BELARUS	1991
215.	ARMENIA	1991
992.	ERITREA	1993
1535.	TURKMENISTAN	1991
1544.	TAJIKISTAN	1991
1553.	KYRGYZSTAN	1991
1562.	UZBEKISTAN	1991
1571.	KAZAKHSTAN	1991
1580.	PAKISTAN	1972
1582.	BANGLADESH	1972
1655.	SINGAPORE	1965

- Cases of partition and dates of creation: Czech republic (1993); Slovakia (1993); Macedonia (1991); Yugoslavia (1992); Slovenia (1991); Moldova (1991); Russia (1991); Estonia (1991); Latvia (1991); Lithuania (1991); Ukraine (1991); Belarus (1991); Armenia (1991); Eritrea (1993); Turkmenistan (1991); Tajikistan (1991); Kyrgyzstan (1991); Uzbekistan (1991); Kazakhstan (1991); Pakistan (1972); Bangladesh (1972); Singapore (1965).
- A number of fairly obvious points can be made about coding errors and inconsistencies that invalidate the results presented in the article.

- First, although states created out of violent partition are supposed to be excluded from this list, some are included. Pakistan and Bangladesh were both “created” out of the violent secession of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) from West Pakistan in 1971 (they are included with 1972 as the start of statehood). Eritrea is also included even though it was not born “peacefully,” but rather as the result of a thirty-year war with Ethiopia.
- Second, Ethiopia is excluded from this list although Yugoslavia, Russia, and Pakistan are all included as they are reconstituted as independent states following the secession of parts of their territories in 1992, 1991, and 1971 respectively. Ethiopia, with continuing violence in the Ogaden region reaching 100 deaths would be coded as a case of ethnic war in this list, working against the authors’ argument, had it been included.
- Third, not all former Soviet states are included. Georgia is excluded. With two wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia breaking out after partition, this is another case in which secession is followed by ethnic conflict and contradicts the authors’ argument. Azerbaijan is also missing and it is another case that contradicts the authors’ arguments. Conflicts in these countries emerged due to partition (it was not conflict between the titular group and the Soviet state), so they should not be excluded.
- Fourth, the results presented in Table 6 boil down to a comparison between patterns of ethnic conflict in the former USSR and Eastern Europe on the one hand, and the rest of the newly independent world since 1955 on the other hand. The only cases of partition outside of Eastern Europe and former USSR are Eritrea, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and Singapore.
- Fifth, since the authors exclude states created out of violent partition (such as Bosnia and Croatia), they should also exclude states created through violent “other means” including all former colonies in Africa and South East Asia that were born out of a violent national liberation struggle (Kenya, Vietnam, etc.). Other states that should also be excluded for similar reasons are those where civil war break out on the year of independence (such as the DRC).
- Sixth, a more general point is that there is no way other than partition for a state to be created after 1955. The comparison between partitions and other cases depends not only on the coding inconsistencies and errors we identified above, but also on a poor conceptualization of partition. Partitions following civil wars are a well-defined category of civil war outcomes as we discuss in our paper. However, outside the context of civil war, the concept of a partition can apply to any new state creation since new states come from a partitioning of the territory of old states or disintegrating empires. Thus, all states created on or after 1955 can be thought of as cases of violent or nonviolent partition, consistent with the definition offered by Chapman and Roeder on page 684 of their article (partition is the “establishment of independent states, each of which maintained diplomatic relations with at least one of the great powers”).

- Seventh, the analysis excludes wars over capture of the central government. A common critique of partition is that wars over capture of the state are likely to arise after secessionist war. We make this point in our paper and present a formal model of this process elsewhere.³⁹ Wimmer and Min (2006, 883), show that, in fact, there is an increased risk of revolutionary wars following the creation of new states.⁴⁰ Fearon and Laitin (2003, 81, 84) present a related result that the risk of civil war is substantially higher in “new states” (defined as states in the first 2 years of independence).
- Eighth, cases of de facto partition are excluded from this list, so this dataset cannot provide the basis for a test of the relative stability of *de jure* and *de facto* partitions, which we have identified as a key issue in the empirical analysis of the effectiveness of partition.
- Overall, these coding problems present serious challenge to the validity of results presented by Chapman and Roeder. We do not correct those errors or several methodological issues that are present in their analysis, because the framing of the questions that this dataset can address (if the errors are corrected) would not allow us to test the theoretical claims advanced by the authors or to adjudicate between rival theories of the effects of partition as a solution to civil war.

Replication and discussion of Table 7 in Chapman and Roeder

Chapman and Roeder present results from an analysis of the effects of partition on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) from 1886-1992. Results are presented in Table 7 of their article (p. 689), which we replicate below.

```
. iis dyadid
. tis year
. set matsize 100

. xtgee dispute partition allies powerratio democless dependless jtigomem noncontiguo
> us distance minorpowers, family(binomial) link(logit) corr(ar1) force robust nolog
note: some groups have fewer than 2 observations
      not possible to estimate correlations for those groups
      8 groups omitted from estimation

GEE population-averaged model      Number of obs      =      39988
Group and time vars:              dyadid year        Number of groups   =      1178
Link:                             logit              Obs per group: min =      2
```

³⁹ In countries and years included in Chapman and Roeder’s dataset, new civil wars can be coded in Guinea Bissau in 1998; in Sierra Leone in 1991; Central African Republic in April 1996; Congo-B in 1993; Djibouti in 1991; Mozambique in 1976; Zimbabwe in 1972; Sudan in 1963; Yemen in 1994; Yemen PR in 1986; Tajikistan in 1992. We have entered these cases in the replication dataset with information on the months that the wars started obtained from Doyle and Sambanis (2006). If only start year information is available, we code the 6th month of the year as the start point to compute peace duration.

⁴⁰ Andreas Wimmer and Brian Min, 2006 (December), “From Empire to Nation-State: Explaining Wars in the Modern World, 1816-2001.” *American Sociological Review* 71(6): 867-897.

Family: binomial avg = 33.9
 Correlation: AR(1) max = 90
 Scale parameter: 1 Wald chi2(9) = 241.63
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

(Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on dyadid)

dispute	Coef.	Semi-robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
partition	.2100817	.260857	0.81	0.421	-.3011886	.7213521
allies	-.5279451	.1583206	-3.33	0.001	-.8382478	-.2176424
powerratio	-.3180294	.0432097	-7.36	0.000	-.4027189	-.2333399
democless	-.0607924	.0094049	-6.46	0.000	-.0792257	-.0423592
dependless	-52.96676	13.29452	-3.98	0.000	-79.02354	-26.90998
jtigomem	-.0131784	.0043197	-3.05	0.002	-.021645	-.0047119
noncontigu~s	-.9928473	.1672723	-5.94	0.000	-1.320695	-.6649995
distance	-.3577098	.0683117	-5.24	0.000	-.4915983	-.2238214
minorpowers	-.6633837	.1781669	-3.72	0.000	-1.012584	-.314183
_cons	-.2987597	.5694057	-0.52	0.600	-1.414774	.817255

The analysis follows a standard “democratic peace” model. The authors use a model developed by Russett and Oneal (2001), which was designed to test the effects of democracy on MIDs (MIDs data come from the Correlates of War project), and add to the model “a dichotomous variable for dyads in which both states had been parts of the same previously sovereign state prior to their independence” (Chapman and Roeder 2007, 688). This “partition” variable has no effect, which the authors interpret as positive support for their arguments.

The authors do not find an effect of partition on MIDs. The analysis has some shortcomings: there are well-known coding problems with the MID dataset; the pooling of data over this long time period is questionable in light of large systemic changes in world politics in that period; country and/or region fixed effects are not controlled for, etc. Even if we agreed with the authors that we should only look at the effects of partition on dyadic MIDs between states that used to be part of the same state, another problem is that, if partition has the democratizing effect that they expect it to have (see Tables 3 and 5 in their article), then the causal effect of partition on MIDs is estimated with bias in the regressions in Table 7. The direction of bias is indeterminate since it depends not only on the association between partition and democracy but also on other, observed and unobserved.

Even if the analysis were correct, the non-result on partitions could not be interpreted as evidence in support of partition as a solution to civil war, since partition is shown not to have any effect. The null hypothesis should be defined with neutral priors since theoretical arguments can support claims that partitions increase or decrease the risk of MIDs. Since partition has costs, it can only be supported as a strategy if it is shown that it has a positive effect.

Finally, the authors frame this question the wrong way. The way to proceed with such an analysis would be to try to estimate the effects of partition on all types of conflict—ethnic/non-ethnic; inter-state/intra-state; lower-level/large-scale—and compare to different institutional solutions after civil war. The authors, however, limit themselves to asking if partition creates risk of MIDs between the predecessor and successor state. But another, equally important, risk is the risk of conflict between new entrants in the international system and all other states. The

“global” effects of partition should be analyzed by exploring the consequences for international peace and stability of having many new states enter the international system.

4. Robustness of Our Results

To summarize how changing the list of partitions affects the results in Table 3 of our paper, we present below three tables, each with one model repeated using all six of our partition lists. The first table, D.1, looks at our standard model of short-term war recurrence (dependent variable is `norecur2`). The second, D.2, looks at the model using an alternate version of recurrence (dependent variable is `norecur2_v2`). The third, D.3, looks at short-term recurrence of low-level violence (dependent variable is `warnov2_01`).

Table D.1: All Partition Variables, Short-Term War Recurrence (2 years); All Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2
part	-0.834 [1.128]					
part2		0.282 [0.973]				
part3			0.203 [1.383]			
part4				0.171 [1.025]		
part5					0.05 [1.473]	
part6						1.588 [1.240]
ethnic war	1.533 [0.656]*	1.401 [0.613]*	1.423 [0.598]*	1.419 [0.603]*	1.427 [0.586]*	1.439 [0.609]*
log cost	-0.299 [0.183]	-0.335 [0.185]+	-0.331 [0.187]+	-0.329 [0.182]+	-0.324 [0.183]+	-0.36 [0.193]+
factnum	-0.118 [0.144]	-0.09 [0.136]	-0.09 [0.137]	-0.093 [0.138]	-0.093 [0.138]	-0.058 [0.139]
anypk0	-0.44 [0.706]	-0.566 [0.752]	-0.527 [0.715]	-0.547 [0.760]	-0.516 [0.724]	-0.696 [0.730]
treaty	0.366 [0.656]	0.602 [0.673]	0.548 [0.615]	0.568 [0.672]	0.528 [0.619]	0.778 [0.681]
isxp2	-2.605 [0.857]**	-2.277 [0.915]*	-2.302 [0.908]*	-2.328 [0.905]*	-2.357 [0.891]**	-2.388 [0.973]**
ef	-2.676 [1.323]*	-2.829 [1.380]*	-2.82 [1.447]+	-2.788 [1.347]*	-2.764 [1.394]*	-2.882 [1.153]*
pre-war GDP	0.925 [0.527]+	0.784 [0.507]	0.817 [0.467]+	0.799 [0.519]	0.823 [0.474]+	0.79 [0.464]+
post-war growth	0.128 [0.045]**	0.137 [0.047]**	0.136 [0.046]**	0.137 [0.047]**	0.136 [0.046]**	0.145 [0.049]**
Constant	0.831 [3.762]	2.068 [4.041]	1.799 [3.674]	1.902 [4.058]	1.686 [3.684]	2.212 [3.632]
Observations	127	127	127	127	127	127
χ^2	27.92**	28.46**	29.88**	28.24**	29.43**	28.06**
Pseudo-R ²	0.3600	0.3552	0.3547	0.3547	0.3544	0.3685

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table D.2: All Partition Variables, Short-Term War Recurrence Alternate Version (2 years); All Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2
part	-0.298 [0.838]					
part2		0.703 [0.747]				
part3			0.439 [1.159]			
part4				0.53 [0.788]		
part5					0.165 [1.252]	
part6						0.392 [1.210]
ethnic war	0.702 [0.565]	0.641 [0.569]	0.679 [0.567]	0.674 [0.570]	0.689 [0.573]	0.673 [0.569]
logcost	-0.231 [0.169]	-0.269 [0.174]	-0.256 [0.173]	-0.257 [0.169]	-0.244 [0.169]	-0.248 [0.171]
factnum	-0.163 [0.173]	-0.144 [0.172]	-0.146 [0.173]	-0.152 [0.168]	-0.154 [0.169]	-0.148 [0.173]
anypko	0.341 [0.704]	0.159 [0.746]	0.28 [0.690]	0.193 [0.753]	0.297 [0.697]	0.259 [0.730]
treaty	0.212 [0.632]	0.465 [0.680]	0.325 [0.620]	0.402 [0.664]	0.284 [0.612]	0.332 [0.649]
isxp2	-3.136 [0.790]**	-2.917 [0.784]**	-2.953 [0.733]**	-3.006 [0.802]**	-3.049 [0.758]**	-3.094 [0.815]**
ef	-2.443 [1.375]+	-2.629 [1.430]+	-2.595 [1.430]+	-2.544 [1.392]+	-2.499 [1.386]+	-2.476 [1.353]+
pre-war gdp	0.801 [0.308]**	0.691 [0.295]*	0.764 [0.280]**	0.703 [0.304]*	0.766 [0.284]**	0.757 [0.288]**
post-war growth	0.109 [0.033]**	0.117 [0.034]**	0.112 [0.032]**	0.116 [0.034]**	0.112 [0.032]**	0.114 [0.033]**
Constant	0.36 [3.016]	1.471 [3.115]	0.852 [2.962]	1.264 [3.107]	0.706 [2.950]	0.781 [2.987]
Observations	127	127	127	127	127	127
χ^2	34.22**	35.89**	36.35**	35.71**	35.53**	36.46**
Pseudo-R ²	0.2998	0.3041	0.3005	0.3018	0.2993	0.3001

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table D.3: All Partition Variables, Short-Term Residual Violence (2 years); All Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01
part	0.777 [0.774]					
part2		1.385 [0.771]+				
part3			1.89 [1.206]			
part4				1.137 [0.775]		
part5					1.518 [1.263]	
part6						2.775 [1.158]*
ethnic war	0.774 [0.511]	0.76 [0.507]	0.853 [0.478]+	0.787 [0.506]	0.871 [0.478]+	0.747 [0.468]
logcost	-0.207 [0.116]+	-0.242 [0.113]*	-0.249 [0.110]*	-0.223 [0.113]*	-0.225 [0.110]*	-0.237 [0.110]*
factnum	-0.237 [0.156]	-0.25 [0.152]	-0.25 [0.150]+	-0.256 [0.151]+	-0.259 [0.148]+	-0.24 [0.168]
anypko	1.539 [0.536]**	1.339 [0.560]*	1.571 [0.526]**	1.392 [0.541]*	1.581 [0.511]**	1.431 [0.504]**
treaty	0.609 [0.517]	0.882 [0.628]	0.722 [0.531]	0.772 [0.583]	0.632 [0.504]	0.865 [0.514]+
isxp2	-2.416 [0.865]**	-2.347 [0.892]**	-2.059 [0.781]**	-2.447 [0.891]**	-2.234 [0.826]**	-2.605 [1.008]**
ef	-2.025 [0.787]*	-2.188 [0.795]**	-2.384 [0.786]**	-2.101 [0.801]**	-2.243 [0.804]**	-2.129 [0.822]**
pre-war gdp	0.133 [0.309]	0.069 [0.316]	0.212 [0.282]	0.08 [0.319]	0.194 [0.278]	0.144 [0.297]
post-war growth	0.072 [0.025]**	0.075 [0.026]**	0.068 [0.026]**	0.075 [0.025]**	0.069 [0.025]**	0.079 [0.026]**
Constant	2.599 [2.701]	3.449 [2.821]	2.565 [2.498]	3.188 [2.821]	2.461 [2.496]	2.854 [2.635]
χ^2	44.69**	32.99**	34.32**	32.99**	34.24**	40.10**
Pseudo-R ²	0.2185	0.2351	0.2376	0.2267	0.2271	0.2510
Observations	127	127	127	127	127	127

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Now, in additional checks, we add in different control variables to the basic models in Table 3 of our article.

The first set of results are displayed in Tables D.4-D.6.1 below. These adds in to the model we use in Table 3 of the article, individually, variables for the duration of the war (*Inwardur*), the effective development assistance as a share of GDP (*edagdp*), the size of the government's army (*Inarmy*), a dummy for the cold war period (*coldwar*), a dummy variable (*oil*) capturing dependence on oil exports (coded 1 for countries whose oil exports are valued at more than 30% of GDP; this is substituted for the *isxp2* variable), a dummy variable for British or French colonial legacy (*colony*), and regional dummies (*LACCAM*- Latin America, Caribbean; *MEast*- Middle East and North Africa; *Asia* – Asia including East Asia and Oceania; *SSA* – Sub-Saharan Africa; with Europe and Central Asia as the reference category).⁴¹ Tables D.4 and D.4.1 show results for the *norecur2* dependent variable for the strict and lenient partitions lists, respectively. Tables D.5 and D.5.1 do the same but for the alternate *norecur2_v2* dependent variable. Finally, Tables D.6 and D.6.1 do this for the no residual violence variable, *warnov2_01*.

We then add in, again, individually, a second set of additional explanatory variables to the baseline model in Table 3 of our article. Here, we substitute post-war GDP (*lnmaddend_i*) for pre-war GDP (*lnmaddpre_i*); an alternative measure of the number of factions involved in the conflict (*factions*), which includes smaller groups in the count but excludes foreign armies, for the previous measure used (*factnum*); Fearon and Laitin's (2003 coding of ethnic wars (*ethwar*) for the variable used in the article (*ewars1*); and electricity consumption in kwh per capita in 1980 or in the 5-year period closest to the end of the war, with missing values imputed (*idev1*) for pre-war GDP (*lnmaddpre_i*). These results are displayed in Table D.7 for the *norecur2* war recurrence dependent variable, in Table D.8 for the alternative *norecur2_v2* dependent variable, and in Table D.9 for the *warnov2_01* no residual violence dependent variable. Each table contains results for the strict and lenient partition lists.

⁴¹ In our data, the reference category, *EurNAM*, is Europe and Central Asia (excluding Azerbaijan and Georgia): Bosnia, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia (both former and Serbia). *LACCAM* consists of Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru. The Middle East and North Africa, *MEast*, includes Georgia and Azerbaijan: Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Syria, Turkey, Yemen, Yemen Arab Republic, Yemen People's Republic. *Asia* is Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. Finally, sub-Saharan Africa (*SSA*) is Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

Table D.4: Strict Partition, Short-Term War Recurrence (2 years), Additional Explanatory Variables; All Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2
part	-0.695 [1.160]	-1.335 [1.877]	-0.956 [1.358]	-0.795 [1.200]	-0.641 [1.240]	-0.891 [1.121]	-1.093 [1.202]
Ethnic war	1.754 [0.560]**	0.578 [1.036]	1.8 [0.686]**	1.55 [0.667]*	1.248 [0.677]+	1.725 [0.688]*	1.523 [0.681]*
logcost	-0.365 [0.188]+	-0.705 [0.400]+	-0.39 [0.222]+	-0.302 [0.184]	-0.329 [0.195]+	-0.314 [0.178]+	-0.263 [0.208]
factnum	-0.176 [0.149]	0.208 [0.300]	-0.079 [0.146]	-0.125 [0.145]	-0.045 [0.170]	-0.102 [0.145]	-0.123 [0.146]
anypko	-0.535 [0.760]	-0.439 [1.051]	-0.223 [0.734]	-0.42 [0.733]	-0.509 [0.654]	-0.551 [0.767]	-0.552 [0.748]
treaty	0.274 [0.692]	0.403 [0.987]	0.759 [0.812]	0.389 [0.626]	0.226 [0.631]	0.475 [0.671]	0.227 [0.755]
isxp2	-2.781 [0.895]**	-7.546 [2.797]**	-3.103 [1.104]**	-2.578 [0.837]**		-2.976 [0.976]**	-2.787 [0.934]**
ethnic fract.	-2.894 [1.299]*	-6.253 [4.387]	-2.488 [1.531]	-2.649 [1.342]*	-3.108 [1.279]*	-2.804 [1.362]*	-3.215 [1.472]*
pre-war GDP	0.999 [0.526]+	3.797 [2.127]+	0.946 [0.540]+	0.926 [0.525]+	0.894 [0.521]+	0.856 [0.510]+	1.027 [0.599]+
post-war growth	0.132 [0.044]**	0.299 [0.142]*	0.13 [0.046]**	0.128 [0.046]**	0.127 [0.046]**	0.134 [0.047]**	0.134 [0.048]**
Inwardur	0.283 [0.227]						
edagdp		0.011 [0.006]*					
Inarmy			0.334 [0.266]				
cold war				0.118 [0.719]			
oil					-0.409 [0.856]		
colony						-0.611 [0.676]	
LACCAM							-0.677 [1.375]
MEast							-0.804 [0.953]
Asia							-0.798 [1.177]
SSA							-0.197 [1.319]
Constant	0.435 [3.887]	-13.732 [10.384]	0.092 [3.671]	0.739 [3.659]	1.163 [4.119]	1.855 [3.696]	0.67 [4.431]
χ^2	56.63**	22.70*	17.75+	28.20**	20.61*	29.01**	35.07**
Pseudo-R ²	0.3709	0.6280	0.3810	0.3602	0.3381	0.3670	0.3655
Observations	127	75	126	127	127	127	127

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table D.4.1: Lenient Partition, Short-Term War Recurrence (2 years), Additional Explanatory Variables; All Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2
part2	0.214 [0.964]	-0.73 [1.865]	0.077 [1.045]	0.285 [0.966]	0.534 [1.000]	0.286 [0.974]	0.308 [0.957]
Ethnic war	1.654 [0.556]**	0.465 [1.095]	1.66 [0.608]**	1.451 [0.651]*	1.138 [0.621]+	1.571 [0.662]*	1.408 [0.678]*
logcost	-0.4 [0.192]*	-0.714 [0.404]+	-0.415 [0.220]+	-0.337 [0.184]+	-0.371 [0.199]+	-0.349 [0.183]+	-0.313 [0.203]
factnum	-0.153 [0.142]	0.212 [0.311]	-0.058 [0.139]	-0.107 [0.135]	-0.019 [0.156]	-0.069 [0.136]	-0.093 [0.136]
anytko	-0.642 [0.797]	-0.475 [1.069]	-0.379 [0.756]	-0.517 [0.788]	-0.654 [0.709]	-0.675 [0.824]	-0.597 [0.787]
treaty	0.46 [0.714]	0.413 [1.062]	0.975 [0.822]	0.629 [0.641]	0.521 [0.658]	0.715 [0.706]	0.506 [0.730]
isxp2	-2.479 [0.937]**	-7.624 [3.136]*	-2.803 [1.106]*	-2.249 [0.888]*		-2.591 [1.046]*	-2.45 [0.951]**
ethnic fract.	-3.047 [1.373]*	-6.215 [4.412]	-2.661 [1.648]	-2.757 [1.385]*	-3.324 [1.383]*	-2.945 [1.454]*	-3.215 [1.616]*
pre-war GDP	0.876 [0.519]+	3.79 [2.344]	0.807 [0.502]	0.793 [0.508]	0.729 [0.471]	0.717 [0.492]	0.849 [0.607]
post-war growth	0.139 [0.047]**	0.309 [0.148]*	0.138 [0.047]**	0.136 [0.049]**	0.136 [0.048]**	0.143 [0.050]**	0.143 [0.052]**
Inwardur	0.294 [0.202]						
edagdp		0.011 [0.006]+					
Inarmy			0.322 [0.267]				
cold war				0.25 [0.654]			
oil					-0.174 [0.792]		
colony						-0.57 [0.676]	
LACCAM							0.115 [1.372]
MEast							-0.209 [1.021]
Asia							-0.266 [1.231]
SSA							0.255 [1.212]
Constant	1.539 [4.172]	-13.589 [11.933]	1.325 [3.940]	1.8 [3.990]	2.679 [4.077]	3.017 [4.098]	1.649 [4.802]
χ^2	52.69**	21.67*	17.36+	27.39**	21.97*	28.59**	32.42**
Pseudo-R ²	0.3675	0.6251	0.3746	0.3562	0.3380	0.3616	0.3584
Observations	127	75	126	127	127	127	127

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table D.5: Strict Partition, Alternate Short-Term War Recurrence (2 years), Additional Explanatory Variables; All Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2
part	-0.177 [0.796]	-0.247 [1.076]	-0.302 [0.826]	-0.25 [0.912]	-0.264 [0.900]	-0.312 [0.831]	-0.388 [0.893]
ethnic war	0.863 [0.592]	-0.284 [0.674]	0.736 [0.572]	0.717 [0.586]	0.529 [0.590]	0.749 [0.580]	0.755 [0.584]
logcost	-0.281 [0.173]	-0.124 [0.230]	-0.239 [0.177]	-0.234 [0.168]	-0.251 [0.164]	-0.233 [0.168]	-0.205 [0.172]
factnum	-0.211 [0.170]	-0.124 [0.324]	-0.156 [0.173]	-0.171 [0.167]	-0.086 [0.179]	-0.159 [0.174]	-0.168 [0.175]
anypko	0.314 [0.730]	0.738 [1.046]	0.345 [0.723]	0.364 [0.698]	0.127 [0.643]	0.318 [0.717]	0.299 [0.718]
treaty	0.108 [0.666]	0.212 [1.123]	0.256 [0.656]	0.245 [0.677]	0.076 [0.598]	0.246 [0.645]	0.086 [0.649]
isxp2	-3.327 [0.815]**	-6.29 [2.527]*	-3.191 [0.849]**	-3.072 [0.819]**		-3.255 [0.787]**	-3.228 [0.831]**
ethnic fract.	-2.639 [1.384]+	-2.501 [2.080]	-2.252 [1.367]+	-2.411 [1.387]+	-2.821 [1.326]*	-2.431 [1.386]+	-2.506 [1.679]
pre-war GDP	0.829 [0.317]**	1.443 [0.419]**	0.847 [0.333]*	0.801 [0.309]**	0.893 [0.359]*	0.781 [0.307]*	0.707 [0.400]+
post-war growth	0.11 [0.032]**	0.158 [0.041]**	0.108 [0.032]**	0.108 [0.033]**	0.11 [0.035]**	0.11 [0.033]**	0.114 [0.038]**
Inwardur	0.244 [0.173]						
edagdp		0.001 [0.000]**					
Inarmy			0.014 [0.137]				
cold war				0.149 [0.599]			
oil					-0.87 [0.585]		
colony						-0.207 [0.429]	
LACCAM							0.003 [1.321]
MEast							-0.626 [0.907]
Asia							-0.909 [1.008]
SSA							-0.492 [1.122]
Constant	0.163 [3.005]	-5.227 [4.129]	-0.111 [3.040]	0.256 [3.073]	-0.272 [3.049]	0.615 [3.032]	1.409 [3.554]
χ^2	41.19**	51.45**	35.40**	35.26**	26.05**	36.33**	41.51**
Pseudo-R ²	0.3099	0.4263	0.3019	0.3002	0.2720	0.3008	0.3061
Obs	127	75	126	127	127	127	127

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table D.5.1: Lenient Partition, Alternate Short-Term War Recurrence (2 years), Additional Explanatory Variables; All Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2
part2	0.659 [0.725]	0.201 [1.144]	0.701 [0.721]	0.713 [0.752]	0.909 [0.793]	0.71 [0.745]	0.861 [0.749]
ethnic war	0.81 [0.596]	-0.317 [0.689]	0.658 [0.575]	0.669 [0.596]	0.468 [0.585]	0.684 [0.582]	0.73 [0.603]
logcost	-0.313 [0.176]+	-0.147 [0.237]	-0.271 [0.177]	-0.272 [0.173]	-0.297 [0.173]+	-0.272 [0.173]	-0.257 [0.178]
factnum	-0.193 [0.170]	-0.109 [0.339]	-0.14 [0.173]	-0.157 [0.169]	-0.066 [0.178]	-0.138 [0.175]	-0.15 [0.175]
anypko	0.167 [0.765]	0.645 [1.192]	0.145 [0.765]	0.199 [0.749]	-0.06 [0.690]	0.131 [0.763]	0.142 [0.763]
treaty	0.324 [0.717]	0.315 [1.289]	0.479 [0.697]	0.496 [0.696]	0.393 [0.651]	0.508 [0.706]	0.385 [0.688]
isxp2	-3.122 [0.808]**	-6.258 [2.553]*	-2.951 [0.847]**	-2.834 [0.803]**		-3.028 [0.797]**	-3.053 [0.812]**
ethnic fract.	-2.803 [1.435]+	-2.536 [2.141]	-2.45 [1.420]+	-2.575 [1.432]+	-3.045 [1.401]*	-2.617 [1.443]+	-2.696 [1.771]
pre-war GDP	0.723 [0.307]*	1.395 [0.411]**	0.745 [0.321]*	0.695 [0.295]*	0.76 [0.327]*	0.671 [0.292]*	0.557 [0.397]
post-war growth	0.117 [0.034]**	0.162 [0.041]**	0.117 [0.035]**	0.115 [0.035]**	0.12 [0.038]**	0.118 [0.035]**	0.125 [0.042]**
Inwardur	0.239 [0.174]						
edagdp		0.001 [0.000]**					
Inarmy			-0.012 [0.137]				
cold war				0.213 [0.548]			
oil					-0.747 [0.533]		
colony						-0.206 [0.425]	
LACCAM							0.639 [1.336]
MEast							-0.155 [0.986]
Asia							-0.584 [1.087]
SSA							-0.112 [1.147]
Constant	1.2 [3.120]	-4.677 [4.037]	1.012 [3.136]	1.282 [3.179]	1.093 [3.118]	1.73 [3.152]	2.531 [3.660]
χ^2	43.68**	50.63**	38.84**	37.14**	29.45**	37.91**	47.46**
Pseudo-R ²	0.3140	0.4262	0.3060	0.3049	0.2800	0.3051	0.3120
Observations	127	75	126	127	127	127	127

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table D.6: Strict Partition, No Residual Violence (2 years), Additional Explanatory Variables; All Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01
part	0.751 [0.818]	1.688 [0.867]+	0.769 [0.791]	1.142 [0.772]	0.724 [0.814]	0.815 [0.735]	1.354 [0.933]
ethnic war	0.758 [0.497]	1.608 [0.932]+	0.841 [0.521]	0.831 [0.507]	0.762 [0.492]	0.71 [0.505]	0.767 [0.538]
logcost	-0.202 [0.119]+	-0.079 [0.201]	-0.232 [0.125]+	-0.241 [0.113]*	-0.231 [0.111]*	-0.201 [0.115]+	-0.24 [0.121]*
factnum	-0.233 [0.153]	-0.564 [0.232]*	-0.224 [0.157]	-0.307 [0.170]+	-0.177 [0.155]	-0.253 [0.165]	-0.269 [0.159]+
anypko	1.537 [0.536]**	3.944 [1.364]**	1.633 [0.515]**	1.768 [0.605]**	1.322 [0.543]*	1.587 [0.576]**	1.73 [0.516]**
treaty	0.629 [0.542]	0.153 [0.954]	0.688 [0.538]	0.809 [0.555]	0.48 [0.527]	0.544 [0.543]	0.749 [0.511]
isxp2	-2.411 [0.870]**	-7.185 [2.095]**	-2.472 [0.848]**	-2.126 [0.831]*		-2.178 [0.889]*	-2.593 [0.892]**
ethnic fraction.	-2.004 [0.787]*	-4.241 [1.909]*	-1.773 [0.777]*	-1.926 [0.795]*	-2.15 [0.775]**	-2.183 [0.823]**	-2.113 [0.952]*
pre-war GDP	0.139 [0.320]	0.992 [0.575]+	0.18 [0.305]	0.139 [0.314]	0.227 [0.320]	0.157 [0.308]	0.123 [0.423]
post-war growth	0.072 [0.025]**	0.216 [0.081]**	0.073 [0.024]**	0.066 [0.024]**	0.073 [0.025]**	0.068 [0.024]**	0.075 [0.027]**
Inwardur	-0.03 [0.190]						
edagdp		0.003 [0.001]**					
Inarmy			0.066 [0.125]				
cold war				0.978 [0.512]+			
oil					-0.934 [0.404]*		
colony						0.513 [0.479]	
LACCAM							1.187 [0.742]
MEast							1.659 [0.667]*
Asia							1.148 [0.777]
SSA							1.184 [0.974]
Constant	2.581 [2.718]	-4.918 [4.870]	1.995 [2.582]	2.124 [2.828]	2.023 [2.589]	2.244 [2.729]	1.89 [3.834]
χ^2	46.94**	23.64*	47.68**	39.98**	35.70**	45.03**	40.93**
Pseudo-R ²	0.2187	0.4842	0.2250	0.2343	0.2123	0.2259	0.2353
Observations	127	75	126	127	127	127	127

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table D.6.1: Lenient Partition, No Residual Violence (2 years), Additional Explanatory Variables; All Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01
part2	1.386 [0.779]+	2.152 [0.829]**	1.369 [0.826]+	1.525 [0.753]*	1.474 [0.796]+	1.379 [0.770]+	1.902 [0.837]*
ethnic war	0.725 [0.509]	1.67 [0.925]+	0.817 [0.515]	0.816 [0.507]	0.761 [0.491]	0.703 [0.500]	0.762 [0.519]
logcost	-0.233 [0.120]+	-0.111 [0.197]	-0.261 [0.118]*	-0.27 [0.115]*	-0.272 [0.108]*	-0.236 [0.115]*	-0.277 [0.115]*
factnum	-0.244 [0.151]	-0.55 [0.244]*	-0.241 [0.156]	-0.325 [0.172]+	-0.192 [0.151]	-0.264 [0.155]+	-0.31 [0.165]+
anypko	1.328 [0.559]*	3.712 [1.451]*	1.402 [0.556]*	1.554 [0.623]*	1.119 [0.553]*	1.398 [0.599]*	1.511 [0.540]**
treaty	0.935 [0.658]	0.434 [1.026]	0.939 [0.634]	1.044 [0.647]	0.769 [0.622]	0.804 [0.641]	1.042 [0.610]+
isxp2	-2.337 [0.911]*	-7.48 [2.299]**	-2.41 [0.889]**	-2.061 [0.830]*		-2.12 [0.919]*	-2.585 [0.926]**
ethnic fraction.	-2.146 [0.805]**	-4.464 [2.005]*	-1.955 [0.812]*	-2.109 [0.811]**	-2.304 [0.768]**	-2.344 [0.853]**	-2.377 [0.951]*
pre-war GDP	0.077 [0.327]	0.971 [0.586]+	0.13 [0.310]	0.092 [0.317]	0.161 [0.320]	0.091 [0.315]	0.039 [0.430]
post-war growth	0.075 [0.026]**	0.22 [0.079]**	0.076 [0.026]**	0.068 [0.026]**	0.079 [0.028]**	0.071 [0.025]**	0.077 [0.029]**
Inwardur	-0.059 [0.181]						
edagdp		0.003 [0.001]**					
Inarmy			0.036 [0.143]				
cold war				0.915 [0.484]+			
oil					-0.997 [0.432]*		
colony						0.487 [0.500]	
LACCAM							1.427 [0.694]*
MEast							1.858 [0.637]**
Asia							1.128 [0.757]
SSA							1.344 [0.893]
Constant	3.448 [2.813]	-4.436 [4.884]	2.834 [2.762]	2.887 [2.908]	2.95 [2.653]	3.101 [2.861]	2.918 [3.996]
χ^2	32.33**	25.50**	39.93**	29.11**	23.33**	31.79**	42.77**
Pseudo-R ²	0.2358	0.4978	0.2407	0.2494	0.2324	0.2416	0.2571
Observations	127	75	126	127	127	127	127

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table D.7: Strict and Lenient Partitions, Short-Term War Recurrence (2 years), Additional Explanatory Variables (second set); All Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2
part	-0.801 [1.137]		-0.743 [1.100]		-0.953 [1.255]		-0.848 [1.164]	
part2		0.236 [0.998]		0.293 [0.973]		0.119 [1.209]		0.52 [0.995]
ethnic war	1.587 [0.683]*	1.461 [0.635]*	1.43 [0.676]*	1.304 [0.631]*			1.274 [0.617]*	1.247 [0.577]*
logcost	-0.288 [0.192]	-0.322 [0.190]+	-0.296 [0.175]+	-0.329 [0.178]+	-0.3 [0.209]	-0.347 [0.226]	-0.298 [0.178]+	-0.359 [0.186]+
factnum	-0.095 [0.143]	-0.073 [0.138]			-0.14 [0.132]	-0.126 [0.135]	-0.113 [0.140]	-0.066 [0.132]
anypko	-0.29 [0.694]	-0.42 [0.737]	-0.573 [0.765]	-0.662 [0.788]	-0.914 [0.937]	-0.975 [0.935]	-0.586 [0.812]	-0.886 [0.869]
treaty	0.322 [0.658]	0.543 [0.674]	0.49 [0.654]	0.713 [0.677]	1 [0.874]	1.231 [0.973]	0.472 [0.764]	0.864 [0.765]
isxp2	-2.127 [0.925]*	-1.893 [0.989]+	-2.603 [0.872]**	-2.346 [0.911]*	-1.406 [0.766]+	-1.127 [0.824]	-1.998 [1.031]+	-1.606 [1.129]
ethnic fract.	-2.72 [1.416]+	-2.839 [1.443]*	-2.512 [1.384]+	-2.65 [1.436]+	-4.163 [1.504]**	-4.024 [1.396]**	-2.514 [1.318]+	-2.902 [1.452]*
pre-war GDP			0.882 [0.510]+	0.756 [0.494]	1.409 [0.614]*	1.251 [0.577]*		
post-war growth	0.111 [0.043]**	0.121 [0.044]**	0.131 [0.046]**	0.14 [0.048]**	0.153 [0.045]**	0.161 [0.047]**	0.12 [0.045]**	0.131 [0.048]**
post-war GDP	0.954 [0.563]+	0.809 [0.552]						
Factions			-0.124 [0.118]	-0.122 [0.113]				
FL ethnic war					2.019 [0.964]*	1.747 [0.959]+		
Electricity. consumption							0.002 [0.001]+	0.001 [0.001]+
Constant	0.404 [4.078]	1.649 [4.415]	1.068 [3.724]	2.248 [3.981]	-2.632 [4.412]	-1.131 [4.672]	6.721 [2.425]**	7.352 [2.645]**
χ^2	27.07**	26.59**	30.60**	30.07**	23.36**	22.58*	26.90**	22.89*
Pseudo-R ²	0.3602	0.3554	0.3633	0.3596	0.4100	0.4030	0.3621	0.3593
Observations	127	127	127	127	109	109	125	125

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table D.8: Strict and Lenient Partitions, Short-Term War Recurrence Alternate Version (2 years), Additional Explanatory Variables (second set); All Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2
part	-0.266 [0.872]		-0.195 [0.833]		-0.229 [0.895]		-0.368 [0.860]	
part2		0.699 [0.743]		0.766 [0.760]		0.767 [0.879]		0.827 [0.777]
ethnic war	0.715 [0.567]	0.648 [0.570]	0.693 [0.582]	0.626 [0.577]			0.605 [0.551]	0.602 [0.567]
logcost	-0.216 [0.169]	-0.255 [0.172]	-0.257 [0.159]	-0.294 [0.162]+	-0.229 [0.187]	-0.281 [0.200]	-0.223 [0.157]	-0.274 [0.165]+
factnum	-0.15 [0.173]	-0.134 [0.174]			-0.29 [0.231]	-0.268 [0.244]	-0.167 [0.178]	-0.137 [0.180]
anypko	0.502 [0.721]	0.314 [0.762]	0.151 [0.668]	-0.005 [0.695]	0.247 [0.858]	0.049 [0.902]	0.262 [0.822]	-0.011 [0.907]
treaty	0.156 [0.650]	0.406 [0.694]	0.254 [0.611]	0.499 [0.668]	0.581 [0.782]	0.934 [0.914]	0.193 [0.721]	0.547 [0.784]
isxp2	-2.782 [0.806]**	-2.619 [0.800]**	-2.852 [0.800]**	-2.662 [0.786]**	-2.535 [0.694]**	-2.344 [0.712]**	-2.769 [0.727]**	-2.526 [0.759]**
ethnic fract.	-2.452 [1.421]+	-2.622 [1.464]+	-2.667 [1.322]*	-2.846 [1.354]*	-2.937 [1.690]+	-3.014 [1.731]+	-2.271 [1.256]+	-2.617 [1.369]+
pre-war GDP			0.8 [0.322]*	0.696 [0.303]*	0.906 [0.380]*	0.799 [0.360]*		
post-war growth	0.093 [0.032]**	0.103 [0.033]**	0.111 [0.033]**	0.119 [0.035]**	0.129 [0.032]**	0.136 [0.035]**	0.102 [0.031]**	0.111 [0.033]**
post-war GDP	0.808 [0.315]*	0.696 [0.306]*						
factions			0 [0.105]	0.001 [0.101]				
FL ethnic war					1.086 [0.771]	0.898 [0.746]		
Electricity consumption							0.001 [0.001]*	0.001 [0.000]+
Constant	0.064 [3.071]	1.209 [3.213]	0.281 [3.054]	1.385 [3.137]	-0.388 [3.461]	0.885 [3.575]	5.512 [2.237]*	6.069 [2.363]*
χ^2	33.01**	33.43**	32.88**	33.60**	41.82**	38.42**	31.08**	28.69**
Pseudo-R ²	0.2996	0.3039	0.2941	0.2998	0.3355	0.3402	0.2910	0.2968
Observations	127	127	127	127	109	109	125	125

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table D.9: Strict and Lenient Partitions, No Residual Violence (2 years), Additional Explanatory Variables (second set); All Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01
part	0.772 [0.768]		0.859 [0.729]		0.836 [0.936]		0.709 [0.769]	
part2		1.371 [0.767]+		1.387 [0.757]+		1.277 [0.880]		1.407 [0.774]+
ethnic war	0.771 [0.508]	0.758 [0.505]	0.673 [0.500]	0.668 [0.501]			0.737 [0.534]	0.746 [0.535]
logcost	-0.203 [0.116]+	-0.239 [0.114]*	-0.23 [0.110]*	-0.266 [0.108]*	-0.114 [0.135]	-0.147 [0.130]	-0.21 [0.117]+	-0.251 [0.114]*
factnum	-0.237 [0.153]	-0.251 [0.150]+			-0.332 [0.171]+	-0.32 [0.174]+	-0.221 [0.162]	-0.227 [0.157]
anypko	1.563 [0.539]**	1.355 [0.560]*	1.344 [0.493]**	1.147 [0.518]*	1.883 [0.577]**	1.7 [0.613]**	1.434 [0.555]**	1.174 [0.582]*
treaty	0.595 [0.520]	0.869 [0.634]	0.679 [0.528]	0.926 [0.624]	0.467 [0.583]	0.73 [0.716]	0.608 [0.551]	0.948 [0.667]
isxp2	-2.345 [0.860]**	-2.312 [0.891]**	-2.198 [0.898]*	-2.116 [0.923]*	-1.707 [0.847]*	-1.644 [0.843]+	-2.143 [0.889]*	-2.076 [0.933]*
ethnic fract.	-2.011 [0.791]*	-2.174 [0.791]**	-1.939 [0.813]*	-2.104 [0.826]*	-1.973 [1.136]+	-2.015 [1.083]+	-2.063 [0.802]*	-2.266 [0.812]**
pre-war GDP			0.08 [0.292]	0.019 [0.299]	0.016 [0.327]	-0.034 [0.323]		
post-war growth	0.069 [0.025]**	0.074 [0.026]**	0.071 [0.025]**	0.074 [0.026]**	0.076 [0.026]**	0.077 [0.026]**	0.07 [0.024]**	0.074 [0.026]**
post-war GDP	0.164 [0.293]	0.095 [0.294]						
factions			-0.124 [0.109]	-0.119 [0.112]				
FL ethnic war					0.165 [0.674]	0.059 [0.684]		
Electricity consumption							0 [0.000]	0 [0.000]
Constant	2.321 [2.686]	3.221 [2.733]	2.876 [2.592]	3.667 [2.679]	2.521 [3.092]	3.19 [3.095]	3.475 [1.342]**	3.921 [1.317]**
χ^2	44.61**	32.54**	45.59**	35.24**	26.67**	22.20*	40.58**	31.41**
Pseudo-R ²	0.2193	0.2354	0.2130	0.2284	0.2205	0.2319	0.2167	0.2349
Observations	127	127	127	127	109	109	125	125

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Next we consider the results from Table 3 of our article adding in, individually, a third set of explanatory variables. These are: a dummy variable for the Europe and Central Asia region (*eca*), which differs from *EurNAM*, the previous geographic variable for Europe and Central Asia used in our analysis in that *eca* includes Azerbaijan and Georgia, and excludes Cyprus and the Soviet Union⁴²; a variable for the outcome of the war (*outcome2*), which captures whether the conflict was ongoing (these are dropped from the analysis), resulted in a government military victory, a rebel military victory, a treaty or settlement, or a truce, cease-fire or stalemate; and a measure of ethnic polarization from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), *ethpol*, which we substitute for the measure of ethnic factionalization (*ef*) that we had previously used. Table D.10 contains results for the *norecur2* no war recurrence dependent variable. Table D.11 contains results for the alternate *norecur2_v2* no war recurrence dependent variable. Table D.12 contains results for the *warnov2_01* no residual violence dependent variable. Each table has results for both the strict and lenient partition lists.

Our next robustness check is to re-do the analysis in Table 3 of our article dropping specific subsets of civil wars. First, we exclude all government victories (*govwin* = 1). Next, we exclude all ambiguous cases of civil war (*ambig* = 1). We also exclude all civil wars that could be considered genocides, politicides, and/or coups (*dataset* = 7 or *coup* = 1). These results are contained in Tables D.13-D.15, for the *norecur2*, *norecur2_v2*, and *warnov2_01* dependent variables, respectively. As a further check, we also run the analysis excluding individual regions one by one from the analysis. Tables D.16-D.18 contain bi-variate results for both strict and lenient partition lists, again for the *norecur2*, *norecur2_v2*, and *warnov2_01* dependent variables, respectively. Table D.19 runs the full model excluding the *EurNAM*. In a final robustness check which involves excluding a subset of civil wars from the analysis, we drop all but the first war that occurred in every country from the analysis (see note 53 in the text) and look at short-term (2-year) war recurrence and residual violence in this restricted sample in Table D.20, and long-term war recurrence in Table D.21. Due to the smaller number of observations in this sample, we bootstrap standard errors and below each present the bias-corrected confidence intervals for the coefficients of the strict and lenient partition variables in each model.

⁴² *eca* is Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Croatia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Yugoslavia (both former and Serbia).

Table D.10: Strict and Lenient Partitions, Short-Term War Recurrence (2 years), Additional Explanatory Variables (third set); All Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2
part	-0.728 [1.539]		-0.908 [1.153]		-1.31 [1.043]	
part2		0.509 [1.069]		0.229 [1.001]		0.074 [0.876]
ethnic war	1.534 [0.652]*	1.446 [0.601]*	1.562 [0.664]*	1.415 [0.614]*	1.837 [0.713]*	1.682 [0.653]**
logcost	-0.304 [0.186]	-0.354 [0.189]+	-0.315 [0.198]	-0.343 [0.195]+	-0.203 [0.157]	-0.252 [0.160]
factnum	-0.12 [0.146]	-0.106 [0.137]	-0.096 [0.144]	-0.075 [0.140]	-0.232 [0.125]+	-0.196 [0.130]
anypko	-0.411 [0.696]	-0.444 [0.733]	-0.469 [0.708]	-0.575 [0.752]	-0.598 [0.726]	-0.633 [0.732]
treaty	0.371 [0.652]	0.615 [0.666]	0.207 [0.651]	0.492 [0.675]	-0.055 [0.715]	0.171 [0.699]
isxp2	-2.597 [0.854]**	-2.306 [0.861]**	-2.687 [0.857]**	-2.328 [0.913]*	-3.707 [1.062]**	-3.254 [1.084]**
ethnic fract.	-2.689 [1.329]*	-2.919 [1.412]*	-2.7 [1.314]*	-2.841 [1.370]*		
pre-war GDP	0.945 [0.517]+	0.88 [0.515]+	0.9 [0.533]+	0.772 [0.513]	0.962 [0.526]+	0.913 [0.495]+
post-war growth	0.128 [0.045]**	0.133 [0.046]**	0.132 [0.045]**	0.139 [0.047]**	0.099 [0.040]*	0.108 [0.043]*
eca	-0.224 [1.258]	-0.943 [0.904]				
war outcome			0.156 [0.170]	0.098 [0.174]		
Ethnic polariz					-1.687 [1.560]	-1.833 [1.508]
Constant	0.752 [3.673]	1.696 [3.960]	0.877 [3.826]	2.048 [4.061]	-0.622 [3.377]	0.023 [3.277]
χ^2	28.13**	27.93**	36.00**	32.21**	31.75**	29.70**
Pseudo-R ²	0.3602	0.3595	0.3619	0.3560	0.3432	0.3305
Observations	127	127	127	127	113	113

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table D.11: Strict and Lenient Partitions, Short-Term War Recurrence Alternate Version (2 years), Additional Explanatory Variables (third set); All Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2
part	-0.215 [1.136]		-0.294 [0.867]		-0.776 [0.948]	
part2		0.91 [0.820]		0.743 [0.780]		0.42 [0.768]
ethnic war	0.702 [0.565]	0.658 [0.571]	0.701 [0.564]	0.632 [0.571]	0.852 [0.555]	0.803 [0.572]
logcost	-0.234 [0.169]	-0.282 [0.175]	-0.23 [0.182]	-0.263 [0.182]	-0.156 [0.150]	-0.194 [0.149]
factnum	-0.165 [0.174]	-0.157 [0.178]	-0.164 [0.174]	-0.152 [0.175]	-0.262 [0.142]+	-0.243 [0.144]+
anypko	0.363 [0.706]	0.262 [0.749]	0.342 [0.694]	0.162 [0.742]	0.303 [0.687]	0.176 [0.711]
treaty	0.218 [0.629]	0.483 [0.679]	0.22 [0.713]	0.535 [0.774]	-0.218 [0.597]	0.003 [0.593]
isxp2	-3.126 [0.778]**	-2.89 [0.755]**	-3.134 [0.814]**	-2.899 [0.813]**	-4.18 [1.109]**	-3.868 [1.048]**
ethnic fract.	-2.457 [1.361]+	-2.713 [1.430]+	-2.439 [1.387]+	-2.604 [1.438]+		
pre-war GDP	0.815 [0.292]**	0.76 [0.285]**	0.803 [0.310]**	0.704 [0.297]*	0.795 [0.309]*	0.757 [0.290]**
post-war growth	0.109 [0.033]**	0.114 [0.034]**	0.109 [0.033]**	0.116 [0.035]**	0.087 [0.028]**	0.095 [0.030]**
eca	-0.178 [1.014]	-0.786 [0.762]				
war outcome			-0.009 [0.271]	-0.065 [0.273]		
ethnic polariz					-0.408 [1.468]	-0.619 [1.471]
Constant	0.306 [2.996]	1.202 [3.095]	0.351 [3.078]	1.436 [3.124]	-1.183 [2.745]	-0.6 [2.636]
χ^2	35.13**	39.25**	37.79**	38.12**	33.31**	34.73**
Pseudo-R ²	0.3000	0.3069	0.2998	0.3046	0.2689	0.2662
Observations	127	127	127	127	113	113

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table D.12: Strict and Lenient Partitions, No Residual Violence (2 years), Additional Explanatory Variables (third set); All Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01
part	1.836 [1.116]		0.78 [0.815]		0.998 [1.134]	
part2		1.999 [0.971]*		1.473 [0.783]+		1.569 [0.916]+
ethnic war	0.818 [0.493]+	0.805 [0.496]	0.773 [0.507]	0.744 [0.507]	0.5 [0.509]	0.453 [0.516]
logcost	-0.232 [0.118]*	-0.26 [0.118]*	-0.207 [0.112]+	-0.236 [0.110]*	-0.134 [0.125]	-0.159 [0.120]
factnum	-0.274 [0.160]+	-0.305 [0.166]+	-0.237 [0.154]	-0.26 [0.150]+	-0.353 [0.172]*	-0.4 [0.173]*
anypko	1.794 [0.583]**	1.559 [0.615]*	1.54 [0.530]**	1.348 [0.558]*	1.384 [0.521]**	1.133 [0.519]*
treaty	0.716 [0.513]	0.964 [0.617]	0.614 [0.567]	1.007 [0.689]	0.636 [0.515]	0.917 [0.607]
isxp2	-2.311 [0.746]**	-2.226 [0.716]**	-2.413 [0.878]**	-2.287 [0.889]*	-2.959 [1.004]**	-2.901 [1.004]**
ethnic fract.	-2.137 [0.763]**	-2.338 [0.809]**	-2.024 [0.792]*	-2.166 [0.804]**		
pre-war GDP	0.271 [0.316]	0.225 [0.326]	0.134 [0.308]	0.084 [0.316]	0.396 [0.317]	0.381 [0.324]
post-war growth	0.073 [0.024]**	0.072 [0.026]**	0.072 [0.025]**	0.074 [0.027]**	0.061 [0.025]*	0.063 [0.025]*
eca	-1.927 [0.953]*	-1.766 [0.860]*				
war outcome			-0.005 [0.225]	-0.103 [0.230]		
ethnic polariz					-1.697 [1.269]	-1.903 [1.311]
Constant	1.944 [2.734]	2.679 [2.823]	2.598 [2.686]	3.443 [2.796]	0.333 [2.582]	0.857 [2.598]
χ^2	40.20**	29.60**	45.82**	33.81**	24.53**	24.65**
Pseudo-R ²	0.2336	0.2511	0.2185	0.2361	0.1837	0.2020
Observations	127	127	127	127	113	113

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table D.13: Strict and Lenient Partitions, Short-Term War Recurrence (2 years); Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	Government Victories		Excluding Ambiguous Cases		Genocides, Politicides, Coups	
	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2
part	-0.697		-0.8		-0.609	
	[1.276]		[1.111]		[1.357]	
part2		0.38		0.233		0.471
		[1.192]		[0.988]		[1.199]
ethnic war	1.082	0.874	1.307	1.133	1.287	1.084
	[0.779]	[0.716]	[0.704]+	[0.636]+	[0.862]	[0.735]
logcost	-0.337	-0.381	-0.257	-0.295	-0.437	-0.477
	[0.154]*	[0.154]*	[0.210]	[0.211]	[0.179]*	[0.176]**
factnum	-0.05	-0.014	-0.118	-0.091	-0.03	0.007
	[0.172]	[0.153]	[0.133]	[0.128]	[0.153]	[0.143]
anypko	-0.24	-0.414	-0.345	-0.419	-0.691	-0.833
	[0.753]	[0.865]	[0.693]	[0.736]	[0.763]	[0.811]
treaty	0.034	0.34	0.444	0.649	0.641	0.896
	[0.768]	[0.840]	[0.685]	[0.700]	[0.790]	[0.813]
isxp2	-2.709	-2.308	-2.691	-2.3	-2.406	-1.952
	[1.025]**	[1.103]*	[0.932]**	[0.991]*	[1.089]*	[1.123]+
ethnic fract.	-2.428	-2.556	-2.526	-2.691	-3.184	-3.398
	[1.771]	[1.975]	[1.335]+	[1.371]*	[1.606]*	[1.692]*
pre-war GDP	1.111	1.003	0.933	0.813	1.288	1.177
	[0.645]+	[0.644]	[0.507]+	[0.506]	[0.625]*	[0.625]+
post-war growth	0.159	0.168	0.118	0.127	0.149	0.158
	[0.060]**	[0.060]**	[0.041]**	[0.043]**	[0.052]**	[0.054]**
Constant	-0.084	0.928	0.002	1.138	-0.03	1.042
	[4.890]	[5.355]	[3.764]	[4.074]	[4.484]	[4.972]
χ^2	52.77**	48.52**	28.84**	29.38**	60.41**	58.97**
Pseudo-R ²	0.3680	0.3652	0.3331	0.3282	0.4249	0.4241
Observations	84	84	104	104	106	106

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table D.14: Strict and Lenient Partitions, Short-Term War Recurrence Alternate Version (2 years); Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	Government Victories		Excluding Ambiguous Cases		Genocides, Politicides, Coups	
	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur_v2
part	0.079		-0.371		0.191	
	[0.967]		[0.828]		[0.898]	
part2		1.372		0.51		1.045
		[0.997]		[0.713]		[0.851]
ethnic war	0.136	-0.057	0.511	0.443	0.129	0.053
	[0.718]	[0.737]	[0.607]	[0.622]	[0.646]	[0.647]
logcost	-0.27	-0.352	-0.175	-0.21	-0.332	-0.37
	[0.212]	[0.221]	[0.193]	[0.196]	[0.193]+	[0.199]+
factnum	-0.071	-0.023	-0.225	-0.216	-0.085	-0.073
	[0.198]	[0.215]	[0.192]	[0.194]	[0.214]	[0.234]
anypko	0.567	0.212	0.46	0.335	0.321	0.089
	[0.826]	[0.920]	[0.743]	[0.794]	[0.803]	[0.875]
treaty	0.165	0.685	0.287	0.495	0.551	0.832
	[0.787]	[0.984]	[0.681]	[0.706]	[0.743]	[0.844]
isxp2	-3.223	-2.777	-4.136	-3.868	-2.671	-2.439
	[1.209]**	[1.201]*	[1.391]**	[1.392]**	[0.965]**	[0.941]**
ethnic fract.	-3.228	-3.561	-2.1	-2.232	-2.786	-2.984
	[1.765]+	[1.947]+	[1.443]	[1.457]	[1.719]	[1.792]+
pre-war GDP	0.889	0.807	1.012	0.908	1.147	1.075
	[0.396]*	[0.384]*	[0.362]**	[0.362]*	[0.360]**	[0.355]**
post-war growth	0.138	0.15	0.107	0.114	0.125	0.133
	[0.043]**	[0.048]**	[0.032]**	[0.034]**	[0.036]**	[0.037]**
Constant	0.513	1.813	-1.802	-0.773	-1.133	-0.254
	[3.968]	[4.075]	[3.232]	[3.376]	[3.731]	[3.829]
χ^2	28.12**	29.17**	27.20**	28.68**	39.51**	43.00**
Pseudo-R ²	0.3418	0.3598	0.3090	0.3105	0.3520	0.3615
Observations	84	84	104	104	106	106

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table D.15: Strict and Lenient Partitions, No Residual Violence (2 years); Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	Government Victories		Excluding Ambiguous Cases		Genocides, Politicides, Coups	
	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01
part	0.384		0.778		1.018	
	[0.839]		[0.864]		[0.861]	
part2		0.911		1.8		1.44
		[0.721]		[0.828]*		[0.883]
ethnic war	1.211	1.169	0.845	0.888	0.812	0.841
	[0.640]+	[0.632]+	[0.638]	[0.605]	[0.626]	[0.617]
logcost	-0.18	-0.22	-0.155	-0.201	-0.231	-0.254
	[0.169]	[0.176]	[0.134]	[0.125]	[0.147]	[0.145]+
factnum	-0.151	-0.143	-0.22	-0.251	-0.099	-0.123
	[0.162]	[0.149]	[0.162]	[0.158]	[0.157]	[0.152]
anypko	1.512	1.349	1.963	1.792	1.27	1.04
	[0.633]*	[0.644]*	[0.671]**	[0.688]**	[0.651]+	[0.677]
treaty	0.077	0.341	0.256	0.566	0.702	0.937
	[0.559]	[0.613]	[0.647]	[0.766]	[0.629]	[0.731]
isxp2	-3.482	-3.325	-3.463	-3.599	-2.11	-2.105
	[1.383]*	[1.390]*	[1.310]**	[1.402]*	[0.973]*	[1.024]*
ethnic fract.	-1.081	-1.161	-2.673	-2.862	-2.783	-2.9
	[1.114]	[1.059]	[0.950]**	[0.944]**	[0.863]**	[0.895]**
pre-war GDP	0.475	0.415	0.101	-0.044	0.243	0.182
	[0.411]	[0.398]	[0.388]	[0.410]	[0.334]	[0.338]
post-war growth	0.09	0.092	0.101	0.112	0.089	0.09
	[0.030]**	[0.035]**	[0.030]**	[0.031]**	[0.026]**	[0.028]**
Constant	-0.644	0.084	2.553	4.115	1.951	2.677
	[3.658]	[3.702]	[2.965]	[3.148]	[2.743]	[2.819]
χ^2	36.18**	20.38*	27.13**	37.52**	44.09**	29.31**
Pseudo-R ²	0.2726	0.2820	0.2762	0.3040	0.2593	0.2727
Observations	84	84	104	104	106	106

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table D.16: Strict and Lenient Partitions, Short-Term War Recurrence (2 years); Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	Europe and Central Asia		Latin America and Caribbean		Excludes Middle East and North Africa		Asia (including East Asia and Oceania)		Sub-Saharan Africa	
	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2
part	-1.333		-0.892		-0.943		-0.707		-1.396	
	[0.688]+		[0.597]		[0.752]		[0.579]		[0.716]+	
part2		-0.348		-0.098		-0.168		-0.095		-0.591
		[0.649]		[0.547]		[0.683]		[0.545]		[0.696]
Constant	1.62	1.552	1.586	1.484	1.636	1.555	1.555	1.482	2.244	2.132
	[0.291]**	[0.291]**	[0.305]**	[0.304]**	[0.316]**	[0.313]**	[0.307]**	[0.308]**	[0.479]**	[0.481]**
χ^2	3.75+	0.29	2.23	0.03	1.57	0.06	1.49	0.03	3.80+	0.72
Pseudo-R ²	0.0226	0.0021	0.0152	0.0002	0.0147	0.0006	0.0090	0.0002	0.0446	0.0095
Observations	116	116	112	112	101	101	96	96	83	83

Robust standard errors in brackets
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table D.17: Strict and Lenient Partitions, Short-Term War Recurrence Alternate Version (2 years); Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	Europe and Central Asia		Latin America and Caribbean		Excludes Middle East and North Africa		Asia (including East Asia and Oceania)		Sub-Saharan Africa	
	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2
part	-0.924		-0.46		-0.525		-0.347		-0.993	
	[0.667]		[0.566]		[0.726]		[0.577]		[0.622]	
part2		0.066		0.345		0.256		0.271		-0.182
		[0.625]		[0.513]		[0.657]		[0.531]		[0.610]
Constant	1.212	1.138	1.153	1.041	1.218	1.13	1.194	1.115	1.841	1.723
	[0.241]**	[0.241]**	[0.249]**	[0.249]**	[0.260]**	[0.258]**	[0.270]**	[0.269]**	[0.364]**	[0.368]**
χ^2	1.92	0.01	0.66	0.45	0.52	0.15	0.36	0.26	2.55	0.09
Pseudo-R ²	0.0099	0.0001	0.0037	0.0027	0.0042	0.0013	0.0020	0.0015	0.0210	0.0009
Obs	116	116	112	112	101	101	96	96	83	83

Robust standard errors in brackets
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table D.18: Strict and Lenient Partitions, No Residual Violence (2 years); Civil Wars, 1945-1999

	Europe and Central Asia		Latin America and Caribbean		Excludes Middle East and North Africa		Asia (including East Asia and Oceania)		Sub-Saharan Africa	
	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01	warnov2_01
part	0.159		0.216		0.18		0.266		-0.011	
	[0.706]		[0.512]		[0.618]		[0.441]		[0.561]	
part2		1.185		0.847		0.74		0.619		0.57
		[0.682]+		[0.490]+		[0.533]		[0.402]		[0.570]
Constant	0.129	0.019	0.12	0	0.043	-0.047	0.14	0.074	0.417	0.305
	[0.222]	[0.236]	[0.241]	[0.260]	[0.232]	[0.244]	[0.225]	[0.232]	[0.312]	[0.343]
χ^2	0.05	3.02+	0.18	2.99+	0.08	1.93	0.36	2.37	0.00	1.00
Pseudo-R ²	0.0003	0.0214	0.0008	0.0176	0.0005	0.0118	0.0012	0.0086	0.0000	0.0088
Observations	116	116	112	112	101	101	96	96	83	83

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table D.19: Strict and Lenient Partitions and Short-Term Outcomes; Civil Wars, 1945-1999 excluding Europe and Central Asia⁴³

	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	warnov2_01	warnov2_01
part	-1.107 [1.300]		-0.476 [1.009]		1.126 [1.099]	
part2		0.209 [1.025]		0.661 [0.817]		2.416 [0.945]*
ethnic war	1.773 [0.689]*	1.646 [0.638]**	0.831 [0.568]	0.786 [0.585]	0.767 [0.543]	0.757 [0.533]
logcost	-0.25 [0.171]	-0.293 [0.174]+	-0.198 [0.163]	-0.24 [0.168]	-0.201 [0.122]	-0.264 [0.119]*
factnum	-0.181 [0.136]	-0.157 [0.129]	-0.214 [0.172]	-0.2 [0.172]	-0.289 [0.172]+	-0.337 [0.195]+
anypko	-0.433 [0.774]	-0.507 [0.800]	0.389 [0.772]	0.236 [0.803]	1.649 [0.550]**	1.331 [0.594]*
treaty	0.257 [0.716]	0.505 [0.714]	0.07 [0.672]	0.332 [0.700]	0.767 [0.506]	1.297 [0.669]+
isxp2	-3.207 [0.950]**	-2.983 [0.986]**	-3.633 [0.947]**	-3.485 [0.939]**	-2.36 [0.847]**	-2.224 [0.829]**
ethnic fract.	-1.924 [1.274]	-2.029 [1.269]	-1.839 [1.303]	-2.002 [1.330]	-2.022 [0.822]*	-2.378 [0.838]**
pre-war GDP	0.92 [0.510]+	0.825 [0.497]+	0.801 [0.298]**	0.726 [0.290]*	0.254 [0.319]	0.202 [0.345]
post-war growth	0.119 [0.042]**	0.127 [0.045]**	0.1 [0.030]**	0.108 [0.032]**	0.076 [0.027]**	0.085 [0.029]**
Constant	0.068 [3.625]	1.061 [3.884]	-0.196 [2.949]	0.73 [3.034]	1.782 [2.748]	2.934 [2.936]
χ^2	34.40**	35.01**	33.86**	35.15**	36.65**	39.24**
Pseudo-R ²	0.3571	0.3492	0.2917	0.2943	0.2274	0.2700
Observations	116	116	116	116	116	116

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

⁴³ The Europe and Central Asia region excluded here (*EurNAM*) consists of the following countries: Bosnia, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia (both former and Serbia). It excludes Georgia and Azerbaijan, which in this geographic set of variables are classified as being part of the Middle East and North Africa (*MEast*). Note that this differs from another Europe and Central Asia dummy variable used in Tables D.10-D.12, which includes Azerbaijan and Georgia, but excludes Cyprus and the Soviet Union (*eca* is: Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Croatia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Yugoslavia – both former and Serbia).

Table D.20: Strict and Lenient Partitions and Short-Term (2 year) War Recurrence and Residual Violence; Civil Wars, 1945-1999, First Civil Wars per Country in the Time Period Only

	norecur2	norecur2	norecur2_v2	norecur2_v2	warnov2_01	warnov2_01
part	-0.852 [1.454]		-0.336 [1.067]		1.056 [0.915]	
part2		0.409 [1.071]		0.738 [0.833]		1.53 [0.809]+
ethnic war	1.386 [0.752]+	1.226 [0.703]+	0.591 [0.658]	0.511 [0.661]	0.483 [0.611]	0.467 [0.614]
logcost	-0.345 [0.206]+	-0.375 [0.202]+	-0.248 [0.163]	-0.282 [0.167]+	-0.278 [0.123]*	-0.315 [0.122]*
factnum	-0.22 [0.172]	-0.177 [0.176]	-0.351 [0.199]+	-0.329 [0.200]+	-0.234 [0.175]	-0.252 [0.176]
anypko	-0.144 [0.771]	-0.353 [0.843]	0.889 [0.736]	0.677 [0.787]	1.477 [0.654]*	1.279 [0.696]+
treaty	0.825 [0.738]	1.078 [0.776]	0.604 [0.689]	0.846 [0.757]	1.207 [0.652]+	1.469 [0.717]*
isxp2	-3.548 [1.483]*	-3.289 [1.478]*	-2.883 [1.159]*	-2.708 [1.136]*	-1.707 [0.976]+	-1.651 [0.966]+
ethnic fract.	-2.482 [1.431]+	-2.411 [1.360]+	-2.05 [1.491]	-2.091 [1.469]	-1.337 [0.828]	-1.409 [0.862]
pre-war GDP	0.828 [0.573]	0.673 [0.507]	0.612 [0.368]+	0.52 [0.349]	-0.161 [0.374]	-0.194 [0.369]
post-war growth	0.104 [0.052]*	0.113 [0.053]*	0.094 [0.037]*	0.102 [0.038]**	0.067 [0.028]*	0.068 [0.028]*
Constant	1.937 [3.908]	3.06 [4.041]	1.769 [3.349]	2.624 [3.415]	4.905 [3.393]	5.502 [3.420]
χ^2	14.15	14.31	21.17*	21.80*	25.23**	22.29*
Pseudo-R ²	0.3326	0.3284	0.2621	0.2679	0.1800	0.2012
Observations	92	92	92	92	92	92

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Due to the small number of observations, we bootstrap standard errors, and obtain the following bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals for coefficients of the partition variables:

part (norecur2): [-15.44102, 13.22308]

part2 (norecur2): [-5.361975, 14.76886]

part (norecur2_v2): [-3.303992, 2.869741]

part2 (norecur2_v2): [-1.96989, 3.674908]

part (warnov2_01): [-1.966815, 3.490172]

part2 (warnov2_01): [-1.072137, 3.940017]

Table D.21: Strict and Lenient Partitions and Longer-Term War Recurrence (5 year); Civil Wars, 1945-1999, First Civil Wars per Country in the Time Period Only

	norecur5	norecur5	norecur5_v2	norecur5_v2
part	-1.108 [1.112]		-1.56 [1.099]	
part2		0.196 [0.990]		-0.067 [0.760]
ethnic war	0.604 [0.641]	0.557 [0.677]	0.204 [0.564]	0.134 [0.550]
logcost	-0.087 [0.147]	-0.128 [0.136]	-0.155 [0.114]	-0.191 [0.112]+
factnum	-0.486 [0.205]*	-0.435 [0.198]*	-0.44 [0.176]*	-0.378 [0.175]*
anypko	1.372 [0.901]	1.262 [0.979]	1.826 [0.717]*	1.645 [0.689]*
treaty	-0.627 [0.709]	-0.449 [0.780]	0.134 [0.657]	0.298 [0.666]
isxp2	-2.82 [1.099]*	-2.715 [1.174]*	-3.734 [1.242]**	-3.739 [1.187]**
ethnic fract.	-2.161 [1.375]	-1.95 [1.234]	-0.982 [1.078]	-0.803 [1.001]
pre-war GDP	0.383 [0.414]	0.311 [0.419]	0.652 [0.369]+	0.515 [0.345]
post-war growth	0.013 [0.042]	0.021 [0.041]	0.051 [0.026]+	0.063 [0.027]*
Constant	2.591 [3.794]	3.117 [3.734]	-0.408 [2.966]	0.591 [2.935]

Observations 92 92 92 92

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Due to the small number of observations, we bootstrap standard errors, and obtain the following bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals for coefficients of the partition variables:

part (norecur5): [-4.550324, 2.093058]

part2 (norecur5): [-2.286373, 3.580756]

part (norecur5_v2): [-4.670288, 1.60601]

part2 (norecur5_v2): [-2.234808, 2.420823]

As an additional robustness check, we look at influence statistics and drop influential cases from the analysis:

```

Logit estimates                                     Number of obs   =      127
                                                    Wald chi2(10)  =      28.46
                                                    Prob > chi2    =      0.0015
Log pseudo-likelihood = -37.748076                Pseudo R2      =      0.3552

```

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on clust2)

norecur2	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
part2	.2817113	.9729535	0.29	0.772	-1.625243	2.188665
ewars1	1.400685	.6133338	2.28	0.022	.1985724	2.602797
logcost	-.3352526	.1846079	-1.82	0.069	-.6970775	.0265723
factnum	-.0895923	.1359464	-0.66	0.510	-.3560423	.1768577
anypko	-.5658875	.7517034	-0.75	0.452	-2.039199	.9074242
treaty	.6018651	.673412	0.89	0.371	-.7179982	1.921728
isxp2	-2.277415	.9146548	-2.49	0.013	-4.070106	-.4847246
ef	-2.829326	1.380489	-2.05	0.040	-5.535034	-.1236174
lnmaddpre_i	.7837032	.5072724	1.54	0.122	-.2105324	1.777939
imaddgro	.1373242	.0472153	2.91	0.004	.0447839	.2298645
_cons	2.068487	4.041204	0.51	0.609	-5.852128	9.989102

Logistic model for norecur2

Classified	True		Total
	D	~D	
+	101	14	115
-	4	8	12
Total	105	22	127

Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5
True D defined as norecur2 != 0

Sensitivity	Pr(+ D)	96.19%
Specificity	Pr(- ~D)	36.36%
Positive predictive value	Pr(D +)	87.83%
Negative predictive value	Pr(~D -)	66.67%
False + rate for true ~D	Pr(+ ~D)	63.64%
False - rate for true D	Pr(- D)	3.81%
False + rate for classified +	Pr(~D +)	12.17%
False - rate for classified -	Pr(D -)	33.33%
Correctly classified		85.83%









Diagram 1.1





Re-estimate the model dropping Iraq.

```

Logit estimates                                     Number of obs   =      126
                                                    Wald chi2(10)   =      57.15
                                                    Prob > chi2     =      0.0000
Log pseudo-likelihood = -32.118134                Pseudo R2      =      0.4342

```

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on clust2)

norecur2	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
part2	.2626313	1.150203	0.23	0.819	-1.991725	2.516988
ewars1	1.436277	.754488	1.90	0.057	-.0424925	2.915046
logcost	-.4679568	.1653218	-2.83	0.005	-.7919815	-.143932
factnum	-.0672978	.1412991	-0.48	0.634	-.3442389	.2096432
anypko	-.7736951	.8107993	-0.95	0.340	-2.362832	.8154422
treaty	.6279866	.7707539	0.81	0.415	-.8826632	2.138636
isxp2	-2.631589	1.133113	-2.32	0.020	-4.852449	-.4107285
ef	-3.402695	1.63522	-2.08	0.037	-6.607668	-.1977228
lnmaddpre_i	1.090301	.6107868	1.79	0.074	-.1068188	2.287422
imaddgro	.1702542	.0572918	2.97	0.003	.0579644	.2825441
_cons	2.142396	4.841243	0.44	0.658	-7.346267	11.63106

We next look at models with interactions, and examine whether the fit statistics are better for these models than our original ones.

```

.
. gen partgdp=part*lnmaddpre_i
. gen partgro=part*imaddgro
(2 missing values generated)
. gen partdur=part*lnwardur
. gen partcost=part*logcost
(4 missing values generated)
. gen part2gdp=part2*lnmaddpre_i
. gen part2gro=part2*imaddgro
(2 missing values generated)
. gen part2dur=part2*lnwardur
. gen part2cost=part2*logcost
(4 missing values generated)
.
. logit norecur2 part ewars1 logcost factnum anypko treaty isxp2 ef lnmaddpre_i
> imaddgro partgdp partdur partcost partgro, nolog

```

```

Logit estimates                                     Number of obs   =      127
                                                    LR chi2(14)     =      44.01
                                                    Prob > chi2     =      0.0001
Log likelihood = -36.540127                Pseudo R2      =      0.3758

```

norecur2	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
part	15.23892	25.72085	0.59	0.554	-35.17301	65.65085
ewars1	1.817722	.8624778	2.11	0.035	.1272969	3.508148
logcost	-.334324	.1769442	-1.89	0.059	-.6811282	.0124802
factnum	-.119584	.2023318	-0.59	0.555	-.516147	.276979
anypko	-.2612524	.8074132	-0.32	0.746	-1.843753	1.321248
treaty	.3466638	.7967655	0.44	0.663	-1.214968	1.908295

isxp2	-2.833749	1.638206	-1.73	0.084	-6.044574	.3770745
ef	-2.743654	1.447155	-1.90	0.058	-5.580027	.0927181
lnmaddpre_i	1.129084	.4935406	2.29	0.022	.1617619	2.096406
imaddgro	.1219753	.0398104	3.06	0.002	.0439483	.2000023
partgdp	-1.034784	1.604314	-0.65	0.519	-4.179182	2.109613
partdur	.3850226	.748096	0.51	0.607	-1.081219	1.851264
partcost	-.6679487	1.229123	-0.54	0.587	-3.076986	1.741089
partgro	.0656136	.1256221	0.52	0.601	-.1806013	.3118285
_cons	-.2172426	3.948164	-0.06	0.956	-7.955501	7.521016

```

. test part partgdp partdur partcost partgro
( 1) part = 0
( 2) partgdp = 0
( 3) partdur = 0
( 4) partcost = 0
( 5) partgro = 0

```

```

      chi2( 5) =      2.46
    Prob > chi2 =      0.7830

```

```

. * model with interactions
.

```

```

. logit norecur2 part ewars1 logcost factnum anypko treaty isxp2 ef lnmaddpre_i
> imaddgro partgdp partdur partcost partgro, nolog

```

```

Logit estimates                    Number of obs   =      127
                                   LR chi2(14)      =      44.01
                                   Prob > chi2      =      0.0001
Log likelihood = -36.540127        Pseudo R2     =      0.3758

```

	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
part	15.23892	25.72085	0.59	0.554	-35.17301 65.65085
ewars1	1.817722	.8624778	2.11	0.035	.1272969 3.508148
logcost	-.334324	.1769442	-1.89	0.059	-.6811282 .0124802
factnum	-.119584	.2023318	-0.59	0.555	-.516147 .276979
anypko	-.2612524	.8074132	-0.32	0.746	-1.843753 1.321248
treaty	.3466638	.7967655	0.44	0.663	-1.214968 1.908295
isxp2	-2.833749	1.638206	-1.73	0.084	-6.044574 .3770745
ef	-2.743654	1.447155	-1.90	0.058	-5.580027 .0927181
lnmaddpre_i	1.129084	.4935406	2.29	0.022	.1617619 2.096406
imaddgro	.1219753	.0398104	3.06	0.002	.0439483 .2000023
partgdp	-1.034784	1.604314	-0.65	0.519	-4.179182 2.109613
partdur	.3850226	.748096	0.51	0.607	-1.081219 1.851264
partcost	-.6679487	1.229123	-0.54	0.587	-3.076986 1.741089
partgro	.0656136	.1256221	0.52	0.601	-.1806013 .3118285
_cons	-.2172426	3.948164	-0.06	0.956	-7.955501 7.521016

```

. est store A
.

```

```

. logit norecur2 part ewars1 logcost factnum anypko treaty isxp2 ef lnmaddpre_i
> imaddgro , nolog

```

```

Logit estimates                    Number of obs   =      127
                                   LR chi2(10)      =      42.15
                                   Prob > chi2      =      0.0000
Log likelihood = -37.468315        Pseudo R2     =      0.3600

```



```
.
. est store A
```

```
. logit norecur2 part2 ewars1 logcost factnum anypko treaty isxp2 ef
lnmaddpre_iimaddgro , nolog
```

```
Logit estimates                               Number of obs   =       127
                                                LR chi2(10)    =       41.59
                                                Prob > chi2    =       0.0000
Log likelihood = -37.748076                    Pseudo R2     =       0.3552
```

norecur2	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
part2	.2817113	.934756	0.30	0.763	-1.550377 2.113799
ewars1	1.400685	.7498956	1.87	0.062	-.0690839 2.870453
logcost	-.3352526	.1654071	-2.03	0.043	-.6594446 -.0110606
factnum	-.0895923	.1935326	-0.46	0.643	-.4689092 .2897246
anypko	-.5658875	.763401	-0.74	0.459	-2.062126 .930351
treaty	.6018651	.8069498	0.75	0.456	-.9797274 2.183458
isxp2	-2.277415	1.568084	-1.45	0.146	-5.350803 .7959731
ef	-2.829326	1.419376	-1.99	0.046	-5.611252 -.0473989
lnmaddpre_i	.7837032	.4400174	1.78	0.075	-.0787151 1.646121
imaddgro	.1373242	.0396493	3.46	0.001	.059613 .2150353
_cons	2.068487	3.909305	0.53	0.597	-5.59361 9.730584

```
.
. lrtest A, stats
```

```
likelihood-ratio test                       LR chi2(4) =       4.56
(Assumption: . nested in A)                 Prob > chi2 =       0.3356
```

Model	nobs	ll(null)	ll(model)	df	AIC	BIC
.	127	-58.54299	-37.74808	11	97.49615	128.7822
A	127	-58.54299	-35.46864	15	100.9373	143.6001

```
.
.
```

```
. * Second version of no war recurrence; first version of partition; no
interactions;
```

```
. logit norecur2_v2 part ewars1 logcost factnum anypko treaty isxp2 ef
lnmaddpre_i imaddgro, nolog
```

```
Logit estimates                               Number of obs   =       127
                                                LR chi2(10)    =       40.92
                                                Prob > chi2    =       0.0000
Log likelihood = -47.774674                    Pseudo R2     =       0.2998
```

norecur2_v2	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
part	-.2981942	.9264009	-0.32	0.748	-2.113907 1.517518
ewars1	.7015297	.5789107	1.21	0.226	-.4331145 1.836174
logcost	-.2310308	.1373294	-1.68	0.093	-.5001915 .0381299
factnum	-.1631107	.1862768	-0.88	0.381	-.5282065 .2019851
anypko	.3409989	.6657059	0.51	0.608	-.9637607 1.645759

treaty	.2116948	.6765691	0.31	0.754	-1.114356	1.537746
isxp2	-3.136223	1.406889	-2.23	0.026	-5.893674	-.3787716
ef	-2.443255	1.185945	-2.06	0.039	-4.767664	-.1188457
lnmaddpre_i	.8009851	.3733488	2.15	0.032	.0692349	1.532735
imaddgro	.1088778	.0329972	3.30	0.001	.0442044	.1735511
_cons	.3598732	3.216929	0.11	0.911	-5.945192	6.664939

. fitstat, saving(fit1)

Measures of Fit for logit of norecur2_v2

Log-Lik Intercept Only:	-68.233	Log-Lik Full Model:	-47.775
D(116):	95.549	LR(10):	40.917
		Prob > LR:	0.000
McFadden's R2:	0.300	McFadden's Adj R2:	0.139
Maximum Likelihood R2:	0.275	Cragg & Uhler's R2:	0.418
McKelvey and Zavoina's R2:	0.522	Efron's R2:	0.356
Variance of y*:	6.882	Variance of error:	3.290
Count R2:	0.843	Adj Count R2:	0.310
AIC:	0.926	AIC*n:	117.549
BIC:	-466.376	BIC':	7.524

(Indices saved in matrix fs_fit1)

. * Second version of no war recurrence; second version of partition; add interactions;

. logit norecur2_v2 part ewars1 logcost factnum anypko treaty isxp2 ef lnmaddpre_i imaddgro partgdp partdur partcost partgro, nolog

Logit estimates	Number of obs	=	127
	LR chi2(14)	=	47.14
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log likelihood = -44.665467	Pseudo R2	=	0.3454

norecur2_v2	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
part	77.19386	80.47046	0.96	0.337	-80.52534 234.9131
ewars1	1.115884	.6502744	1.72	0.086	-.15863 2.390399
logcost	-.2392717	.147073	-1.63	0.104	-.5275295 .0489861
factnum	-.2065323	.1956278	-1.06	0.291	-.5899558 .1768911
anypko	.5956327	.7512683	0.79	0.428	-.876826 2.068091
treaty	.1017772	.7120624	0.14	0.886	-1.293839 1.497394
isxp2	-3.894771	1.580369	-2.46	0.014	-6.992238 -.797305
ef	-2.134463	1.246352	-1.71	0.087	-4.577268 .3083406
lnmaddpre_i	.937928	.4102244	2.29	0.022	.1339029 1.741953
imaddgro	.0984634	.0330051	2.98	0.003	.0337745 .1631523
partgdp	.2282744	3.010466	0.08	0.940	-5.67213 6.128678
partdur	1.441783	1.090192	1.32	0.186	-.6949541 3.578519
partcost	-5.69731	5.171161	-1.10	0.271	-15.8326 4.437979
partgro	.7175717	.6134357	1.17	0.242	-.4847402 1.919884
_cons	-.6012337	3.327626	-0.18	0.857	-7.123261 5.920794

. fitstat, using(fit1)

Measures of Fit for logit of norecur2_v2

Model:	Current logit	Saved logit	Difference
--------	---------------	-------------	------------

```

N: 127 127 0
Log-Lik Intercept Only: -68.233 -68.233 0.000
Log-Lik Full Model: -44.665 -47.775 3.109
D: 89.331(112) 95.549(116) -6.218(-4)
LR: 47.136(14) 40.917(10) 6.218(4)
Prob > LR: 0.000 0.000 0.000
McFadden's R2: 0.345 0.300 0.046
McFadden's Adj R2: 0.126 0.139 -0.013
Maximum Likelihood R2: 0.310 0.275 0.035
Cragg & Uhler's R2: 0.471 0.418 0.053
McKelvey and Zavoina's R2: 0.718 0.522 0.196
Efron's R2: 0.400 0.356 0.044
Variance of y*: 11.647 6.882 4.766
Variance of error: 3.290 3.290 0.000
Count R2: 0.850 0.843 0.008
Adj Count R2: 0.345 0.310 0.034
AIC: 0.940 0.926 0.014
AIC*n: 119.331 117.549 1.782
BIC: -453.218 -466.376 13.158
BIC': 20.683 7.524 13.158

```

Difference of 13.158 in BIC' provides very strong support for saved model.

```

.
.
.
. * Second version of no war recurrence; second version of partition; no
interactions;
.

```

```

. logit norecur2_v2 part2 ewars1 logcost factnum anypko treaty isxp2 ef
lnmaddpre_i imaddgro, nolog

```

```

Logit estimates Number of obs = 127
LR chi2(10) = 41.50
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.3041
Log likelihood = -47.482463

```

norecur2_v2	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
part2	.7030422	.8635961	0.81	0.416	-.9895752 2.395659
ewars1	.6408054	.5793349	1.11	0.269	-.4946701 1.776281
logcost	-.2690234	.1398432	-1.92	0.054	-.5431111 .0050643
factnum	-.1441304	.1887521	-0.76	0.445	-.5140777 .2258169
anypko	.1587101	.6819025	0.23	0.816	-1.177794 1.495214
treaty	.4652567	.7106816	0.65	0.513	-.9276536 1.858167
isxp2	-2.916754	1.425199	-2.05	0.041	-5.710092 -.1234151
ef	-2.628642	1.219003	-2.16	0.031	-5.017843 -.2394404
lnmaddpre_i	.691258	.3728	1.85	0.064	-.0394165 1.421932
imaddgro	.1171228	.0340784	3.44	0.001	.0503304 .1839153
_cons	1.470717	3.275935	0.45	0.653	-4.949997 7.891431

```

. fitstat, saving(fit1)

```

Measures of Fit for logit of norecur2_v2

```

Log-Lik Intercept Only: -68.233 Log-Lik Full Model: -47.482
D(116): 94.965 LR(10): 41.502
Prob > LR: 0.000
McFadden's R2: 0.304 McFadden's Adj R2: 0.143
Maximum Likelihood R2: 0.279 Cragg & Uhler's R2: 0.423
McKelvey and Zavoina's R2: 0.535 Efron's R2: 0.362

```

```

Variance of y*:          7.068      Variance of error:          3.290
Count R2:                0.835      Adj Count R2:              0.276
AIC:                    0.921      AIC*n:                    116.965
BIC:                    -466.961    BIC':                      6.940

```

(Indices saved in matrix fs_fit1)

```
. * model with interactions
```

```
. logit norecur2_v2 part2 ewars1 logcost factnum anypko treaty isxp2 ef
lnmaddpre_i imaddgro partgdp partdur partcost partgro, nolog
```

```

Logit estimates                                     Number of obs   =       127
                                                    LR chi2(14)    =        49.97
                                                    Prob > chi2    =         0.0000
Log likelihood = -43.249269                       Pseudo R2      =         0.3662

```

norecur2_v2	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
part2	74.99964	81.42754	0.92	0.357	-84.5954 234.5947
ewars1	1.089302	.670033	1.63	0.104	-.2239382 2.402543
logcost	-.259905	.1519299	-1.71	0.087	-.5576821 .0378721
factnum	-.2165941	.2140691	-1.01	0.312	-.6361619 .2029736
anypko	.320413	.7774435	0.41	0.680	-1.203348 1.844174
treaty	.3256172	.7625766	0.43	0.669	-1.169006 1.82024
isxp2	-3.698991	1.593006	-2.32	0.020	-6.821226 -.5767566
ef	-2.359802	1.268732	-1.86	0.063	-4.84647 .1268671
lnmaddpre_i	.8283794	.4146778	2.00	0.046	.0156258 1.641133
imaddgro	.0975954	.0335789	2.91	0.004	.0317819 .1634089
partgdp	.3919092	3.042229	0.13	0.897	-5.57075 6.354568
partdur	1.415313	1.097143	1.29	0.197	-.7350474 3.565673
partcost	-5.60698	5.234537	-1.07	0.284	-15.86648 4.652523
partgro	.7052581	.620402	1.14	0.256	-.5107075 1.921224
_cons	.4630131	3.382468	0.14	0.891	-6.166502 7.092529

note: 0 failures and 8 successes completely determined.

```
. fitstat, using(fit1)
```

Measures of Fit for logit of norecur2_v2

Model:	Current	Saved	Difference
	logit	logit	
N:	127	127	0
Log-Lik Intercept Only:	-68.233	-68.233	0.000
Log-Lik Full Model:	-43.249	-47.482	4.233
D:	86.499(112)	94.965(116)	-8.466(-4)
LR:	49.968(14)	41.502(10)	8.466(4)
Prob > LR:	0.000	0.000	-0.000
McFadden's R2:	0.366	0.304	0.062
McFadden's Adj R2:	0.146	0.143	0.003
Maximum Likelihood R2:	0.325	0.279	0.047
Cragg & Uhler's R2:	0.494	0.423	0.071
McKelvey and Zavoina's R2:	0.991	0.535	0.456
Efron's R2:	0.419	0.362	0.057
Variance of y*:	350.308	7.068	343.240
Variance of error:	3.290	3.290	0.000
Count R2:	0.858	0.835	0.024
Adj Count R2:	0.379	0.276	0.103
AIC:	0.917	0.921	-0.004

```

AIC*n:                116.499          116.965          -0.466
BIC:                  -456.050         -466.961          10.910
BIC':                 17.850           6.940            10.910

```

Difference of 10.910 in BIC' provides very strong support for saved model.

We also run equality of means tests by partition status:

```

. *** Equality of means tests by partition status
.
. ttest lnaddpre_i, by(part)

```

Two-sample t test with equal variances

```

-----+-----
      Group |      Obs      Mean   Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----
          0 |      122   7.250177   .0726305   .8022301    7.106386    7.393969
          1 |       12   7.981146   .2611879   .9047813    7.406276    8.556017
-----+-----
combined |      134   7.315637   .0721268   .8349277    7.172973    7.458301
-----+-----
      diff |           -.7309691   .2454415           -1.216477    -.2454616
-----+-----

```

Degrees of freedom: 132

Ho: mean(0) - mean(1) = diff = 0

```

      Ha: diff < 0          Ha: diff != 0          Ha: diff > 0
      t = -2.9782          t = -2.9782          t = -2.9782
P < t = 0.0017          P > |t| = 0.0035          P > t = 0.9983

```

```

. ttest imaddgro, by(part)

```

Two-sample t test with equal variances

```

-----+-----
      Group |      Obs      Mean   Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----
          0 |      120   3.198059   1.061606   11.62931    1.095973    5.300144
          1 |       12  -9.78868    2.567145    8.89285   -15.43893   -4.138432
-----+-----
combined |      132   2.017446   1.042788   11.98072   -.0454375    4.08033
-----+-----
      diff |           12.98674   3.458539           6.144433   19.82904
-----+-----

```

Degrees of freedom: 130

Ho: mean(0) - mean(1) = diff = 0

```

      Ha: diff < 0          Ha: diff != 0          Ha: diff > 0
      t = 3.7550          t = 3.7550          t = 3.7550
P < t = 0.9999          P > |t| = 0.0003          P > t = 0.0001

```

```

. ttest logcost, by(part)

```

Two-sample t test with equal variances

```

-----+-----
      Group |      Obs      Mean   Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----

```


0	118	11.31778	.228267	2.479614	10.86571	11.76985
1	12	12.77416	.3236002	1.120984	12.06192	13.48639
combined	130	11.45221	.2123636	2.421318	11.03204	11.87238
diff		-1.456379	.7251786		-2.891269	-.0214894

Degrees of freedom: 128

Ho: mean(0) - mean(1) = diff = 0

Ha: diff < 0	Ha: diff != 0	Ha: diff > 0
t = -2.0083	t = -2.0083	t = -2.0083
P < t = 0.0234	P > t = 0.0467	P > t = 0.9766

. ttest lnwardur, by(part)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
0	122	3.566314	.1331066	1.470211	3.302795	3.829834
1	12	2.900696	.3280197	1.136293	2.17873	3.622663
combined	134	3.506707	.1254746	1.452473	3.258523	3.754891
diff		.6656182	.4372704		-.1993459	1.530582

Degrees of freedom: 132

Ho: mean(0) - mean(1) = diff = 0

Ha: diff < 0	Ha: diff != 0	Ha: diff > 0
t = 1.5222	t = 1.5222	t = 1.5222
P < t = 0.9348	P > t = 0.1303	P > t = 0.0652

. ttest factnum, by(part)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
0	118	3.237288	.140196	1.522919	2.959637	3.514939
1	12	3.25	.3046359	1.05529	2.579501	3.920499
combined	130	3.238462	.1300446	1.482737	2.981165	3.495758
diff		-.0127119	.4510168		-.9051256	.8797019

Degrees of freedom: 128

Ho: mean(0) - mean(1) = diff = 0

Ha: diff < 0	Ha: diff != 0	Ha: diff > 0
t = -0.0282	t = -0.0282	t = -0.0282
P < t = 0.4888	P > t = 0.9776	P > t = 0.5112

. ttest isxp2, by(part)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
0	122	.1585191	.0164118	.1812743	.1260276	.1910106
1	12	.1569967	.0450629	.1561024	.057814	.2561795
combined	134	.1583827	.0154319	.1786368	.1278591	.1889064
diff		.0015224	.0542488		-.1057872	.1088319

Degrees of freedom: 132

Ho: mean(0) - mean(1) = diff = 0

Ha: diff < 0	Ha: diff != 0	Ha: diff > 0
t = 0.0281	t = 0.0281	t = 0.0281
P < t = 0.5112	P > t = 0.9777	P > t = 0.4888

. ttest idev1, by(part)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
0	121	579.7889	91.96828	1011.651	397.6982	761.8797
1	11	932.0936	260.978	865.5662	350.5983	1513.589
combined	132	609.1477	87.22338	1002.12	436.599	781.6963
diff		-352.3047	315.287		-976.0624	271.453

Degrees of freedom: 130

Ho: mean(0) - mean(1) = diff = 0

Ha: diff < 0	Ha: diff != 0	Ha: diff > 0
t = -1.1174	t = -1.1174	t = -1.1174
P < t = 0.1329	P > t = 0.2659	P > t = 0.8671

. ttest lnmaddpre_i, by(part2)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
0	114	7.226787	.0757747	.8090529	7.076664	7.37691
1	20	7.822085	.1829518	.8181852	7.439162	8.205007
combined	134	7.315637	.0721268	.8349277	7.172973	7.458301
diff		-.5952976	.1964583		-.9839114	-.2066837

Degrees of freedom: 132

Ho: mean(0) - mean(1) = diff = 0

Ha: diff < 0	Ha: diff != 0	Ha: diff > 0
t = -3.0301	t = -3.0301	t = -3.0301
P < t = 0.0015	P > t = 0.0029	P > t = 0.9985

```
. ttest imaddgro, by(part2)
```

Two-sample t test with equal variances

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
0	112	2.631481	.9839571	10.41322	.6817045	4.581258
1	20	-1.421149	4.132168	18.47962	-10.06988	7.227577
combined	132	2.017446	1.042788	11.98072	-.0454375	4.08033
diff		4.05263	2.897793		-1.680306	9.785567

Degrees of freedom: 130

Ho: mean(0) - mean(1) = diff = 0

Ha: diff < 0	Ha: diff != 0	Ha: diff > 0
t = 1.3985	t = 1.3985	t = 1.3985
P < t = 0.9178	P > t = 0.1643	P > t = 0.0822

```
. ttest logcost, by(part2)
```

Two-sample t test with equal variances

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
0	110	11.18655	.2376511	2.492505	10.71553	11.65756
1	20	12.91337	.2746463	1.228256	12.33853	13.48821
combined	130	11.45221	.2123636	2.421318	11.03204	11.87238
diff		-1.726827	.5708303		-2.856312	-.5973417

Degrees of freedom: 128

Ho: mean(0) - mean(1) = diff = 0

Ha: diff < 0	Ha: diff != 0	Ha: diff > 0
t = -3.0251	t = -3.0251	t = -3.0251
P < t = 0.0015	P > t = 0.0030	P > t = 0.9985

```
. ttest lnwardur, by(part2)
```

Two-sample t test with equal variances

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
0	114	3.490262	.1381431	1.474965	3.216576	3.763949
1	20	3.600442	.3015174	1.348427	2.969358	4.231525
combined	134	3.506707	.1254746	1.452473	3.258523	3.754891
diff		-.1101793	.3533231		-.8090873	.5887287

Degrees of freedom: 132

Ho: mean(0) - mean(1) = diff = 0

Ha: diff < 0	Ha: diff != 0	Ha: diff > 0
--------------	---------------	--------------

t = -0.3118 t = -0.3118 t = -0.3118
P < t = 0.3778 P > |t| = 0.7557 P > t = 0.6222

. ttest factnum, by(part2)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
0	110	3.154545	.1409999	1.478819	2.875088	3.434003
1	20	3.7	.3252529	1.454575	3.019238	4.380762
combined	130	3.238462	.1300446	1.482737	2.981165	3.495758
diff		-.5454545	.3586119		-1.255029	.1641203

Degrees of freedom: 128

Ho: mean(0) - mean(1) = diff = 0

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0
t = -1.5210 t = -1.5210 t = -1.5210
P < t = 0.0654 P > |t| = 0.1307 P > t = 0.9346

. ttest isxp2, by(part2)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
0	114	.1591785	.0174386	.1861936	.1246294	.1937275
1	20	.153847	.0292991	.1310297	.0925232	.2151708
combined	134	.1583827	.0154319	.1786368	.1278591	.1889064
diff		.0053314	.043468		-.0806526	.0913155

Degrees of freedom: 132

Ho: mean(0) - mean(1) = diff = 0

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0
t = 0.1227 t = 0.1227 t = 0.1227
P < t = 0.5487 P > |t| = 0.9026 P > t = 0.4513

. ttest idev1, by(part2)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
0	113	581.5254	97.58103	1037.301	388.1811	774.8697
1	19	773.4274	174.7678	761.7951	406.2539	1140.601
combined	132	609.1477	87.22338	1002.12	436.599	781.6963
diff		-191.902	248.865		-684.2516	300.4477

Degrees of freedom: 130


```

diff |          -.2062832    .2404108          -.6815589    .2689926
-----+-----
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                t = -0.8580
Ho: diff = 0                                           degrees of freedom = 141

Ha: diff < 0                Ha: diff != 0                Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.1962          Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3923          Pr(T > t) = 0.8038

```

```
. ttest lnwardur, by(ewar2)
```

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
```

```

-----+-----
Group |      Obs      Mean   Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----
0 |      51   3.296829   .227491    1.62461     2.8399   3.753758
1 |      92   3.675586   .1365308   1.309557   3.404384   3.946787
-----+-----
combined |    143   3.540505   .1200673   1.435796   3.303154   3.777855
-----+-----
diff |          -.3787568    .2495149          -.8720306    .1145169
-----+-----
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                t = -1.5180
Ho: diff = 0                                           degrees of freedom = 141

Ha: diff < 0                Ha: diff != 0                Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0656          Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1313          Pr(T > t) = 0.9344

```

```
. tab negset wartype if dataset!=2 & dataset!=8, chi2
```

```

Did the |
war end in |
a |
negotiated | was it an ethnic or
settlement | religious war?
? |          0          1 |      Total
-----+-----+-----
0 |          37          67 |      104
1 |          10          17 |      27
-----+-----+-----
Total |          47          84 |      131

```

```
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.0199 Pr = 0.888
```

```
. tab negset ewar1 if dataset!=2 & dataset!=8, chi2
```

```

Did the |
war end in |
a |
negotiated | different coding of
settlement | 'ethnic war' (see
? | notes and supplement)
0 |          0          1 |      Total
-----+-----+-----
0 |          53          51 |      104
1 |          13          14 |      27
-----+-----+-----
Total |          66          65 |      131

```

```
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.0679 Pr = 0.794
```

As a final robustness check, we look at alternative measures of low-level violence and check with our results in Tables 3 and 4 of our article on the effects of partitions on low-level violence hold. Using the PRIO/Uppsala Conflict Database (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005, 2007; Gleditsch et al 2002), we coded a dichotomous dependent variable capturing whether there had been violence resulting in 25 to 999 deaths between the same parties to the conflict as listed in the database in the two years following the war's end (*pnomedvio2*) and in the five years following its end (*pnomedvio5*). We also coded territorial versions of this variable (*rnomedvio2* and *rnomedvio5*), which were equal to 1 if there had been violence at this level in the same country in which the civil war had been fought (if a secession occurred, we coded whether there had been such violence in the rump state and/or the secessionist state). These variables are based on essentially the same concepts as the *issend2_v2/issend5_v2* and *rend2/rend5* variables for war recurrence (see pages 23-27 of this appendix). Since our coding is based entirely on the the PRIO/Uppsala Conflict Database, so as to provide a truly alternate measure to our own *warnov2_01* variable, there many missing values of the dependent variable, making the results presented here necessarily preliminary.

Table D.22 below shows results for our two alternative measures of low-level violence for a two-year period following the end of the civil war, for all civil wars and for ethnic civil wars only. Table D.23 does the same but for a five-year period following the war's end.

Table D. 22: Partition, Alternative Measures of Residual Violence – Same Parties (2 and 5 years)

	All Civil Wars, 1945-1999				Ethnic Civil Wars, 1945-1999			
	pnomedvio2	pnomedvio5	pnomedvio2	pnomedvio5	pnomedvio2	pnomedvio5	pnomedvio2	pnomedvio5
part	2.163 [0.814]**	1.629 [0.607]**			2.263 [1.123]*	1.256 [0.715]+		
part2			2.824 [0.897]**	2.251 [0.770]**			3.964 [1.625]*	2.04 [1.020]*
ethnic war	1.084 [0.481]*	-0.064 [0.515]	0.98 [0.509]+	-0.176 [0.557]				
logcost	-0.383 [0.133]**	-0.243 [0.091]**	-0.449 [0.139]**	-0.293 [0.100]**	-0.336 [0.196]+	-0.095 [0.107]	-0.526 [0.259]*	-0.162 [0.117]
factnum	-0.037 [0.182]	-0.071 [0.179]	-0.017 [0.177]	-0.051 [0.180]	-0.051 [0.203]	-0.18 [0.212]	0.044 [0.237]	-0.155 [0.216]
anypko	-0.263 [0.568]	0.85 [0.647]	-0.535 [0.636]	0.693 [0.668]	-1.028 [0.658]	0.249 [0.853]	-1.574 [0.731]*	0.097 [0.898]
treaty	0.702 [0.535]	0.142 [0.535]	1.122 [0.689]	0.441 [0.616]	0.886 [0.747]	0.031 [0.669]	1.893 [1.257]	0.4 [0.841]
isxp2	-0.761 [1.324]	-1.726 [1.296]	-0.485 [1.404]	-1.551 [1.308]	0.125 [1.273]	-1.025 [1.430]	0.929 [1.470]	-0.812 [1.481]
ethnic fract.	-1.288 [1.158]	-0.341 [0.968]	-1.519 [1.262]	-0.515 [0.990]	-2.405 [1.501]	-0.008 [1.285]	-3.626 [1.890]+	-0.341 [1.340]
pre-war GDP	-0.105 [0.361]	0.097 [0.297]	-0.156 [0.386]	0.041 [0.307]	0.198 [0.428]	0.367 [0.320]	0.087 [0.486]	0.277 [0.349]
post-war growth	0.049 [0.021]*	0.046 [0.017]**	0.047 [0.021]*	0.047 [0.020]*	0.051 [0.025]*	0.036 [0.020]+	0.073 [0.032]*	0.042 [0.024]+
Constant	6.052 [3.620]+	2.457 [2.822]	7.082 [3.876]+	3.33 [3.012]	4.605 [4.570]	-1.068 [3.241]	7.473 [5.655]	0.179 [3.590]
χ^2	27.14**	27.23**	36.23**	23.72**	20.65*	10.78	17.86*	9.96
Pseudo-R ²	0.1926	0.1276	0.2307	0.1584	0.2090	0.0930	0.2948	0.1309
Observations	98	102	98	102	57	60	57	60

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table D. 23: Partition, Alternative Measures of Residual Violence – Same Territory (2 and 5 years)

	All Civil Wars, 1945-1999				Ethnic Civil Wars, 1945-1999			
	rnomedvio2	rnomedvio5	rnomedvio2	rnomedvio5	rnomedvio2	rnomedvio5	rnomedvio2	rnomedvio5
part	0.824 [0.791]	0.534 [0.845]			1.568 [1.046]	0.675 [0.912]		
part2			0.782 [0.725]	0.243 [0.834]			1.522 [0.893]+	0.875 [0.803]
ethnic war	-0.064 [0.520]	-1.094 [0.537]*	-0.077 [0.511]	-1.065 [0.521]*				
logcost	-0.244 [0.122]*	-0.258 [0.122]*	-0.257 [0.124]*	-0.255 [0.127]*	-0.106 [0.185]	-0.139 [0.156]	-0.147 [0.187]	-0.172 [0.170]
factnum	-0.168 [0.158]	-0.209 [0.219]	-0.162 [0.162]	-0.212 [0.217]	-0.433 [0.336]	-0.362 [0.312]	-0.41 [0.348]	-0.36 [0.333]
anypko	1.345 [0.544]*	1.933 [0.578]**	1.266 [0.595]*	1.933 [0.609]**	0.884 [0.752]	1.209 [0.731]+	0.714 [0.833]	1.093 [0.711]
treaty	-0.109 [0.562]	-0.666 [0.593]	-0.019 [0.643]	-0.69 [0.586]	0.14 [0.637]	-0.734 [0.707]	0.319 [0.790]	-0.595 [0.742]
isxp2	-2.247 [1.038]*	-2.375 [1.461]	-2.22 [1.048]*	-2.378 [1.454]	-2.987 [1.527]+	-1.794 [1.386]	-2.944 [1.596]+	-1.79 [1.417]
ethnic fract.	-1.586 [1.049]	-0.148 [1.031]	-1.669 [1.057]	-0.198 [1.036]	-3.328 [1.749]+	-0.093 [1.935]	-3.642 [1.782]*	-0.387 [1.961]
pre-war GDP	0.177 [0.292]	0.583 [0.284]*	0.175 [0.295]	0.599 [0.301]*	0.084 [0.372]	0.698 [0.344]*	0.084 [0.351]	0.644 [0.352]+
post-war growth	0.062 [0.025]*	0.04 [0.020]*	0.058 [0.023]*	0.036 [0.020]+	0.076 [0.040]+	0.041 [0.026]	0.071 [0.035]*	0.039 [0.024]
Constant	2.317 [2.658]	-1.393 [2.404]	2.486 [2.692]	-1.487 [2.616]	3.135 [4.064]	-3.634 [3.712]	3.627 [3.787]	-2.78 [4.046]
X^2								
Pseudo-R ²								
Observations	102	105	102	105	59	62	59	62

Robust standard errors in brackets

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

5. Further discussion of matching estimates

In our paper (p. 31), we report matching estimates of the effects of partition for all wars and ethnic wars only. Balance statistics are reported below.

All civil wars; strict partition list

```
Fri May 23 10:59:11 2008
Total run time : 0 hours 0 minutes and 2 seconds
> mout <- Match(Y=Y, Tr=treat, X=X, estimand="ATT", Weight.matrix=genout)
> summary(mout)

Estimate... -0.33333
AI SE..... 0.18426
T-stat..... -1.8091
p.val..... 0.07044

Original number of observations..... 127
Original number of treated obs..... 12
Matched number of observations..... 12
Matched number of observations (unweighted). 12

> mb <- MatchBalance(treat~datal$factnum,datal$treaty + datal$ef +
datal$logcost + datal$isxp2 + datal$anypk0 + datal$ewars1 + datal$imaddgro +
datal$lnmaddpre_i, match.out=mout, nboots=1000, nmc=1000, ks=TRUE, mv=FALSE)

***** (V1) datal$factnum *****
                Before Matching          After Matching
mean treatment.....          3.25              3.25
mean control.....          3.1913              3.5
mean std eQQ diff.....    0.039946              0.14583
med  std eQQ diff.....    0.021739              0.125
max  std eQQ diff  ....    0.16739              0.33333

mean raw eQQ diff.....    0.66667              0.58333
med  raw eQQ diff.....          0              1
max  raw eQQ diff.....          6              1

var ratio (Tr/Co).....    0.51234              1.75
T-test p-value.....    0.86281              0.44359
KS Bootstrap p-value..    0.097              0.223
KS Naive p-value.....    0.92101              0.51755
KS Statistic.....    0.16739              0.33333

> mb <- MatchBalance(treat~datal$factnum + datal$treaty + datal$ef +
datal$logcost + datal$isxp2 + datal$anypk0 + datal$ewars1 + datal$imaddgro +
datal$lnmaddpre_i, match.out=mout, nboots=1000, nmc=1000, ks=TRUE, mv=FALSE)

***** (V1) datal$factnum *****
                Before Matching          After Matching
mean treatment.....          3.25              3.25
mean control.....          3.1913              3.5
mean std eQQ diff.....    0.039946              0.14583
med  std eQQ diff.....    0.021739              0.125
max  std eQQ diff  ....    0.16739              0.33333

mean raw eQQ diff.....    0.66667              0.58333
med  raw eQQ diff.....          0              1
```

max raw eQQ diff.....	6	1
var ratio (Tr/Co).....	0.51234	1.75
T-test p-value.....	0.86281	0.44359
KS Bootstrap p-value..	0.085	0.21
KS Naive p-value.....	0.92101	0.51755
KS Statistic.....	0.16739	0.33333

***** (V2) data1\$treaty *****

	Before Matching	After Matching
mean treatment.....	0.083333	0.083333
mean control.....	0.33913	0.083333
mean std eQQ diff.....	0.12790	0
med std eQQ diff.....	0.12790	0
max std eQQ diff	0.25580	0
mean raw eQQ diff.....	0.25	0
med raw eQQ diff.....	0	0
max raw eQQ diff.....	1	0
var ratio (Tr/Co).....	0.36859	1
T-test p-value.....	0.014362	1

***** (V3) data1\$ef *****

	Before Matching	After Matching
mean treatment.....	0.50017	0.50017
mean control.....	0.54153	0.51567
mean std eQQ diff.....	0.084675	0.11765
med std eQQ diff.....	0.075362	0.083333
max std eQQ diff	0.21957	0.25
mean raw eQQ diff.....	0.10408	0.077833
med raw eQQ diff.....	0.0875	0.0755
max raw eQQ diff.....	0.219	0.144
var ratio (Tr/Co).....	0.6407	2.0321
T-test p-value.....	0.55311	0.76417
KS Bootstrap p-value..	0.058	0.771
KS Naive p-value.....	0.67139	0.84749
KS Statistic.....	0.21957	0.25

***** (V4) data1\$logcost *****

	Before Matching	After Matching
mean treatment.....	12.774	12.774
mean control.....	11.350	12.972
mean std eQQ diff.....	0.16143	0.11111
med std eQQ diff.....	0.13333	0.083333
max std eQQ diff	0.38623	0.25
mean raw eQQ diff.....	1.7384	0.44438
med raw eQQ diff.....	1.2475	0.42695
max raw eQQ diff.....	3.9512	0.85913
var ratio (Tr/Co).....	0.20422	1.8560
T-test p-value.....	0.0014719	0.38142
KS Bootstrap p-value..	< 2.22e-16	0.771
KS Naive p-value.....	0.078173	0.84749

KS Statistic..... 0.38623 0.25

***** (V5) data1\$ixsp2 *****

	Before Matching	After Matching
mean treatment.....	0.15700	0.15700
mean control.....	0.15959	0.22779
mean std eQQ diff.....	0.072577	0.23148
med std eQQ diff.....	0.071014	0.25
max std eQQ diff	0.18188	0.41667
mean raw eQQ diff.....	0.06686	0.10662
med raw eQQ diff.....	0.019589	0.10789
max raw eQQ diff.....	0.51408	0.171
var ratio (Tr/Co).....	0.72988	2.0136
T-test p-value.....	0.95788	0.27442
KS Bootstrap p-value..	0.157	0.183
KS Naive p-value.....	0.86487	0.24855
KS Statistic.....	0.18188	0.41667

***** (V6) data1\$anyeko *****

	Before Matching	After Matching
mean treatment.....	0.58333	0.58333
mean control.....	0.35652	0.41667
mean std eQQ diff.....	0.11341	0.083333
med std eQQ diff.....	0.11341	0.083333
max std eQQ diff	0.22681	0.16667
mean raw eQQ diff.....	0.25	0.16667
med raw eQQ diff.....	0	0
max raw eQQ diff.....	1	1
var ratio (Tr/Co).....	1.1457	1
T-test p-value.....	0.16767	0.48517

***** (V7) data1\$ewars1 *****

	Before Matching	After Matching
mean treatment.....	0.58333	0.58333
mean control.....	0.39130	0.5
mean std eQQ diff.....	0.096014	0.041667
med std eQQ diff.....	0.096014	0.041667
max std eQQ diff	0.19203	0.083333
mean raw eQQ diff.....	0.16667	0.083333
med raw eQQ diff.....	0	0
max raw eQQ diff.....	1	1
var ratio (Tr/Co).....	1.1035	0.97222
T-test p-value.....	0.23849	0.74401

***** (V8) data1\$imaddgro *****

	Before Matching	After Matching
mean treatment.....	-9.7887	-9.7887
mean control.....	2.9871	-8.8485
mean std eQQ diff.....	0.36929	0.074074

med std eQQ diff.....	0.41522	0.083333
max std eQQ diff	0.62971	0.16667
mean raw eQQ diff.....	15.193	1.5951
med raw eQQ diff.....	11.278	0.80121
max raw eQQ diff.....	56.951	10.328
var ratio (Tr/Co).....	0.57281	1.3723
T-test p-value.....	0.00034450	0.29869
KS Bootstrap p-value..	< 2.22e-16	0.979
KS Naive p-value.....	0.00036178	0.99626
KS Statistic.....	0.62971	0.16667

***** (V9) data1\$lnmaddpre_i *****

	Before Matching	After Matching
mean treatment.....	7.9811	7.9811
mean control.....	7.2334	7.9652
mean std eQQ diff.....	0.2434	0.11111
med std eQQ diff.....	0.23587	0.083333
max std eQQ diff	0.51377	0.25
mean raw eQQ diff.....	0.80002	0.33292
med raw eQQ diff.....	0.77347	0.24574
max raw eQQ diff.....	1.4925	0.8101
var ratio (Tr/Co).....	1.3078	1.3235
T-test p-value.....	0.016560	0.93823
KS Bootstrap p-value..	< 2.22e-16	0.766
KS Naive p-value.....	0.0064527	0.84749
KS Statistic.....	0.51377	0.25

Ethnic wars only; lenient version of partition.

```
> # caliper option not set to match all observations

> summary(mout)

Estimate... -0.16667
AI SE..... 0.13734
T-stat..... -1.2136
p.val..... 0.22492

Original number of observations..... 80
Original number of treated obs..... 18
Matched number of observations..... 18
Matched number of observations (unweighted). 18

> #Has balance been obtained on the variables of interest?
>
> mb <- MatchBalance(treat~data1$factnum + data1$treaty + data1$ef +
data1$logcost + data1$ixp2 + data1$anytko + data1$imaddgro +
data1$lnmaddpre_i, match.out=mout, nboots=1000, nmc=1000, ks=TRUE, mv=FALSE)

**** (V1) data1$factnum ****
                Before Matching                After Matching
mean treatment..... 3.7222                3.7222
mean control..... 3.1452                3.8889

mean std eQQ diff.... 0.09319                0.074074
med std eQQ diff.... 0.039427                0.055556
max std eQQ diff .... 0.28495                0.27778

mean raw eQQ diff.... 0.77778                0.5
med raw eQQ diff.... 1                0
max raw eQQ diff.... 3                2

var ratio (Tr/Co).... 0.86518                1.6352
T-test p-value..... 0.15388                0.3675
KS Bootstrap p-value.. 0.012                0.181
KS Naive p-value..... 0.20736                0.49098
KS Statistic..... 0.28495                0.27778

**** (V2) data1$treaty ****
                Before Matching                After Matching
mean treatment..... 0.16667                0.16667
mean control..... 0.3871                0.16667

mean std eQQ diff.... 0.11022                0
med std eQQ diff.... 0.11022                0
max std eQQ diff .... 0.22043                0

mean raw eQQ diff.... 0.22222                0
med raw eQQ diff.... 0                0
max raw eQQ diff.... 1                0

var ratio (Tr/Co).... 0.60984                1
T-test p-value..... 0.052527                1

**** (V3) data1$ef ****
                Before Matching                After Matching
mean treatment..... 0.56756                0.56756
mean control..... 0.61002                0.56928
```

mean std eQQ diff.....	0.098417	0.098485
med std eQQ diff.....	0.10036	0.055556
max std eQQ diff	0.20609	0.33333
mean raw eQQ diff.....	0.080278	0.072056
med raw eQQ diff.....	0.055	0.0315
max raw eQQ diff.....	0.188	0.211
var ratio (Tr/Co).....	0.59414	1.9243
T-test p-value.....	0.43665	0.97167
KS Bootstrap p-value..	0.236	0.185
KS Naive p-value.....	0.59404	0.27
KS Statistic.....	0.20609	0.33333

***** (V4) data1\$logcost *****

	Before Matching	After Matching
mean treatment.....	12.763	12.763
mean control.....	11.37	12.606
mean std eQQ diff.....	0.15245	0.089744
med std eQQ diff.....	0.1362	0.11111
max std eQQ diff	0.40323	0.22222
mean raw eQQ diff.....	1.5123	0.37479
med raw eQQ diff.....	1.1128	0.28205
max raw eQQ diff.....	3.9512	0.79851
var ratio (Tr/Co).....	0.23291	1.0681
T-test p-value.....	0.0016085	0.53824
KS Bootstrap p-value..	< 2.22e-16	0.673
KS Naive p-value.....	0.021426	0.76576
KS Statistic.....	0.40323	0.22222

***** (V5) data1\$isxp2 *****

	Before Matching	After Matching
mean treatment.....	0.16214	0.16214
mean control.....	0.17628	0.12349
mean std eQQ diff.....	0.084846	0.10870
med std eQQ diff.....	0.0681	0.11111
max std eQQ diff	0.23297	0.27778
mean raw eQQ diff.....	0.063056	0.050379
med raw eQQ diff.....	0.0255	0.039114
max raw eQQ diff.....	0.51408	0.23092
var ratio (Tr/Co).....	0.36065	1.7409
T-test p-value.....	0.74283	0.12893
KS Bootstrap p-value..	0.116	0.41
KS Naive p-value.....	0.43523	0.49098
KS Statistic.....	0.23297	0.27778

***** (V6) data1\$anyeko *****

	Before Matching	After Matching
mean treatment.....	0.72222	0.72222
mean control.....	0.30645	0.72222
mean std eQQ diff.....	0.20789	0
med std eQQ diff.....	0.20789	0

max std eQQ diff	0.41577	0
mean raw eQQ diff.....	0.38889	0
med raw eQQ diff.....	0	0
max raw eQQ diff.....	1	0
var ratio (Tr/Co).....	0.98331	1
T-test p-value.....	0.0022580	1

***** (V7) data1\$imaddgro *****

	Before Matching	After Matching
mean treatment.....	-3.2857	-3.2857
mean control.....	3.3522	-1.3452
mean std eQQ diff.....	0.26698	0.14744
med std eQQ diff.....	0.28047	0.11111
max std eQQ diff	0.50717	0.38889
mean raw eQQ diff.....	8.652	7.9225
med raw eQQ diff.....	8.9853	5.4223
max raw eQQ diff.....	14.277	52.947
var ratio (Tr/Co).....	2.5552	12.857
T-test p-value.....	0.14873	0.6185
KS Bootstrap p-value..	< 2.22e-16	0.091
KS Naive p-value.....	0.00077776	0.13142
KS Statistic.....	0.50717	0.38889

***** (V8) data1\$lnmaddpre_i *****

	Before Matching	After Matching
mean treatment.....	7.919	7.919
mean control.....	7.1664	7.7983
mean std eQQ diff.....	0.25211	0.18803
med std eQQ diff.....	0.27957	0.16667
max std eQQ diff	0.43907	0.44444
mean raw eQQ diff.....	0.81471	0.48605
med raw eQQ diff.....	0.8007	0.51734
max raw eQQ diff.....	1.2555	0.9492
var ratio (Tr/Co).....	0.89037	4.3457
T-test p-value.....	0.001764	0.57365
KS Bootstrap p-value..	< 2.22e-16	0.035
KS Naive p-value.....	0.0059512	0.05713
KS Statistic.....	0.43907	0.44444

Chapman and Roeder data and model

```
# Drop separation and autonomy; they are alternative and mutually exclusive
# treatments so they should not be included in the matching

Wed Oct 01 11:41:23 2008
Total run time : 0 hours 0 minutes and 2 seconds
>
> #causal effect of interest using GenMatch weights
> # caliper under .15 results in no valid matches (checked increments of .05)
> # only 1 observation matched with caliper 0.15
> # 2 observations matched with caliper 0.25
> # Even with caliper=1, only 6 treatment observations can be matched
> # To match all 7 partitions, do not set caliper
> mout <- Match(Y=Y, Tr=treat, X=X, estimand="ATT", Weight.matrix=genout)
> summary(mout)

Estimate... 0.28571
AI SE..... 0.26452
T-stat..... 1.0801
p.val..... 0.28009

Original number of observations..... 72
Original number of treated obs..... 7
Matched number of observations..... 7
Matched number of observations (unweighted). 7

> #Has balance been obtained on the variables of interest?
> # data0$separation + data0$autonomy
> mb <- MatchBalance(treat~data0$wardduration + data0$wardeaths +
data0$armedforces + data0$gdppercapita + data0$peaceoperations, match.out=mout,
nboots=1000, nmc=1000, ks=TRUE, mv=FALSE)

**** (V1) data0$wardduration ****

```

	Before Matching	After Matching
mean treatment.....	7.0238	7.0238
mean control.....	6.3833	13.131
std mean diff.....	6.7678	-64.533
mean raw eQQ diff.....	4.0357	6.1071
med raw eQQ diff.....	1	6
max raw eQQ diff.....	20	20
mean eCDF diff.....	0.080806	0.16883
med eCDF diff.....	0.069231	0.14286
max eCDF diff.....	0.20659	0.42857
var ratio (Tr/Co).....	1.4171	0.36543
T-test p-value.....	0.86787	0.32616
KS Bootstrap p-value..	0.824	0.424
KS Naive p-value.....	0.9502	0.54124
KS Statistic.....	0.20659	0.42857

```
**** (V2) data0$wardeaths ****

```

	Before Matching	After Matching
mean treatment.....	13.866	13.866
mean control.....	11.664	13.751
std mean diff.....	198.42	10.351
mean raw eQQ diff.....	2.4787	0.14066
med raw eQQ diff.....	2.0255	0.07961

max raw eQQ diff.....	6.0231	0.32208
mean eCDF diff.....	0.31916	0.076923
med eCDF diff.....	0.35055	0.14286
max eCDF diff.....	0.51868	0.14286
var ratio (Tr/Co).....	0.20456	0.8097
T-test p-value.....	0.00085761	0.43538
KS Bootstrap p-value..	0.032	1
KS Naive p-value.....	0.066728	1
KS Statistic.....	0.51868	0.14286

***** (V3) data0\$armedforces *****

	Before Matching	After Matching
mean treatment.....	0.20153	0.20153
mean control.....	0.40562	0.11853
std mean diff.....	-91.654	37.274
mean raw eQQ diff.....	0.55864	0.098714
med raw eQQ diff.....	0.013	0.0293
max raw eQQ diff.....	3.4	0.237
mean eCDF diff.....	0.089307	0.16667
med eCDF diff.....	0.071429	0.14286
max eCDF diff.....	0.27473	0.28571
var ratio (Tr/Co).....	0.099263	3.7004
T-test p-value.....	0.10633	0.21510
KS Bootstrap p-value..	0.56	0.87
KS Naive p-value.....	0.72679	0.9375
KS Statistic.....	0.27473	0.28571

***** (V4) data0\$gdppercapita *****

	Before Matching	After Matching
mean treatment.....	3.0429	3.0429
mean control.....	1.8928	3.017
std mean diff.....	33.587	0.75513
mean raw eQQ diff.....	0.53614	0.084143
med raw eQQ diff.....	0.328	0.054
max raw eQQ diff.....	1.652	0.23
mean eCDF diff.....	0.10213	0.059524
med eCDF diff.....	0.096703	0
max eCDF diff.....	0.23297	0.14286
var ratio (Tr/Co).....	2.9047	0.99212
T-test p-value.....	0.41417	0.8025
KS Bootstrap p-value..	0.769	1
KS Naive p-value.....	0.8827	1
KS Statistic.....	0.23297	0.14286

***** (V5) data0\$peaceoperations *****

	Before Matching	After Matching
mean treatment.....	0.71429	0.71429
mean control.....	0.38462	0.71429
std mean diff.....	67.562	0
mean raw eQQ diff.....	0.28571	0
med raw eQQ diff.....	0	0

max raw eQQ diff.....	1	0
mean eCDF diff.....	0.16484	0
med eCDF diff.....	0.16484	0
max eCDF diff.....	0.32967	0
var ratio (Tr/Co).....	0.99048	1
T-test p-value.....	0.13125	1

Before Matching Minimum p.value: 0.00085761
Variable Name(s): data0\$wardeaths Number(s): 2

After Matching Minimum p.value: 0.21510
Variable Name(s): data0\$armedforces Number(s): 3

6. How Durable Is the Peace? Long-term effects of partition

The analysis in the text is based on a two-year assessment of the effects of partition. The results for the two-year period also apply to a five-year period after the end of the war. Perhaps partition has different effects if an even longer perspective is used. In this section we use survival analysis to analyze the duration of the peace. Survival models estimate the “hazard” (or risk) of peace failure at time t given that failure has not occurred until then and can account for right-censoring (the fact that the peace has not failed up to the end of analysis time though it might fail afterwards). The dependent variable (*peace duration*) is measured in months from the end of the war until the peace fails or we stop counting (at the end of December 1999). Peace failure implies war recurrence, which is understood in the same way as in the short run analysis.

Out of 131 peace processes that started before 1999 (ongoing wars are dropped), there are 62 peace failures (*peacend*) with a median duration of 71 months. The longest peace duration in the dataset is 634 months (following a small civil war in Taiwan in 1947). Failures cannot occur at zero months, but there are several failures of the peace in the first month. As in the short-run analysis, we focus on the effects of partition and not on other variables. Out of 12 “strict” partitions, there are 6 peace failures (56 failures among non-partitions). The median peace duration (up to the censoring point) for partitions is 49.5 months and for non-partitions it is 72 months. Out of 20 “lenient” partitions, there are 8 peace failures (54 among non-partitions). The median peace duration for partitions is 55.5 months and for non-partitions it is 72 months.

We start by using a Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) model, which is a better initial choice than the more frequently used Weibull model or other parametric hazard models. The Cox model gives the hazard rate for the i 'th individual as $h_i(t)=h_0(t)\exp(\beta'x)$, where h_0 is the baseline hazard rate and $\beta'x$ are the estimated coefficients and covariates. It assumes a proportional hazard rate and utilizes the ordered duration times to derive estimates for the regression covariates. We test the proportional hazard assumption after each regression and if it is not satisfied, we shift to another model. A Weibull model would be appropriate if the hazard rate is monotonically increasing or decreasing. If results from a Weibull model are presented in the table below, this is because the PH assumption was rejected.

Our dataset includes several different measures of peace duration, each corresponding to a slightly different list of recurring wars since it is difficult to determine which wars are recurred and which are new. For example, after the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949, in one list we code civil war as recurring with the re-annexation of Tibet in 1950 and in the other list the peace fails much later (after 216 months), in 1967 with the Red Guards war. In the case of Pakistan after the Bangladesh war of independence in 1971, we code peace duration of 337 months (the peace does not fail) and in another list, we consider the Baluchistan rebellion somehow connected to the 1971 war, so we code a peace failure after 13 months. These are obviously important differences and since reasonable arguments can be made in favor of all the lists, we tried several different ways to code ambiguous cases, and tried several lists of peace duration.

The different lists can be found in our replication dataset and readers can confirm that the conclusions that we discuss here do not rely on a specific way of coding an ambiguous case. (The other two versions of the peace duration variable that we tried include 64 failures out of 130 cases with median peace duration of 68 months and 53 failures out of 118 cases with median peace duration of 85 months, respectively.)

Below we show results from a model of war recurrence that controls for deaths and displacements (in logs), the type of war (ethnic or not?), whether a peace treaty was signed, the number of factions, the level of ethnic fractionalization (using Fearon's 2003 index), per capita income at the start of the war, and commodity dependence (measured as primary commodity exports as a percent of GDP). We also control for all peace operations because in cases of partition, especially *de facto*, the peace may be held together by peacekeepers separating the parties. There have been seven cases of partition with a peace operation, three of which had consent-based UN missions. Since we observe peace transitions that start at different times, we also control for the decade the peace started since cases where the war ended have a longer time to fail (this is a left truncation problem that arises in our data). We also checked that the results do not change if we add a control for the time elapsed from January 1945 (the start of the dataset) to the end of the war. (Results on the peace decade variables are omitted.)

The table below includes the results. Column 1 presents results based on a model that controls for the strict list of partition and column 2 for the lenient list of partitions.

Partition is never statistically significant in any of these models or with the other two versions of the peace duration variable. The fact that partition is not significantly correlated with lasting peace does not change if we control for other factors, such as war outcomes (truces and victories). Readers can confirm this using our replication dataset that the results on partition do not change qualitatively if we control for war outcomes (whether the war ended in a victory or in a truce). Readers can also confirm that other versions of the partition variable do not perform better, including "good" partitions (defined by Johnson 2008 as having achieved a substantial degree of ethnic separation).

Correlates of the Risk of Peace Failure; Weibull Regression

Reported: hazard ratios & coefficient robust standard errors; bold indicates significance at the 0.05 level

	1	2
Partition (strict)	1.67 (0.97)	-- --
Partition (lenient)	-- --	1.15 (0.60)
Ethnic War	1.10 (0.44)	1.12 (0.45)
Dead & Displaced (log)	1.12 (0.08)	1.13 (0.09)
Number of Factions	1.14 (0.14)	1.12 (0.14)
Any peacekeeping	0.42 (0.21)	0.42 (0.21)
Signed Treaty	1.40 (0.47)	1.31 (0.46)
Real GDP (log)	0.66 (0.11)	0.65 (0.11)
Primary Commodity	5.74 (3.34)	5.22 (3.33)
Exports/GDP		
Ethnic fractionalization	4.15 (2.44)	4.08 (2.44)
<i>Decade controls omitted</i>	--	--
Observations	127	127
Number of failures	59	59
Log pseudo-likelihood	-153.05	-153.05
Wald chi2 (14)	87.34	87.34

As in the logistic regressions of war recurrence two and five years after the end of the war, the strongest result is that local capacities are key determinants of peace duration. Local capacity variables now take away some of the effect of the hostility variables which seemed to matter for the shorter term. Countries with higher levels of income going into the war are more likely to return to stability (we get similar results using measures of the early postwar economic growth but do not show these results here since this is not central to the key question of our paper). Ethnic fractionalization has a strong negative effect on peace duration, as in the short-run models. This finding revises earlier results by Sambanis (2000), which were based on a different measure of ethnic heterogeneity.

This basic picture does not change much if we use different datasets.

We find concurring evidence using Fearon's (2004) data, which is based on a very different list of civil wars (103 wars with 29 peace failures over the same period).

Fearon's data are unusual in that they include several wars of decolonization from the major European powers (for example, there are 6 civil wars coded in France). These cases are interesting because they all technically result in partitions as the colonists left the territories where the civil war took place and in all cases there is no new war between the former colonies and the European colonist.⁴⁴ In many former colonies, a civil war takes place over capture of the central government in the post-colonization period. Thus, depending on whether or not these wars are coded as war "recurrences," including cases of decolonization wars in the data could lead us to different conclusions with respect to the consequences of partition. We do *not* code cases of war in newly decolonized countries as war recurrences, consistent with a conservative interpretation of the concept of war recurrence (i.e. Walter's 2004 definition). There are 13 anticolonial wars in Fearon's dataset and peace does not fail after any of these wars are concluded. We only code a recurrence of war if Fearon's description of the cases warrants it, otherwise we consider subsequent wars as new. So, for example, we consider Fearon's three wars in Pakistan as new wars and compute peace durations until the end of 1999 in each case. We do the same for Russia (except for the Chechnyan wars), Indonesia (except for Darul Islam and Aceh) and so on.

We only present results from bivariate regressions here because Fearon's dataset does not include the same set of controls that we used in the regressions using our data. However, the picture emerging from these bivariate regressions does not change substantively if we add controls for deaths due to the war, per capita income, the country's polity score, population size, and ethnic fractionalization (regressions with these controls are included in the master do-file in our replication folder).

Neither strict nor lenient partition have a significant effect on peace duration using Fearon's data (columns 1 and 2 respectively in the table below), except if we code cases of decolonization as partitions (columns 3 and 4, respectively), in which case partitions prolong peace duration substantially. These decolonization cases are never considered as partitions in the literature (none of these cases is included in Kaufmann's list, for example). They are special cases in many respects, in that the former imperial metropolises in Europe no longer had any claims on the territory of their former colonies largely as the result of a normative change against colonialism in the aftermath of World War II. Moreover, former colonies with few resources and little military strength could not threaten their former metropolises, particularly since large oceans separated them. So,

⁴⁴ Including so many cases of decolonization war to the data introduces a problem of cross-sectional dependence between cases of war in the same colonial power. A related problem of left censoring arises in Fearon's data because new countries are created only if and when they succeed in their independence struggle. These countries typically enter the dataset later than non-colonies and therefore have different exposure risk, and this is directly related to the process we are studying.

the challenges of preserving peace following civil wars with partitions do not apply well to these cases. Moreover, many of these new states became quickly immersed in new civil wars within a few years of independence and these wars are not considered war recurrences here.

Partition and War Recurrence (Fearon 2004 data)

Reported are hazard ratios & coefficient robust standard errors; Bold indicates significance at the 0.05 level

	1	2	3	4
Strict partitions only	2.15 (1.32)	--	--	--
All partitions (lenient)	--	1.34 (.82)	--	--
Strict partitions plus cases of decolonization	--	--	.29 (.17)	--
Lenient partitions plus cases of decolonization	--	--	--	.24 (.14)
Observations	103	103	103	103
Number of failures	29	29	29	29
Log pseudo-likelihood	-120.00	-120.69	-117.35	-116.25
Wald (d. f.)	1.55	0.23	4.58	6.10

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